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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the development of the Home Affairs policies of the New Labour 
Government (1997-2010) – specifically in the areas of counter-terrorism, policing, and 
immigration. Much of the most significant research on this government has focussed on 
political economy or politics in general. The Home Affairs agenda has been largely ignored 
and has only ever been dealt with in the context of civil liberties and the government’s 
apparent proclivity towards authoritarianism. This thesis fills this lacuna and does so from a 
unique perspective of the researcher as a former Home Office minister.  
It focusses on both how policy is devised, developed, and implemented, and the role of 
ministers at each stage of the decision-making process. These themes are explored through the 
analysis of three key case studies: the development of a points-based system of immigration 
for non-European Union migrants;  the proposal to merge the 43 police forces in England and 
Wales into 12-15 strategic forces; and the development of pre-charge detention in counter-
terrorism legislation. 
Each area is analysed in the context of rational choice theory, historical institutionalism, and 
an interpretivist approach. The relevance of these theories to an understanding of the 
development of policy in the real world is discussed from the perspective of an insider. It 
considers the historical context of each area, how each policy was formed, and the ultimate 
success or failure of the implementation process. The empirical analysis includes interviews 
with over 45 participants in these events at the time, among them, former ministers, including 
cabinet minister, former civil servants, policy officials and special advisers.  
The thesis contextualises these Home Affairs policy choices within the New Labour project 
in general and within the specific experience of government. It makes a hitherto unique 
contribution to political science since it represents a rigorous academic assessment and 
analysis of key policy areas by an active participant in the events described and analysed. It 
examines the key factors that inform both policy decision-making and the role of ministers 
from this dual perspective and argues that policies fail because so little regard is given to the 
factors that are afforded importance in an interpretivist approach.   
Memoirs abound, but this thesis uses the insider’s perspective and an interpretivist approach, 
to make a substantive contribution to the field of UK politics and public policy by arguing that 
policies fail unless the ‘understandings, beliefs and practices’ of all the actors are understood 
and clear policy narratives are established.   
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Introduction 
Politics is about policy and position. Politics is about choice – but to make the choices 
you have to be a participant. Politics is about decisions - decisions that are made in the 
hurly-burly world of a multi-faceted, multi-layered, and multi-dimensional 
freneticism. Politicians have little time to stand still and reflect, little time to fully 
digest the complexities of the decisions they have to make, and little time to understand 
either the enormity or mundanity of these decisions.  
Political decisions such as these are not made in laboratories, classrooms, lecture 
theatres or seminar sessions. Politicians seldom have the luxury of the academic – 
time. There is little or no time for introspection, reflection or thought. Former Home 
Secretary, Jacqui Smith,1 related that 
I think one of the shocks of ministerial life is the speed with which decisions need to be taken. 
One of the shocks is the amount of paper…reading…general information and submissions that 
you need to process and the speed at which you need to do it. 2 
Ministers have to struggle to make time to learn - the work of the department does not 
stop just because there is a new minister in the department. John Healey3, who held 
five various ministerial roles during the 1997-2010 government stated that 
I had no training beforehand, no training after, no support after and I had a big, fat lever arched 
file prepared by the department for new ministers which I never got to read.4 
One of their first struggles will be to find room in the diary to go through the diary. 
Ministers have to find their feet very quickly – the machinery of government will roll 
on and over the minister if they do not assert themselves and do so quickly. New 
ministers seldom talk to their predecessors at any length. Some might see it as a sign 
of weakness, but I suspect the truth is that ministers who have moved on to new jobs 
are too busy to look back and ministers who have been sacked feel less than generous 
towards the people who have replaced them. Smith answered ‘Not really’ when asked 
                                                 
1 Smith was the MP for Redditch from 1997-2010 
2 Institute for Government (2016) Transcript, Jacqui Smith, June 2016, Ministers Reflect Archive, 
Institute for Government, Online: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ministers-
reflect/person/jacqui-smith/ p.3 
3 Healey is the MP for Wentworth and Dearne and has been since 1997 
4 Institute for Government (2016) Transcript, John Healey, May 2016, Ministers Reflect Archive, 
Institute for Government, Online: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/ministers-
reflect/person/john-healey/ 
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if she had any handover with Charles Clarke,5 her predecessor as Home Secretary.6 
She continued that ‘the challenge … is that if you are promoted or reshuffled into 
another ministerial job, you yourself then have all the challenges of that. So equally, I 
often didn’t talk to the people who came into a job after me.’7  
The only time I had substantive handovers with successors was when I stayed in the 
same department but moved roles – as I did at Transport and the Home Office.8  
Whatever the situation, ministers have to find out what their role is in the department 
and how they fit in to the decision making and policy making processes. 
The thesis will attempt to show that the academic can be a politician, and the politician 
can be an academic, and that both worlds can benefit from an academic analysis which 
takes account of role of the participant – Roosevelt’s ‘man in the arena’.9  If it is the 
case that these two worlds co-exist in a state of mutual misunderstanding or, indeed, 
no understanding at all, then both will suffer as a consequence.  
It focuses on the role of ministers, in general and their role in the policy and decision-
making processes of government in particular. We need to understand the varied roles 
of the government minister in all their complexity to comprehend politics and then 
understand the processes of policy development and decision-making, and the 
ministerial role within them. Ministers are very important to the smooth running of 
government and central to governmental decision-making. Ministers may appear all-
powerful decision-makers but may feel anything but. As Barber puts it: 
From the outside people at the heart of government look all-powerful; on the inside they often 
felt helpless, stretched to and beyond breaking point by the weight of expectations on the one 
hand and the sheer complexity and difficulty of meeting them on the other.10  
The central research problem is why do policies fail? Why do governments in general 
and politicians in particular invariably fail in policy terms? The key dependent variable 
in this study are the policies themselves – as represented by the three key areas of 
                                                 
5 Clarke was the MP for Norwich South from 1997-2010 and Home Secretary from 2004-2006. 
6 Institute for Government (2016) Transcript, Jacqui Smith. Op.cit. p.4 
7 Ibid. p.4 
8 See Appendix Two for the full history of my ministerial roles.  
9 Roosevelt, Theodore (1910) ‘Citizenship in the Republic’ Speech delivered at the Sorbonne Paris, 
France April 23, 1910 (“The Man In The Arena”) 
http://design.caltech.edu/erik/Misc/Citizenship_in_a_Republic.pdf Downloaded 13-2-15 
10 Barber (2015) How to Run a Government: So that Citizens Benefit and Taxpayers Don’t Go Crazy 
Allen Lane Penguin London p.xiii 
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Home Affairs policy under discussion. The key task is to look in detail at each of the 
case studies and then compare across the three experiences to find some common 
ground. Central to this analysis is the insider perspective and how the rich description 
and analysis of such a perspective can advance our understanding of these processes, 
not just in terms of policy development but also an evaluation of the success or failure 
of the policy. 
This first chapter looks at the world of government ministers and how they have been 
considered by scholars thus far. It discusses the literature on the role of ministers, the 
historic need for balance in cabinets, the turnover of ministers and the, until recently, 
dominance of cabinet ministers in the literature. It looks at how ministers have used 
memoirs, diaries, autobiographies and journalism – and the usefulness of these tracts.   
The second chapter looks at the theoretical context of the thesis and elaborates on the 
three theoretical approaches that are utilised to discuss and analyse the role of 
ministers and the internal processes of government. As Bevir would have it, social 
scientists often employ two broad, dominant ways of studying politics.11 One – 
rational choice theory – offers an “abstract general theory of more or less universal 
scope from which other theories or hypotheses could then be deduced, applied and 
tested.” The other – new institutionalism – looks at a ‘set of theoretical ideas and 
hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political 
agency, performance and change.’12 The chapter looks at such phenomena in the 
context of correlations and typologies focussing on institutions, the impact of 
institutions on individuals and also the interaction between individuals and 
institutions.13  
Given that the researcher is also a participant in the events under discussion, the work 
of the interpretivist school will also be of particular interest.14 As Bevir et al would 
have it, interpretivists  
                                                 
11 Bevir, Mark (2006) ‘Political Studies as Narrative and Science 1880-2000’ Political Studies Vol.54 
pp583-606 p. 594-595 
12 March, James G and Olsen, Johan P (2006) ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”’ in Rhodes, Rod, 
Binder.Sarah and Rockman, Bert (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions Oxford 
University Press, Oxford pp. 3-21 p.4. See also March, James G and Olsen, Johan P (1984) ‘The New 
Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life” American Political Science Review Vol.78 
No.3 pp.734-749 
13 Bevir (2006) Op.cit. pp.594-595 
14 See for example - Rhodes, Rod A.W. (2005) ‘Everyday Life in A Ministry: Public Administration as 
Anthropology’ American Review of Public Administration Vol.35 No.1 March 2005 pp.3-25 p.5; Bevir, 
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…conceive of individuals not as passive supports of institutions or discourses but as agents 
who can modify inherited norms and languages for reasons of their own … [and] conceive of 
agency as inherently situated.15 
Central to such an approach is an understanding of the data and events that make up 
the narratives relating to the role of ministers and the processes they are involved in 
and that ‘… agency always occurs against a particular historic background.’16 Far too 
often, this approach has been overlooked but will be central to this thesis. It will further 
be argued that the perspective of a minister – an active participant in government – is 
very different from the perspective highlighted in the ethnographic, interpretivist 
research of Bevir and Rhodes and can therefore offer insights that both complement 
and go beyond their ground-breaking work.17 This chapter will also consider the policy 
failure literature and how this may inform the analysis of  policy and decision making. 
More broadly, the thesis will look at the use and usefulness of academic theory to the 
world of politics.  
The third chapter details the methodological context and research design of the thesis. 
The research design comprised case studies, cross-case analysis and elite interviews. 
Each of the case studies relate to various aspects and events that occurred during the 
life of the last Labour Government 1997-2010. By using case studies that I was 
involved in,  I am providing ‘constructions of my own and other people’s constructions 
of what I and my compatriots were up to’.18 They are also case studies that have 
continuing relevance to and influence on the UK’s politics today 
The chapter summarises how effective case studies can be in helping to explain the 
phenomenon of agency and the events that ministers are involved in. After discussing 
the use of case studies, the chapter looks at the issues presented by interviewing elites 
as over forty-five of the participants in the events discussed in the case studies have 
been interviewed. The interviews were with a range of my colleagues at the time – 
                                                 
Mark and Rhodes, Rod A.W. (2006) Governance Stories Routledge Abingdon Oxford; Rhodes, Rod 
A.W. (2011) Everyday Life in British Government Oxford University Press Oxford 
15 Bevir, Mark Daddow, Oliver and Hall, Ian (2013)‘Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy’ 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 15, pp.163-174 p.167 
16 Ibid p.167 
17 See in particular Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, Rod A.W. (2008) ‘The Differentiated Polity as Narrative’ 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 10 pp.729-734 ; Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, 
Rod A.W. (2009) ‘Decentering Policy Networks: A Theoretical Agenda.’ Public Administration Vol. 
87 No. 1 pp.3-14; Bevir, Mark and Rhodes, Rod A.W. (2010) The State as Cultural Practice Oxford 
University Press Oxford 
18 Rhodes, Rod A.W. (2008) ‘Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture 2008: ‘Scenes from the Departmental 
Court’ Public Policy and Administration Vol. 24 No.4 pp.437-456. 
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departmental officials, police, policy advisers as well as a range of very senior 
politicians – and with politicians, journalists and academics beyond the department 
whose insights will be of value in informing the development of the narratives for each 
of the case studies.  
The thesis also uses a range of public sources – the media, academic works, journals 
and books, general political output, Hansard, political journalism, blogs and other 
public records – to help recreate the narratives necessary to explain and understand 
the case studies. It looks at some important aspects of policy formulation and framing 
theory as they relate to the research design before returning to the notion of 
interpretivism and ethnography.   
Chapter four contextualises the home affairs agenda within the broader New Labour 
project. Much of the academic literature on the New Labour government under 
discussion concentrates more on the wider theme of political economy, and home 
affairs is a much more secondary consideration. More has been written and discussed 
on foreign affairs, as Daddow contends. He maintains that   
… the defeat of New Labour in 2010 has ‘encouraged reflection on the conceptual 
underpinnings – the ‘big ideas’ – that drove the execution of Britain’s external policy over the 
longue durée of its 13 years in office’19 
Hoyle and Rose noted in 2001 that an ‘objective analysis of Labour’s record in office 
across the whole field of criminal justice has been  noticeably lacking’20 and this 
remains the case nearly twenty years later – across the whole range of issues in the 
Home Office not least the subjects of the case studies  – immigration, policing and 
counter-terrorism. The chapter will put the New Labour government into the broader 
historical context and show how home affairs became an area of ‘contested terrain’ 
during this period.  
Chapters five, six and seven develop the narratives and analyses for each of the case 
studies, including the use of the results from the interviews carried out and my own 
recollections as a participant.  The case studies concern events taking place under the 
                                                 
19 Daddow, Oliver (2011) ‘“Character is Destiny”: Tony Blair’s Foreign Policy Leadership’ 
International Studies Review Vol. 13, pp.342-344 p.342 
20 Hoyle, Carolyn and Rose, David (2001) ‘Labour, Law and Order’ Political Quarterly Vol.72 No.1 
pp.76-85 p.76 
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Labour Government during the period 2005 to 2008. Whilst the broad subject of each 
case study is immigration, policing and counter-terrorism, they specifically focus on 
the development of a point-based system for immigration; the police force mergers 
policy of reducing 43 forces to 12-15 forces; and the introduction of a pre-charge 
detention period of up to 42 days for terrorists. It will look at how each policy was 
formulated, what evidence was offered to support the range of options considered and 
what was their success or otherwise.  
The case studies exhibit varying degrees of Government success and failure. I shall 
argue that the points-based system for immigration was the appropriate policy option 
but ended up being the right answer to the wrong question. It suffered because of the 
government’s own confusion over its narrative. The police forces merger policy was 
entirely the correct policy option, the right answer to the right question, but a political 
failure because the ground had not been properly prepared both internally and 
externally. The introduction of a 42-day limit for pre-charge detention was the wrong 
policy answer to the wrong policy question and a complete fiasco. The government 
had already addressed the legislative issue and had significantly advanced its counter-
terrorism policy in all other areas.  
Chapter eight provides a more general analysis across the case studies  and summarises 
the thesis’s conclusions. The thesis makes a theoretical contribution to political 
science and our understanding of both how government works and how ministers work 
within government.  
It makes use of existing political science theory, in particular an interpretivist 
approach,  and the policy failure literature, to advance an understanding of how politics 
works that has practical relevance to today’s politics as well as to a greater 
understanding of the New Labour government. 
17 
 
Chapter One 
‘Ministrables’: a diminishing pool of decision-makers  
Decisions, decisions, decisions 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at how the academic literature has dealt with the 
subject of government ministers to date. It discusses what we know and how we know 
it from both an academic perspective and from the standpoint of former ministers and 
officials. It then goes on to consider how this thesis goes beyond this literature and 
uses my unique position as researcher and participant to ensure that this thesis adds to 
academic knowledge and understanding. 
A fellow minister once declared to me that he ‘loved being a Minister, but the only 
thing that spoilt it was all those bloody decisions.’21 He was actually a good minister 
but given that much of ministerial life is to do with making decisions, this struck me 
as a strange thing to say. I have known university lecturers who could not stand 
teaching and more than one ‘man of the cloth’ who had only a passing interest in 
theology or God, but I simply could not understand why a politician would resist the 
satisfaction of making decisions. King argues that: 
Ministers decide. That continues to be the bedrock doctrine underlying the whole of Britain’s 
governing arrangement… ministers are free, within the law, to do pretty much whatever they 
like – and if they dislike the law enough, they can usually change that to.22 
Decisions are essential to the smooth running of each government department. 
Decisions allow the work of government to flow freely – and all substantial and 
significant decisions can be tracked back to a minister. For those who are only familiar 
with the UK model of government, this would seem to be a normal state of affairs. It 
may be that King not only overplays the complete freedom of ministers but also 
underplays the other forces that influence them. 23 However, his description does, to 
some small degree, reflect my experience as a minister. I would, though, suggest that 
those ‘other forces’ deserve greater scrutiny, for they are varied, ever-changing and 
increasingly important –  especially the media. The twenty-four-hour omnipresence of 
the latter and its apparently increasing power  –  notwithstanding the Leveson Inquiry 
                                                 
21 Personal recollection of Author 
22 King, Anthony (2015) Who Governs Britain? Pelican (Penguin Random House) UK, p.167 
23 King (2015) Op.cit.  p.167 
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and subsequent report24 - need further investigation. Nonetheless, in the UK, 
departments have always been the powerhouses of policy making, with the Prime 
Minister having relatively limited resources to achieve his or her goals.25 
The role of ministers is varied and multi-faceted, beyond simply making decisions – 
however mundane. Within a department, ministers have “a policy role… a political 
role … an executive role … a public relations role.”26 So, one would imagine that, as 
ministers are so very important to the smooth running of any government and central 
to governmental decision-making, they should be chosen from the broadest range of 
potential appointees.  This is far from the case - they are drawn from a very limited 
parliamentary ‘reservoir’. The Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975 does not 
explicitly state that ministers have to be members of either the House of Commons or 
the House of Lords – but this is the constitutional assumption made. When people are 
appointed who are not MPs, they take a seat in the Lords. It does make clear that there 
should be a limit on paid ministerial positions – 21 at Secretary of State level (plus the 
Lord Chancellor), up to 50 at Minister of State level and a total of 83 at Minister of 
State or Parliamentary Secretary level. This has often caused some difficulty for 
successive Prime Ministers who sought to use their extensive patronage to promote 
more people than the Act permitted to be paid.27 
It may be difficult to imagine but Attlee’s 1945-51 government managed with half the 
number of junior ministers as in the Blair/Brown government. Theakston et al. report 
that ‘…whereas Attlee had appointed 32 junior ministers in 1945 (29 Parliamentary 
Under Secretaries (PUSS) and 3 Ministers of State (MoS)), Blair initially appointed 
64 in 1997 (32 of each) …’ 28 By 2008, Brown had appointed 13 ministers in unpaid 
                                                 
24The Leveson inquiry took evidence in 2011and 2012 and produced a report - Leveson, Brain (2012) 
The Report into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press. It was published on Thursday 29 
November 2012  
25 Yong, Ben and Hazell, Robert (2014) Special Advisers: Who They Are, What They Do and Why They 
Matter Hart Publishing Oxford and Portland  p.14.See also Kavanagh, Dennis and Seldon, Anthony 
(2008) The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: the Hidden Influence of Number Ten HarperCollins 
London  
26 Yong, Ben and Hazell, Robert (2014) Ibid. pp.13-14. For more detailed exposition on role of ministers 
see Marsh, David Richards, David and Smith, Martin J. (2000) ‘Re-assessing the Role of Departmental 
Cabinet Ministers’ Public Administration Vol.78, No.2 pp.305-326 
27 Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975 
28 Theakston, Kevin, Gill, Mark and Atkins, Judi (2014) ‘The Ministerial Foothills: Labour Government 
Junior Ministers 1997-2010’ Parliamentary Affairs 67, 688-707 
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capacities to get around the legislation. Thus, the number of junior ministers has 
increased significantly since 1945.   
So, the pool of ministrables, as King 29 would have it, is extremely limited. It is limited 
by number – at least of paid ministers – and limited by convention – ministers have to 
be members of either House of Parliament. This is not too problematic for the limited 
number of ministers that a government needs to sit in the Lords: the Prime Minister 
can simply ennoble them, but it can be in the Commons - where most of the ministers 
will sit.  
Upon becoming Prime Minister, Brown appointed what Hennessy described as the 
“greatest import of experts of a non-political background since World War Two.” 30 
He made four such appointments as part of his first government and spoke of wanting 
a ‘government of all the talents’. By doing so, he instantly offended all those in 
parliament who were expecting preferment but were overlooked. The message from 
Number 10 was that Prime Minister had to go beyond Labour’s ranks to find good 
ministers. Any point about ‘big tent’ or non-partisan pluralism in the service of the 
nation was lost on them. These outside ministers would soon be termed ‘GOATS’- as 
in Government of All Talents. Two of the four were installed as the second ranking 
‘deputy’ position, or most senior Minister of State, in their respective departments – 
Mark Malloch-Brown at the Foreign Office and Ari Darzi at the Health department. 
The other two were appointed to relatively junior positions – Digby Jones as Trade 
Minister, albeit at Minister of State level and Admiral Alan West as my junior minister 
– at Parliamentary Under-Secretary level - for security at the Home Office. 31  
Discussion of the success or failure of these and other historical examples of 
ministerial ‘goats’ is for another time and place, but they do indicate the relatively 
limited ‘pool’ a Prime Minister has to draw on. It is far smaller than most other 
countries as King32 explains. He points out that in France, the Netherlands and Sweden 
a government minister may not also be a member of parliament and an MP accepting 
a ministerial position must resign that role. In Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain this 
                                                 
29 King Op.cit p.169 Ministrables is a French term for ‘potential minister’. 
30 Quoted in Seldon, Anthony and Lodge, Guy (2010) Brown at 10 Biteback London p.10 
31 Seldon and Lodge (2010) p.10-11; Richards, Steve (2010) Whatever it Takes Fourth Estate London 
p.268-269 
32 King Op.cit p.170 
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rule is relaxed, and a minister can be an MP but does not have to be. In all these 
countries “the country’s president, prime minister or chancellor is free to appoint to 
ministerial office whomever he or she pleases.” 33 King adds that of all the EU member 
states only the Republic of Ireland shares the requirement that ministers be 
parliamentarians – although it is a constitutional device that has been exported to 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. 
Most post-war governments have had around 350-370 MPs to choose ministers from. 
The government of the day has only had more than 370 MPs on five occasions – 1945 
(393), 1983 (376), 1987 (397), 1997 (418) and 2001 (412).34 Realistically the actual 
pool of potential ministers is less than this 350-370 figure because any number of the 
MPs will either eschew ministerial office or will have been ministers before with only 
relative success, in the mind of the Prime Minister at least, be simply ‘not up to it’, as 
Attlee once rather cruelly told an ‘about-to-be’ ex-minister.35 Also, some MPs may 
feel too old, whilst others will have just got elected to the Commons.  The pool for the 
prime minister may be as little as 200-250 MPs for the entire ministerial cohort. The 
pool available for the cabinet is probably no more than 40-50, at the absolute 
maximum,  in any given parliament. The entire system also has an in-built self-destruct 
mechanism – some MPs must stop being ministers for other MPs to begin being 
ministers. Over time, a steady pool of ex-ministers is built up and the pool for new 
ministers inevitably diminishes. The limited nature of the pool of putative ministers 
does mean that ex-ministers will sometimes have the chance of a revived ministerial 
career. This can also be a useful tool for party discipline, and occasionally provide for 
the triumph of hope over experience. 
A matter of balance 
Added to the limitations of the size of the cohort of potential ministers are other 
considerations that the prime minister must be taken into account. In the early days of  
Thatcher’s first government, although her takeover of the Conservative Party was 
almost complete, she had to be mindful of the split between those who supported her 
                                                 
33 Ibid p.170 
34Kavanagh, Denis and Cowley, Philip (2010) The British General Election of 2010 Palgrave 
Macmillan Basingstoke pp..350-351 
35 This quote is often attributed to Attlee in response to junior minister John Parker MP when he asked 
why he had to give up his job.  
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in the 1975 leadership election and those who were more sympathetically disposed 
towards the vanquished Ted Heath. She famously represented the ‘dry’ wing of the 
party – ideologically very right-wing – and had triumphed over the left-wing, centrist 
wing of the party, represented by Ted Heath. Her first cabinet reflected this shift, but 
she maintained the fine balance between the two wings of the party and contained 
some ministers from what she would dismiss as the ‘wet’ wing of the party. She did 
not, however, find room for Heath, who would probably have refused any overture 
anyway.36 Moore makes clear that Thatcher did not want to “upset the institutional 
applecart. Her appointments sought political balance more than ideological affinity.”37 
Although Heath was a step too far, she did keep faith with a promise that she gave to 
Willie Whitelaw when he assumed the role of deputy leader of the party in 1975, that 
is, not to appoint Keith Joseph as Chancellor on the assumption of power. Joseph was 
one of Thatcher’s key ideological lieutenants, but she understood that the kudos and 
balance achieved by having the loyalist Whitelaw as deputy leader and then Home 
Secretary and de facto deputy prime minister far outweighed her own loyalty to an 
ideological soulmate.38 Over successive years, Thatcher’s quip that ‘every Prime 
Minister needs a Willie’ seems that her focus on balance paid off.39 Although Keith 
Joseph would never be Chancellor, Thatcher’s cabinets became successively more and 
more in her own ideological image, but even she always needed to nod in the direction 
of ideological balance.  
Geographic balance was far less a concern for Thatcher. Up to and including her 
governments, the Conservatives had been much more of a nationally based party than 
Labour had been. The Labour Party had only ever had realised broad national coverage 
at times of heightened electoral success – 1945, 1966 and eventually, 1997. The 
balance needed in cabinet had as much to do with class and ideology as it did with 
geography. Geography was important for Labour not least because of the dominance 
of Wales, Scotland and the North of England.  
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Conservative cabinets since the war were broadly ideologically consensual until the 
arrival of Thatcher. They were characterised by the ‘Butskellism’40 of the post-war 
consensus far more readily than the post-war Labour cabinets were. Notwithstanding 
this post-war consensus which Labour maintained serious splits along ideological and 
class lines. There was a long-established schism between a traditional left and a 
traditional right in Labour ranks. Wilson and Callaghan certainly had to be aware that 
their cabinets would be scrutinised for a left/centre/right balance, a working 
class/middle class balance, and a balance between colleagues with a union background 
and those without. To more recent Labour leaders, these ‘cleavages’ mattered less and 
less, when it came to balancing their cabinets and ministerial teams.  
Throughout the term of the 1997-2010 Labour government, the dominant internal 
division was between supporters of Blair and supporters of Brown. There was an 
ongoing subtext of New Labour versus Old Labour but all movement within the 
ministerial cohort was interpreted through this Blair/Brown prism. By 1997, the 
number of Labour MPs from a working-class background had significantly 
diminished, as had the number of MPs who came from a union background. As a 
consequence, MPs from both these backgrounds lost significant influence within the 
party.41 There has also been a sharp decline in declared left-wing MPs – and the left 
of the party remained split between a soft left and a hard left.42 Neither Brown nor 
Blair was that troubled by the routine left/right splits endured by Attlee, Wilson and 
Callaghan when in government and subsequently did not have to worry unduly about 
left/right balance within the cabinet or the broader ministerial cohort.   
New balance for a 3G Government: geography, generation and gender 
Both Blair and Brown had to be more concerned with new, emerging divisions in the 
party’s ranks which were rooted in the luxury of large parliamentary parties from 
which to choose ministers. These divisions, the three Gs – geography, generation and 
                                                 
40 First coined by The Economist journalist Norman Macrae in 1954. See The Economist (2010) The 
unacknowledged giant – Norman Macrae at https://www.economist.com/obituary/2010/06/17/the-
unacknowledged-giant 
41 See MP occupational tables in Kavanagh, Dennis and Butler, David (2005) The British General 
Election of 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke; Kavanagh, Dennis and Cowley, Philip (2010) Op.cit 
and the previous editions in the series 
42 The difference between the hard left and the soft left goes back to the 1981 deputy Leadership 
election. The Tribune group of MPs supported Denis Healey or abstained. Benn supporters formed the 
Campaign Group (later Socialist Campaign Group) in 1982  
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gender - were very different from the past. Geography now mattered – but in the 
context of London and the broader south of England, not the traditional Labour 
heartlands. Generation now mattered much more than it had done in the past because 
of the continuing churn and turnover of MPs since 1997. MPs elected after 1997 made 
up 25% of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) by 2005.43 Gender also began to 
matter much more, not least because of the impact of all-women shortlists. Although 
progress remained slow after the 1997 surge in the number of women MPs44 on 
Labour’s benches, there was more and more pressure on the Labour leadership to 
promote and advance women – from the media as well the party. 45 
In 1992, the last time the Conservatives formed a majority government until 2015, 
there were only 20 women Conservative MPs – so gender would not have been quite 
the concern it would rightly become by 2010 and the Coalition government. By 2015, 
68 women MPs were elected under the conservative banner – and they expect 
preferment to ministerial office just as their male counterparts do. 46 
So, in short, ministers do not drop out of the sky and prime ministers do not have 
carte-blanche on who they can appoint to these positions. The number of paid 
ministers is limited by statute; the source of ministers is limited by status and 
convention to the Lords and Commons; and the mix of ministers is limited by internal 
party considerations, particularly of the three Gs – geography, generation and gender. 
For the 1997-2010 Labour government, the main ideological division was not between 
Old and New Labour, but between the supporters of the two principal architects of 
New Labour – Blair and Brown.47 For the Conservative governments before 1997 and 
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since 2010, notwithstanding the minor inconvenience of a five-year coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats, the main ideological division was Europe. 
Ministerial ‘churn’ 
In an Institute for Government report, the authors concluded that “a real constraint on 
ministerial effectiveness is that many ministers do not stay in their posts long enough, 
as a result of over-frequent reshuffles.”48 This was a common complaint by many of 
the ministers they interviewed for the report. The authors state that ‘Few ministers are 
in the same job long enough to see a policy through from inception, via legislation, to 
implementation.’49 This is important, not least because it is a very fortunate minister 
who gets to start a policy process as well as see it through. Government is, by its very 
nature, dynamic – government departments run to their own internal rhythm, new 
policies do not simply come in the front door with a new minister. Somewhere along 
the line, as the media became more and more important and all-pervasive in UK 
politics, reshuffles became ‘media events’. They were increasingly used to revitalise 
or relaunch governments. They became a demonstration of the resolve and 
determination of the Prime Minister. They were no longer simply an administrative 
process to fill all the roles available, but a rewards and punishment system that was 
hung constantly about ministers’ necks. 
The turnover of ministers cannot be conducive to good government. Astonishingly, as 
the Institute for Government report highlights, the Labour government from 1997-
2010 had ‘six defence secretaries, eight trade and industry secretaries, eight business 
secretaries and six home secretaries (including three in four years).’50 Indeed, in my 
time as a minister in the Home Office from May2005 until October 2008 – a total of 
41 months – I served three different Home Secretaries each with very different styles 
and priorities – Charles Clarke, John Reid and Jacqui Smith. John Reid held seven 
cabinet posts in eight years – including Health, Defence and the Home Office – not 
exactly an advert for stable government.  
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For Jack Straw, this churn was very ineffective. He claims that both Blair and Brown 
“misused reshuffles as a way of turning attention away from bad news (like poor 
election results).”51 He argues that such constant churn led junior ministers, but also 
the government as a whole, to function far less well than they could have done if they 
were left for longer  to get on with their newly appointed jobs. Straw relates that over 
the course of the thirteen years of the Labour government, 60 different MPs and peers 
occupied the 23 cabinet posts – an aggregate of 127 posts. He maintains that amongst 
junior ministers (including whips) the position was even worse with 770 changes of 
posts including 39 changes at the Foreign Office and 45 at the Home Office.52 I held 
a total of 9 posts in government over twelve years – from Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to Minister of State. 53 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to the way prime ministers change their 
ministerial personnel. As we have seen, many regard stability of tenure as a key 
element of efficient government, but this does not always follow. Traditionally, the 
whips office – the party and government business managers – is the training ground 
for new ministers and an important part of a parliamentary apprenticeship. As Prime 
Minister, Blair resisted this tradition and appointed MPs straight into the ministerial 
ranks. This was partly because he did not completely trust the first two incumbents of 
the role of Chief Whip – Nick Brown or Anne Taylor - and regarded them both as 
‘traditionalists’54 and partly, because he did not appreciate the importance of the 
office.  
Normally, the Whips Office is where future ministers learn their trade – and many 
spend at least a short time as whip. If you walk down the corridor that includes the 
Chief Whip’s Office in Downing Street the walls are lined with photographs of the 
Whips Offices from previous years. It is striking how much the photographs of the 
Conservative Whips’ Offices contain future Cabinet Ministers, the Labour photos 
much less so. The Whips’ Office was considered much more an apprenticeship and 
precursor to ministerial office for the Conservatives. The measure of a good Chief 
Whip was as someone who got ‘their people’, i.e. the whips, promoted to higher office. 
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52 Ibid p.550 
53 See footnote 13 above  
54 Personal recollection of Author  
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There were seldom any bottlenecks in Conservative Whips Offices. Here, at least, 
turnover was a virtue.55  
The absence of this natural turnover of whips assuming ministerial office during the 
normal course of events meant, for the Labour government, by the 2001 election, there 
was a real bottleneck. Promotions were not being made at a sufficient pace. In the first 
reshuffle after the election, only five of the whips stayed in the office. Three others 
were promoted into ministerial ranks, but the remaining eight, half of the office, were 
sacked, even though many of them had good ministerial potential. This could have 
caused real problems both in terms of the resentment caused and the relative 
inexperience of the incoming team, including a new Chief Whip. It didn’t for two 
reasons. Firstly, in Hilary Armstrong, Tony Blair had the Chief Whip he wanted and 
could trust completely. Secondly, the loyalty of those who were sacked meant they all 
took it with a good deal of grace and dignity.56 It may be, of course, that this was part 
of the calculation when deciding who to sack to make room for others. Stability, then, 
can become sclerotic just as churn and turnover can be destructive rather than efficient. 
It is, again, a matter of balance, but it is also important from the perspective of those 
seeking advancement.  If there is little movement in the Whips’ Office, then 
backbenchers lose hope.   
The tension is between those concerned that turnover poses a ‘real constraint’ on 
effectiveness57 and those who think that ministers should be detached from their 
departments and that staying for too long in one department can lead to ‘capture’ by 
the officials.58 Labour Minister Tony Crosland is often quoted in favour of at least a 
degree of ministerial longevity.59 He is much cited as saying “It takes you six months 
to get your head properly above water, a year to get the general drift of most of the 
field and two years really to master the whole of the department.” 60 The balance 
remains, perhaps, a fine one and the last word on turnover should go to Riddell who, 
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nearly twenty years before the Institute of Government report cited above, said that 
real issue was “how to improve the quality and range of experience of those in the 
House of Commons”61 and, by definition,  how to improve the available pool of les 
Ministrables. 
For all the concerns about balance, in many instances, the experience of the new 
minister may have little to do with the prime ministerial worries at all and more to do 
with more intangible factors. However much the ‘Westminster Village’ contends that 
all departments are equal (except perhaps for the ‘big three’, that is, the Treasury, 
Home Office and Foreign Office), it is clear there is very much a pecking order. 
Cabinet ministers from each of the departments have to ‘get in line’ when opting for 
their ministers. One mentioned to Riddell et al that all the bargaining and bartering 
that went on for the most promising junior ministers ‘all depends on your place in the 
pecking order.’ They continued that ‘weaker or new heads of departments had no real 
say in the choice of junior ministers.’62 Secretaries of State become very adept at 
letting the individuals in their ministerial teams know that, of course, they wanted 
them all along.  
First impressions: minimalists, mandarins’ ministers, MoS-sies and 
PUSS-sies 
However much the constitutional experts will tell you that there is no difference – 
legally, technically and constitutionally – between the Ministers of State (MoS) and 
the Parliamentary (Under-) Secretaries (PUSS) – there is. They are viewed very 
differently by both other ministers and MPs – and certainly by officials and civil 
servants. Some Secretaries of State are extremely status conscious and would 
recognise a MoS before a PUSS in meetings and would invariably ask a MoS to 
deputise for them but not a PUSS. Civil servants will watch the relationships between 
all ministers and the Secretary of State very keenly. Some MoS may clearly be on a 
fast-track to the cabinet, or at least think they are, and will be treated as such if this is 
a view shared by both their colleagues and officials. Both levels of junior minister – 
MoS and PUSS – come to their new roles with some degree of baggage – personal 
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connections and experience, party connections and experience or, indeed, professional 
connections and experience. It is always useful, as observer, academic or rival, to 
know and understand these linkages and networks. Each new minister comes with a 
history and ‘political footprints’ – and good colleagues, civil servants and members of 
the media – both know and understand the provenance of a new minister.  
Sometimes, however good or bad the first impressions made by a new minister they 
are initially judged against their predecessor. When Roy Jenkins was appointed to his 
very first ministerial post as Minister of Aviation,  the Spectator predicted that he “will 
shine brightly at the scarcely impossible task of doing better than Mr. Julian Amery.”63 
He also proved to be good in the House of Commons very quickly into his ministerial 
career. Three weeks after his appointment, Campbell relates, the Daily Telegraph 
reported that “… in little more than half an hour he established himself as one of the 
most formidable and powerful debaters on the Government Front Bench….Rarely has 
a new Minister made so decisive an impact on the House.”64 Such parliamentary 
performances still matter and the “main criterion for promotion remains 
parliamentary, rather than necessarily administrative, skills.”65 Lord Norton of Louth 
bemoaned the notion that some ministers survived ‘because of their performance in 
the House even though they may not be good at taking decisions and managing their 
departments.’66 It may well be the case that a good performer in the House obtains 
preferment faster than other colleagues, but it is not clear that a ditherer or a bad 
decision-maker will advance just because of such performing skills. Clearly, 
performance in the House becomes all the more important in the context of a hung 
parliament or a government with a small minority.  
So, the lot of ministers is governed by a range of issues, many of which are clearly 
beyond their control. The Prime Minister’s consideration of an array of different 
balancing factors – especially more recently, geography, generation and gender – is 
complicated by an array of further considerations – longevity, turnover, departmental 
teams, House and media performance. The list is endless. And all this for a role that is 
seldom reported upon favourably, if at all and one that sits firmly under the prime 
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minister and his or her cabinet. When the media or the academic world focuses on 
minsters, it is invariably at cabinet level, not below.  Yet, the prevailing strata of junior 
ministers at both MoS and PUSS level at any given time will contain tomorrow’s 
cabinet ministers.  If merit was the only criteria for advancement to the role of minister, 
then a Prime Minister would be well-advised not to appoint people whom they could 
not see sitting around the cabinet table. As I have indicated, there are many other 
factors beyond simply merit and competence that result in the appointment of MPs as 
ministers.  
As Riddell et al make clear  
… secretaries of state have dominated the discussion on ministerial performance in previous 
studies and memoirs. But there are four times as many junior ministers as those in the cabinet 
and their role has often been neglected.”67  
They go on to say that ministers of state and under-secretaries often play a very 
important role in delivering change and implementing policies. Theakston, ‘a leading 
academic student of junior ministers’68 maintains that the pattern of appointment and 
promotions has not altered much since the Victorian era. With his colleagues, he 
believes that “junior ministerial jobs remain key apprenticeship posts in the British 
system” and while they accept that the experience can be limiting and frustrating, 
junior ministers “undertake many essential ministerial functions and help maintain 
political control and accountability in government.”69  
Power games 
One such dimension in the 1997-2010 government was the relative relationship, at any 
given time, of each individual MP to the both the Blair and Brown camps – and the 
relationship of any of the new ministers or Secretaries of State to Blair and Brown too. 
One senior Home Office official related that when Jack Straw70 arrived for the first 
time  
… he came in … and … didn’t talk … about the New Labour manifesto, … he talked about 
which MPs were Blair’s and which MPs were Brown’s…I thought ‘what on earth is this all 
about? 71 
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It was made very clear to me when I joined John Prescott in the newly formed Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) in 2002 that the worst thing I could do was to 
have any dealings with Number 10 that he did not know about. He did not want to 
curtail any interactions I had with the Prime Minister’s Office in my role as an MP or 
as a minister – he just wanted to know about it. I used to joke to colleagues, after 
ending my term as an MP, that for the duration of the government the Blairites thought 
I was a Brownite and the Brownites thought I was a Blairite – and Prescott was not 
sure at all what to think. Such concerns bedevilled the Labour Government of 1997-
2010 and impacted on the entire ministerial strata as we shall see in the analysis of the 
case studies. 
Another dimension is the distribution of power within a department. Theakston says 
that there are “still reports of Permanent Secretaries taking a lofty attitude towards 
Parliamentary Secretaries, as well as claims that officials try to exclude or isolate the 
small fry and attempt to by-pass or appeal against the decisions of junior ministers.”72 
Junior ministers are at their most vulnerable when first appointed as they are unaware 
of the power relationships within the department and can get ‘run over’. As an 
example, I offer the following anecdotal evidence together with an analysis of the 
power relationship within parentheses and italics: 
Within days of my appointment to the position of Minister of State in a department, 
the Permanent Secretary walked into my office unannounced.  
(I am superior to you but as a mark of respect I have walked the 500 yards between 
our offices but have not made an appointment because I am superior.)  
He sat down in a very friendly manner and started to discuss the split of responsibility 
between me and my junior minister.  
(I will determine what your role is because it is far too trivial a matter for the Secretary 
of State – and certainly none of your business, you should do what you are told.)  
He was fully anticipating that I would receive this information with equanimity and 
due deference and do what I was told. I did not. I thanked the Permanent Secretary 
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profusely for his kind consideration of what my role and that of my junior should be 
and explained that I had not even considered the matter yet.  
(Thank you for fulfilling this administrative task, sorry to disappoint you but I have 
not made my decision on the matter yet.)  
I said that I would happily give it the fullest of considerations.  
(This is a decision for me to make, in the context of the political and governmental 
realms, not an administrative one that I am going to agree to simply for your 
bureaucratic convenience.)  
I said I would have a word with my junior colleague, and we would both go to the 
Secretary of State with our determination on how the responsibilities should be divided 
between us.  
(You work for us, not the other way around – and the politicians – not the civil 
servants, will decide who does what. Oh, and I take my guidance from my Secretary 
of State – not from you.) 
Clearly, in the case above, if the Secretary of State had come back and agreed with the 
Permanent Secretary, then I would have had to comply – and rightly so. But I knew 
the Permanent Secretary was seeking to establish the power relationship between us 
from the very start and I was not going to take it. As it happens, the Secretary of State 
agreed entirely with the eventual division I had arrived at in consultation with my 
junior. I knew too that the Ministerial Code clearly states that whilst the “Permanent 
Secretary is not subject to the directions of the junior minister, equally, junior ministers 
are not subject to the directions of the Permanent Secretary.”73 When disputes of any 
description arise at any level, they are ultimately resolved at the Secretary of State-
Permanent Secretary level. Such disputes are easier when it comes to Special Advisers 
(Spads) as they are first, and foremost political appointees and the disputes are 
resolved in the political realm.  
Once the split of responsibilities has been established, what do junior ministers 
actually do? Digby Jones’ description of the role as “one of the most dehumanising 
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and depersonalising experiences a human being can have” is not one I recognise, and 
neither is his characterisation of the whole system as being “designed to take the 
personality, the drive and the initiative out of a junior minister”74 Most commentators 
agree that junior ministers, like cabinet ministers, fulfil a range of roles. The key roles 
of cabinet ministers have been variously described as policy, political, 
executive/managerial and public relations; or policy, politics, management and 
diplomat.75 Headey identified three types of policy roles for cabinet ministers; the 
initiator, the selector and the legitimator or minimalist.76 Marsh et al. go further and 
suggest that the policy initiator can either be narrowly focussed on narrow policy areas 
and ‘agenda-setters’ who actually try to change their department’s policy agenda.77 
They also point out that in general, civil servants prefer their ministers to be both 
decisive and to have political judgement. This makes sense as these are the key skills 
and qualities that officials need in their ministers.  
The major differences in the role of ministers as set out in Headey’s seminal work in 
the early 1970s to the early 2000s world of Marsh et al, are the increased role of public 
relations and the media; a much more developed role in policy-making for all 
ministers; and an increasingly political environment within each department, not least 
with the growth of special advisers. Marsh et al, conclude that ministers matter and  
… are important. Civil Servants cannot act alone; they lack the legitimacy to do anything 
without ministerial authority, which explains their preference for decisive ministers.78  
Further, while ministers have multiple roles, this is not to suggest that they are 
“omnipotent actors, able to bring about significant political and cultural changes inside 
and outside departments.”79 The action of ministers needs to be considered within the  
structural context in which they operate. One should not overestimate ministerial 
power, nor assess it outside of its immediate context. 
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Theakston highlights three broad areas of junior ministerial activity – “departmental 
work, parliamentary duties and ‘ambassadorial’ or ‘representative’ functions 80 - a 
narrower focus than for cabinet ministers, as one would anticipate. Theakston shows 
how the role of junior ministers has changed over time – especially the role of 
ministers of state.  
Summary  
This then is the world within which ministers make the decisions that constitute the 
lifeblood of any government. There is a limited pool from which to choose ministers 
in the UK system and the circumstances of virtually each minister are distinct and 
different. I was a minister or a whip for eleven of the thirteen years of the 1997-2010 
government and have a unique insider’s view to bring to this thesis. 
Much of the academic discussion about the role of ministers revolves around the two 
distinct worlds of policy and politics. In reality, the two worlds are interchangeable,  
and it is here that the minister dwells. However, detailed a study a researcher can 
undertake about the life of a minister and the political processes they deal with, they 
cannot live the life and role of the minister. However comprehensively the journalist, 
commentator or academic can understand how policy is formulated, their perceptions 
cannot rival those of the insider. This is not to argue that the insider perspective is 
superior, it comes with its own baggage, but to argue that such a view is unique and 
brings new perception and a significant contribution to knowledge. Yes, there are 
ontological difficulties that come with such a perspective, but there are real strengths 
to the researcher as participant. This thesis develops three in-depth narratives in three 
key public policy areas to illustrate how the insider’s perspective is of real importance 
to our understanding of both the role of the minister and the processes the minister 
deals with on a daily basis.  
In terms of the case studies, all took place in the Home Office over a three-year period 
– 2005 to 2008 - when I was a Minister of State there. Ironically, given what has been 
discussed on the notion of ministerial churn and stability – I served three different 
Home Secretaries during those three years.   
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From May 2005 to May 2006,  I was the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and 
Nationality and worked with the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke on the 
introduction of the points-based system for non-EU immigrants.  My junior minister 
was Andy Burnham.81 One of the first things we did together was a re-run of the ID 
Cards Bill. 82 Mindful of what was said earlier about how junior ministers crave a 
policy area of their own, Clarke was keen to give Burnham the ID cards area as a 
discrete issue that warranted that sort of focussed attention. I acquiesced but remember 
being annoyed that part of my ministerial ‘fiefdom’ was being given to somebody else. 
Burnham did a good job with the brief. Clarke and Number 10 both knew that I had 
plenty to do with the rest of my brief and the development of the points-based system 
in immigration. 
From May 2006 until October 2008, I was firstly Minister for Crime Reduction, 
Policing and Community Safety, and then thereafter the Minister for Security, 
Counterterrorism, Crime and Policing. The Home Secretary, until July 2007, was John 
Reid,83 who had replaced Charles Clarke in May 2006. One of my first roles as the 
new Policing Minister was to determine whether one of Clarke’s key policies – the 
rationalisation of the 43 police forces in England and Wales into 12-15 regional 
strategic forces – remained feasible or not or whether it should be scrapped. My junior 
minister at the time was Vernon Coaker, MP for Gedling.84 The posts lent themselves 
to a reasonable split in responsibility between the Police, Security and Counter-
Terrorism elements on my side and the Policing, Community Safety and Crime 
Reduction element on Coaker’s side.  
In June 2007, when Brown replaced Blair as the Prime Minister and Reid stepped 
down, Jacqui Smith was appointed Home Secretary and almost immediately faced her 
first test. The day after her appointment, two car bombs were found in the Haymarket 
area of central London. They had failed to detonate, and the ensuing pursuit ended up 
with a Jeep-style vehicle trying to crash through into the terminal building at Glasgow 
Airport. Smith handled the media so well that day that she won plaudits from all 
quarters. Home Office media personnel have told me that on news of her appointment 
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they thought the focus was going to be around the ‘first woman’ to be appointed Home 
Secretary and whether she would be up for the job.85 All such doubts disappeared after 
the way she handled the Haymarket bombs and subsequent activity.  
My time as a government minister means that I bring both a wealth of experience and 
a unique insider perspective to the analysis of the case studies that are central to this 
thesis. But before going on to discuss in full the case studies, the theoretical framework 
of the thesis and the methodological framework and research design are discussed in 
detail in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Context: rational choice theory, new institutionalism and 
interpretivism 
Policy context and development : an ugly business 
Decisions are essential to the smooth running of government departments and, indeed, 
the country. Academics have tried a range of different ways in which to get to grips 
with the nature of decisions and the necessary precursory elements such as policy 
development, formulation and implementation. This chapter looks in some detail at 
these approaches and whether or not they offer any useful insight into the task of 
analysing the public policy case studies that are under discussion. The chapter begins 
with a brief look at the nature of the policy context and how policies are developed, 
before going on to look at some of the key aspects of rational choice theory, new 
institutionalism and interpretivism.  It then discusses the policy failure literature in 
detail before positing an analytical framework rooted in both the literature and my 
extensive experience as a government minister.  
In the world of policy making certainly nothing is straightforward and there are many 
different facets, dimensions, and perceptions at play. Heclo argues that “policy-
making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding 
and knowing.”86 He also asserts that the policy process is iterative in that “policy 
invariably builds on policy, either in moving forward with what has been inherited, or 
amending it, or repudiating it”. 87 
Kingdon identifies two key elements to the policy making process – the ‘agenda’, that 
is “the pressing problems of the moment” and ‘alternatives’, the policy options that 
are available to resolve the problems identified.88 He goes on to describe three 
autonomous streams through which actors – social and political – mobilise to promote 
specific issues or policy options. It could be argued that these three streams – problem, 
policy, and political streams – are reflected at every stage of the policy process, 
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including at the highest level of government. It may well be that each of these streams 
contract and the options become more limited the higher up the policy process one 
travels, but they remain present. They do not arise in a vacuum – they are rooted in 
these wider policy streams and the choices reflect the wider society. 
Kingdon’s problem stream, or how issues get on to the policy agenda in the first place, 
refers to how issues become serious enough to be considered as pressing problems that 
require action. Such problems can be short-term or long-term, institutional, or one-off, 
unique, or cyclical, local or national (or even multi-national), situational or 
ideological, reactive, or proactive, threatening or fading, original or expected, routine 
or catastrophic, real or imagined. They can emerge as a result of events beyond the 
government’s control or as a matter of government action. Kingdon relates that 
bureaucrats, elected politicians and the public become aware of socially constructed 
economic and social problems through statistical indicators, spectacular focusing 
events or feedback from previously enacted policies.89  
Statistical indicators entail the increasingly important, often economic factors that the 
media especially determines are so important – growth rates, exchange rates, 
unemployment rates, poverty rates – many of them cyclical in nature. Focusing events 
refers to major dramatic events that not only attract media attention but had a 
significant impact on society. They include events such as natural catastrophes such 
as earthquakes, unexpected political developments such as the reaction to the Poll Tax 
in 1990,  terrorist outrages such as the bomb attacks in London in July 2005, and  
economic disasters such as the 2008 economic crash.90 In other words, a focussing 
event 
…is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the 
possibility of potential future great harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular 
geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public 
simultaneously.91  
Feedback effects relate to how current policies are being implemented and their impact 
in the areas concerned.  The Conservative Government of the 1980s, following a long 
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history of objecting to the relative financial autonomy of local government, stood on 
a platform of a radical overhaul of local government finance. The resulting policy was 
the community charge – the poll tax. Others have reported in more detail on the genesis 
of the poll tax,92 but the feedback received on it was damning and after much 
consideration the policy was changed. Feedback is only of value in any given policy 
scenario if it is legitimised, listened to and acted upon – it is otherwise entirely 
redundant.  
Kingdon’s policy stream concerns the development of paradigms and alternatives to 
the issues that require solutions. 93 This stream concerns policy experts who work for 
academic institutions, governments, and interest groups. These are potentially the 
‘epistemic communities’ that Balch refers to,94 that is actors that frame alternatives 
and legislative proposals which coagulate and stew in what Kingdon calls a ‘policy 
primeval soup.’ The latter contains the many policy ideas floating around that 
“combine with each one another in various ways”.95 He suggests, quite rightly, that 
most alternatives are grounded in policy paradigms. Once again, it is clear that policies 
are not determined in a vacuum – there are temporal, legacy, ideological and a range 
of other dimensions that contribute to the overarching paradigms and alternatives. 
Béland argues that such paradigms and alternatives have a dialogical nature – that is, 
“each of them only exist in opposition to other policy ideas available in a particular 
policy environment at a precise moment in time.”96 This is not strictly the case as there 
are those who would articulate a preferred or ideologically rooted policy response to 
a problem above and beyond alternatives or any temporal considerations. 
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Entrepreneurs and advocates, frames and framing  
Whatever the policy direction agreed upon, the proposals will still need to be advanced 
and supported by ‘major political advocates.’ This is the core of Kingdon’s ‘political 
stream’, 97 wherein key factors are providing the political backdrop within which the 
policy will be successful or otherwise. These factors include variables such as electoral 
results, pressures from interest groups and shifts in public opinion. Such factors afford 
chances to change, shift or sway policy and, as Béland notes, Kingdon identifies these 
factors as the terrain on which successful policy entrepreneurs advocate their preferred 
policy solutions and grasp the political opportunities afforded.98  
Such policy entrepreneurs try to make the problem, policy and political streams 
converge as this is necessary to gain advancement and success. Policy ideas need 
powerful actors that have an interest in promoting them. The institutions within which 
they promote them will largely help to determine success as will the timing – the 
moment – at which the policy alternative is promoted. Béland quotes an example of 
such timing from Hansen and King.99 They noted that the whole area of eugenics was 
becoming increasingly popular as a matter of social policy on the Left and the Right 
of the political spectrum in both Western Europe and the USA in the 1920s. The advent 
of the Nazi regime in Germany in the 1930s reduced the legitimacy of eugenics as a 
social policy tool.  Bernard Shaw is quoted in Freedland100  as saying that “…the only 
fundamental and possible socialism is the socialisation of the selective breeding of 
men’ even suggesting that defectives be dealt with by means of a ‘lethal chamber’”. 
Post-Second World War policy entrepreneurs would not have got anywhere had they 
showed the same degree of enthusiasm for eugenics that their Leftist forebears had 
evinced prior to the war. Timing is all important for the success of a policy alternative.  
In addition to a propitious blend between powerful actors, political institutions and 
catching ‘the moment’ policy entrepreneurs utilise and mobilise political symbols that 
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are ‘ever-present in a shared ideological repertoire’101 These shared symbols and 
political representations are mobilised during policy debates to frame the issues and 
shape public opinion.102 As we shall see when we look in detail at each of the case 
studies, policy makers must constantly justify their political and technical choices.103  
To do this, ideas, and other forms - ideology, legacy and other variables, as discussed 
earlier, provide them with “symbols and concepts with which to frame solutions to 
policy problems in normatively acceptable terms through transposition and 
bricolage.”104 Campbell continues arguing that “...frames appear typically in the public 
pronouncement of policy makers and their aides, such as sound bites, campaign 
speeches, press releases, and other very public statements designed to muster public 
support for policy proposals.”105 The ability to frame a policy programme in a 
politically and “culturally – acceptable and desirable manner is a key factor that can 
help explain why some policy alternatives triumph over others” and “why elected 
officials decide to ‘do something’ in the first place.”106 
No policy is developed within a vacuum. No policy is determined without at least an 
understanding of the context within which it is to operate and some knowledge of the 
policy it is to replace. Campbell maintains that policies are framed in order to make 
them politically acceptable. 107 He goes on to say that in order for policy programmes 
to be adopted “political elites strategically craft frames and use them to legitimise their 
policies to the public and to each other.”108 Other observers are keen on how the policy 
is relayed – that is, how devices such as political advertising, rhetoric and symbolic 
politics play a role in policy making and formulation. 109 This dimension of academic 
enquiry has expanded significantly over recent years, especially in the context of 
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rhetorical political analysis, political marketing and advertising and the use and role 
of symbols.110 
Campbell is right to contend that researchers “rarely explore the process by which 
frames are constructed, tested, transformed and fit to the prevailing normative and 
cognitive paradigms residing in the background of policy debates.”111 Policymakers, 
he argues, may ‘use frames to conceal their true motives from others whom they are 
trying to persuade’112 It is also the case that one of the aims of the policy is precisely 
the development of a new frame. Of course, it is often difficult empirically to 
determine when policy makers are expressing their true motives rather than framing 
the argument in terms that they think will conform to what others want to hear. So, it 
is important to discern how it can be established whether policy makers are being 
truthful rather than manipulative framers, or truthful and manipulative framers, or 
indeed whether they act differently with different audiences depending on whether the 
audience in internal or external.113  
Rational choice theory posits that the preferences and bargaining of actors, including 
how they frame policy, explain decisions and outcomes.114 The focus is clearly on the 
individual – not processes, groups, networks or institutions. Institutional approaches 
argue that political organisations such as parliament, legal systems, and bureaucracies 
shape decisions and outcomes. The focus is clearly on the norms embodied in 
constitutional rules and conventions within the institutions. Bevir and others115 assert 
that a ‘new institutionalism’ emerged in the 70s and 80s to push back against the 
prevailing dominance of behaviourism and rational choice theory, both of which 
dismissed institutions as “no more than a simple aggregation of individual 
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preferences.”116 For ‘new institutionalists,’ the “organisation of political life makes a 
difference” and they define institutionalism as a set of “theoretical ideas and 
hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political 
agency, performance and change.”117 In essence, institutions – the state, society, 
courts, bureaucratic agency or legislative committee – are political actors in their own 
right. These two competing approaches are rooted in the ongoing discourse between 
the rational and the incremental, or the deductive and the inductive, in political 
science.  This chapter now looks at each of these approaches in detail to see if they 
can help explain and analyse the case studies. 
Rational choice theory: a repugnance for politics and the complexities of 
political life  
Rational choice theory is rooted in this foundational ontology.  Smith and May suggest 
that the debate between rationalist and incrementalist models of decision-making is 
essentially an artificial one – and that both approaches are lacking.118 John says that 
“the main problem with the rational-incrementalist debate is that both models capture 
elements of decision making even though the textbooks present them as polar 
opposites.”119 Whilst the incrementalist model may be regarded as having some value 
as an “empirical model of how decisions are made”, it lacks any real normative value. 
Rationalist models, on the other hand, “are empirically inaccurate or unrealistic” 
whilst purporting to be both normative and prescriptive. The question is whether either 
approach is of any value in an assessment of the efficiency of policy formulation and 
decision making.  
For Hay, the appeal of rational choice theory “lies in its promise to deliver a naturalist 
science of the political. Crucial to this is the assumption of rationality, which 
effectively serves to render (political) behaviour predictable in any given context.”120 
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Given their economistic roots, rational choice theorists make some simple 
assumptions to sustain this predictability. Hindmoor summarises this as 
methodological individualism; the use of models; rationality; self-interest and 
subjectivism, or political individualism. If rational choice theory is useful in 
explaining and analysing public policy, then it should be applicable to the three case 
studies under investigation.  
There have been many variations and developments of the original rational choice 
theory that grew out of these deductive ‘scientific’ roots in economics (and, to an 
extent, mathematics). The thesis will look at whether or not, in the complex and highly 
developed world of politics, any of the starting assumptions of this theory – 
assumptions common to all of these variations – can be recognised as of any value to 
analysis.  
These assumptions are adhered to rigidly by some proponents and more flexibly by 
others  - as a rigidly deductive schema by some, with its assumptions about human 
behaviour as absolute, and as a starting point for the development of hypotheses by 
others. Methodological individualism means that political processes and outcomes are 
completely determined by the actions and interactions between individuals and, at its 
purest, takes no account of the surrounding environment, structures, history, culture 
or context.  The use of models can be framed either by this deductive absolutism or by 
a more flexible approach. The purity of the model is of little use to the pragmatic 
politician or academic seeking to utilise models to explain, analyse, digest and learn 
from public policy-making.  
The assumption of rationality is an instrumental one. Rationality means that actions 
are judged against the extent to which they constitute the best way to achieve goals. It 
is about means rather than ends and the maximisation of utility. Self-interest means 
precisely that – all actors are motivated by self-interest. This is rooted partly in a 
conviction that this is how people are and partly to assist in creating these deductive 
models. Other people matter, but only in the context of the individual achieving his or 
her own goals. The emphasis on self-interest has led some commentators to link a 
rational choice approach with the political right.  Subjectivism means that ‘what counts 
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for rational choice theorists is what people want.’121 Sometimes, when people clash 
with government, there is a seeming mismatch or gap that emerges between, for 
example 
…public demands to limit immigration (together with the ‘control’ rhetoric of politicians) and 
the [political] reality of an increasing volume of immigration… [encouraged by the 
government or otherwise]122 
When this gap is clear, it is difficult to discern which ‘rationality’ prevails and how 
long the gap persists. Many suggest that the growing support for further control on 
immigration and the rise of right-wing parties has its roots in this gap.123  
The thesis applies some of these starting assumptions to the reality of today’s politics. 
Hay argues that the “self-serving, utility-maximising behaviour in situations of perfect 
or near-perfect information translates into collectively irrational outcomes.”124 For 
some, this implies an antithesis between a rational choice approach and collective 
provision or an antithesis between such an approach and benign view of the role of the 
state at all. Hay speaks of the ‘almost natural affinity between public choice theory on 
the one hand and the new right’s antipathy to the state’ being plausibly rooted in the 
projection of such pessimistic assumptions onto public officials that the rationality 
implies.125 The thesis also looks at this relationship and asks if this concept of 
rationality is relevant to today’s politics? Or does it imply an antipathy to the role of 
the state and collective provision in general?  
Neiman and Stambough argue that “rational choice theory is imbued with normative 
commitments…the most important of (which) derive from the typical rational choice 
practitioner’s loathing of ‘politics’ as process and a kind of celebration of the private 
exchange of markets.” They refer to rational choice theory as a ‘flight from politics’ 
and argue that ‘at the very time that popular disquiet with “politics” as a means of 
making governing choices has reached a climax, the infatuation with rational models 
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has grown.’126 Their point about the loathing of “politics” is a moot one. Survey data 
in the United Kingdom, at least, shows that in answer to a question about which 
occupational groups you ‘would trust’, 18% said ‘politicians generally’ in 1983 – not 
a wonderful score, but by 2013 the figure was still 18%. Sadly, this only goes to show 
that politicians have never been particularly trusted as there certainly was not a 
particular ‘climax’ of disquiet in 1998. 127  Some in the rational choice school have 
sought to deal with this by positing that politics is just another marketplace – imbued 
with the supposed rationality of such markets.  
At least part of this distrust is rooted in the notion that politicians will do and say 
anything for a vote in such a market. So, it is important to look in detail at the idea of 
politics as a marketplace and, in particular, the spatial metaphor of the centre ground 
in politics as outlined by rational choice theorist Downs.128 Hay contends that 
… a quite startling range of authors have … been impressed by the similarities between 
Labour’s ‘politics of catch-up’, with its studious targeting of the ‘median voter’ and the 
Downsian logic of electoral rationality. 129  
Hindmoor’s New Labour at the Centre130 utilises a ‘Downsian’ analysis to explain 
how New Labour repositioned itself in the political centre ground in the 1990s 
especially under Tony Blair. But he moves the model on from Downs. He suggested 
that the centre ground the party seeks to occupy is not some pre-determined fixed 
‘centre ground’ that a utility/vote maximising party moves towards, as under Downs’ 
spatial theory. Rather he argued, that the centre can be constructed, shaped and 
defined. Hindmoor’s work offers some insights into how a modification of some of 
the rigidities of rational choice theory can help the analysis of the public policy case 
studies.  
Whereas Downs would recognise the pre-existing centre and would map how a party 
would move from either left or right to occupy the centre ground, Hindmoor sees 
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things as much more complex. He sees them as  much more flexible and, ultimately, 
much more rewarding than simply an anodyne drive to the centre to command votes 
regardless of policy. He makes use of a range of different approaches to explain how 
New Labour ‘constructed a new centre ground.’131 This  centre ground is constructed 
through rhetoric, through innovation, through framing and through leadership. His 
notion that ‘parties cannot simply move to the political centre by abandoning one set 
of policies and adapting another. They must construct the positions they seek to 
occupy.’ Of course, there are limits to this process of construction, Hindmoor 
contends, and suggests that this difference to Downs’ theory is a function of four 
factors – policy and position; creativity; spin and choice. 132 This is not ‘spin’ in the 
crude sense suggested by countless commentators throughout the government’s time 
in office. 133 Just as  
…parties must convince voters that they are at the political centre, that their policies are 
moderate and that those of their opponents are extreme … spin is an essential part of the 
political process. 134 
Daddow has argued that establishing New Labour as a successful national movement 
‘… entailed the reinvention of the language of the party’s politics for public 
consumption’ and that ‘New Labour took the collapse of an already fragile distinction  
[between policy and language] … to new levels.’135 Daddow’s  point about language 
and policy is well-made given, as we shall see, the importance of narrative.  
Of all the variations of rational choice theory, Hindmoor’s adaptation and 
reassessment of Downs is the most appealing. As will be seen later, one of the key 
contentions of this thesis is that some aspect of each of the three case studies under 
review was unpopular and policies that a party simply seeking to maximise its vote 
would not have pursued them. Many of the ‘startling range of authors’ that Hay 
referred as utilising Downs, claim that ‘…the driving force behind programmatic 
renewal in the Labour Party since 1987 has been the search for votes.” 136 If this was 
the case, then the government would never have adopted policies that were so 
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unpopular. Hindmoor’s model is, as we shall see, utilised as part of the analysis of the 
case studies. 
Critics have argued that the assumptions underpinning rational choice theory are 
simply wrong. People do not just act out of pure self-interest or utility maximisation, 
and nor do they do so in a world of perfect and comprehensive information. Further, 
rational choice theory can privilege structure over agency but only when accounting 
for incentives and ignores ideas completely when the real world is a synthesis between 
structure, agency and ideation.137 Rational choice theory has, at best, a rather limited 
empirical record and, at worst, a very poor one.138  
For, if the rational choice theorists are accurate in the assumption that people generally 
and political actors, in particular,  are only self-interested, utility maximisers then this 
does not imply a predisposition to the collectively focussed, altruistically-driven 
politics of the left or centre-left.  Indeed, Nieman and Stamborough claim that, with 
few exceptions, “rational choice theorists begin with a deep repugnance for politics as 
a means of making choice.”139 Downs’ vote-maximisation theory, as adapted by 
Hindmoor, goes beyond this view. He argues that: 
…academic interpretations of  New Labour have downplayed or ignored the very possibility 
of persuasion. This may be because they have been derived form a theory interpreted in such 
a way as to mean that parties can only increase their votes by changing position and can only 
change position by changing their policies.140 
Using this to explore both the role of ministers and the decision-making and policy-
making processes of government will help underline the importance of persuasion and 
a greater understanding of government – and goes beyond the shortcomings of rational 
choice.   
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New institutionalism  
Lowndes has argued that ‘institutions matter’ because they are central to an  
…understanding of political behaviour and political outcomes, not just for the purpose of post-
hoc explanations, but to anticipate the shape and dynamics of ongoing political projects.’141 
 For March and Olsen, ‘the organisation of political life makes a difference’ and 
political institutions play a more autonomous role in shaping political outcomes.142 
They have argued that the norms and values embodied in political institutions shape 
the behaviour of individuals. Lowndes asserts that the ‘new institutionalism’ has 
emerged as a “reaction to the ‘under-socialised’ character of dominant approaches in 
the discipline”.143 However, the socialisation that she refers to is defined in a very 
broad context. The new institutionalism is concerned with the informal conventions 
of political life as well as with formal constitutions and organisational structures. It 
operates with a “more expansive (yet more sophisticated) definition of its subject 
matter and with more explicit (if diverse) theoretical frameworks.” 144 For Goodin, 
political institutions are no longer equated with political organisations; ‘institution’ is 
understood more broadly to refer to a ‘stable, recurring pattern of behaviour’. Of 
course, formal institutions – such as parties, legislatures, civil service, electorates and 
judiciaries – still matter, but the old focus on formal rules and organisations is 
enhanced by trying to understand informal conventions, relationships and networks.  
Tony Blair visited the Home Office in May 2006 to introduce John Reid as the new 
Home Secretary. This was a turbulent time for the department in the wake of what 
became known as the ‘foreign national prisoners’ crisis’145 and the sacking of the 
previous incumbent, Charles Clarke.  Blair described the Home Office as unique 
amongst government departments in that all of its apparent ‘client groups’ had a 
negative relationship with it.146 The ultimate ‘customers’ of the Home Office - 
criminals, asylum-seekers, prisoners, terrorists – all had an antagonistic relationship 
with the department. Its ultimate ‘customer’ – the public – had an entirely ambivalent 
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relationship with the department, in that they only generally encountered it on negative 
terms – as the result of trouble. Its immediate ‘clients’ – police, prison system, 
intelligence services – all act as ‘producer’ interests and seek resources from the 
department. Understanding this elaborate web of both formal and informal interests is 
better done by new institutionalism which elaborates the granularity of reality.  
As March and Olsen relate: 
… the bureaucratic agency, the legislative committee, and the appellate court are arenas for 
contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and 
structures that define and defend interests. They are political actors in their own right. 147  
Institutions are not inert, they possess active, participatory dimensions. The old 
institutionalism relied on descriptive-inductive methods, the new experiments with 
deductive approaches that start from theoretical concepts about the way institutions 
work. 148 The old had a real concern for formal written rules such as contracts, job 
descriptions, committee terms of reference, budget systems; the new would now 
include practices, unwritten conventions, informal norms and values, informal power 
networks, informal meanings and customs, informal impact of history and prior 
choices. It is important to understand how these formal and informal ‘actors’ relate to 
each other, especially within a department as complex as the Home Office and to 
understand both the formal and informal ways that actors develop strategies.  
Hay and Wincott argue that:  
… actors are strategic, seeking to realise complex, contingent and often changing goals. They 
do so in a context which favours certain strategies over others and must rely upon perception 
of that context which are at best incomplete and which may reveal themselves inaccurate after 
the event.149  
The difficulty in the political world is that it is a world of competing contexts in a 
world of contested terrain. Lowndes highlights a range of differing strains of new 
institutionalism to explain the role of these actors but accepts that they are probably 
now converging in many ways.150 She looks at a range of features common to each of 
these differing strains overall approach.  
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The first such common feature among the varying strands of the new institutionalism 
is an advance on the initial shift from the formal to the informal. The very real concern 
for the informal as well as formal dimensions of organisational constraints has moved 
on to include discourse theory, narrative methodologies and studies of political 
rhetoric.151 It looks at the ways in which institutions take the form of a collection of 
stories about the ‘way we do things round here’. Home Office officials play an 
interesting game with new Home Secretaries – they constantly remind them how long 
they have been in office and how it compares to their predecessors. So, on a weekly 
basis, there are light-hearted conversations about how the incumbent Home Secretary 
is no longer the shortest in post, having just surpassed the tenure of one of his or her 
illustrious predecessors. But all the time the implicit message is ‘Respice post te! 
Hominem te esse memento! Momento mori!’152, that is, ‘Look behind you. Remember 
that you are a man. Remember you are mortal’. In other words, ‘we now have a strong 
say over your political destiny and your political mortality.’  
The second common feature within new institutionalism concerns a stability-dynamic 
continuum. Stability has always been seen as a key feature of organisations. Before 
new institutionalism, Huntington defined political institutions as “stable, valued and 
recurring patterns of behaviour”153 There is a recognition that they are not stable as a 
result of some magical process and the key is to establish the processes and dynamics 
that allow institutions to remain stable, especially at times of change. This approach 
explains that the mechanisms for stability and destabilisation are the same. Stability is 
conditional on the continuing presence of particular forms of support. As Lowndes 
contends, “an institution is destabilised when change occurs in the institutional 
environment.” This is particularly the case when the institutions with which it is 
connected are destabilised.154   
Streeck (2001) argues that institutions are ‘continuously established, restored, 
redefined and defended against all sorts of disorganising forces’ – internal and 
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external, endogenous and exogenous.155 During my three years in the Home Office, 
there were at least two major reorganisations and a constant review of departmental 
structures in the context of its continuing programme of legislation.  
The third common feature is the use of power and critique inside institutions. For 
institutionalism, events and processes are described in the context of existing values 
norms and structures. Power is formal and clear and there is no room for any 
substantive discussion. Lowndes’s second phase institutionalists understood that 
institutions reflect  the values of society – including its power relationships – formal 
and informal, overt and hidden. What the institutionalists reported in neutral terms 
were in fact processes, procedures, structures and arrangements that embodied and 
reflected the politics, power relationships, challenges, contest and conflicts – formal 
and informal – inside each and very institution. The most mundane piece of 
information, the most routine of processes can be loaded with the power relationships 
that are determined both within and beyond institutions. The most mundane social 
interaction can reinforce norms and values. Pierson contends that ‘every time we shake 
hands, the strength of [a] norm is reinforced’. He goes to say that:  
The same argument can be applied with considerable force to collective understandings – of 
how the world works, what is to be valued, what an individual’s interests might be… who that 
individual’s friends and enemies might be156   
The new institutionalism also understands that institutions are ‘messy and 
differentiated’.157 There is also recognition that there are very different power 
resources within institutions and that there is no such thing as completely ‘closed’ 
institutions.  
For institutionalists, it is institutions that determine, or at least shape, certain outcomes 
in political life. Nonetheless, Lowndes points to two sources of contingency. Firstly, 
she argues  
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… understanding how any one political institution operates requires that we locate it within its 
wider institutional context and study its two-way linkages with other institutions – political 
and non-political, at the same and different spatial scales, and across the passage of time.158 
Secondly, contingency is ‘understanding [that] institutional dynamics requires an 
appreciation of the mutually constitutive character of agents and institutions,’ that is 
to say although institutions are the product of human agency they constrain it at the 
same time. Lowndes calls this the ‘Janus-faced’ nature of institutions.159  
The final common element to the various stands of the new institutionalism – structure 
and agency – is the recognition that actors within institutions must have some reflexive 
and strategic capacities. Actors, to at least some extent, must have the capacity to look 
back and learn from past experience and also be able to look forward and attempt to 
influence future events.  In older models of institutionalism, the capacity for an actor 
to have any agency was entirely dependent on their position within the structure and 
forms, rules and norms within the institution. The new institutionalist analysis is more 
compelling and Lowndes point to other methodologies that new institutionalists are 
starting to utilise such as ethnography and case studies.160  
Pierson notes that a path-dependency approach rooted in an institutionalist context is 
useful in studying the causal processes in institutions.161 He quotes Sewell as defining 
path-dependence as  
… what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence 
of events occurring at a later point in time.’162 
Yet, if there is such a causal dependency, not every element of the path is as important 
as the others. For Pierson, the ‘earlier parts of a sequence matter much more than later 
parts’ – timing matters.163  He is also clear that an event that happened too late in the 
sequence may have no effect but would have done had it happened earlier. Equally, 
sometimes events that happen too early in a process, might be much more important 
had they happened later in the sequence. However, once a set of events are dealt with, 
                                                 
158 Ibid pp.44-45 
159 Lowndes (2013) Ibid. p.77 
160 See Dunleavy, Patrick (1991) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice Macmillan Basingstoke 
on game theory; Douglas, M (1987) How Institutions Think Routledge and Kegan Paul London, on 
ethnography                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
161 Pierson, Paul (2000) ‘Increasing returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics’ The American 
Political Science Review Vol.94, No. 2, pp.251-267 pp.263-264 
162 Ibid. p.251 
163 Ibid. p.263 – quoted in Mahoney, Jim (2000) ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’ Theory and 
Society Vol.29, No.4 pp.507-548 p.510 
53 
 
that is, decisions are made, then the ‘probability of further steps in a particular 
direction induce further movements in the same direction.’ In a path-dependent model, 
such action reinforces the path, and makes alternative decisions or the cost of exit from 
the path increase. Pierson describes this as an ‘increasing returns process’.164 Timing, 
the notion of a temporal dimension, does matter as we shall see in each of the policy 
areas to be discussed.  
Sometimes, there occurs what is described, in institutionalist terms, as a ‘critical 
juncture’.165 Capoccia and Keleman describe such a concept as the moment when 
‘structural (economic, cultural, ideological, organisational) influences on political 
action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period’166 and times when 
political actors can [sometimes must] ‘overcome the usual bias towards inertia caused 
by lock-in and feedback effects.’167 Institutional change is characterised by ‘long 
periods of path dependence punctuated by critical junctures, the origin of which lay in 
the institution itself.’168 I share Consterdine and Hampshire’s view that such critical 
junctures are useful for ‘examining … case studies where a period of policy inertia is 
punctuated by a period of transformation which… leaves an enduring legacy.’169  
When looking at the case studies, I have applied the concepts of  path dependency and 
critical juncture. These concepts usefully inform my analysis of the case studies as an 
insider. The new institutionalism, in all its forms, emphasised far more readily than 
previous models that people and the informal dimensions of institutions matter, and 
this is also the core claim of the interpretivist approach to political science. Such an 
approach is rooted in an ethnography that owes much to anthropology and sociology 
rather than political science. 
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Dahl’s New Haven, Heclo and Wildavsky’s Treasury and Public Money – 
hints of an interpretivist ‘turn’ 
Two early examples of the analysis and observation of political activity that have 
focussed on the detailed study of governmental institutions are Dahl’s work170 on New 
Haven and Heclo and Wildavsky’s work171 on the Treasury. Both were extraordinarily 
innovative and pioneering works – Dahl in 1960 and the Treasury study in 1974 - but 
are not without flaws. Domhoff contends that Dahl missed many important points 
about the relationships between elites in New Haven and how they impacted on the 
prevailing power structures in the city.172 He showed that the social and economic 
elites did overlap, although Dahl said they did not; that business leaders were not 
interested in downtown urban renewal – they were; that, contrary to Dahl, the business 
sector did have an impact; that Yale University was fully interested and powerful in 
the affairs of New Haven; and that there was a downtown power structure – Dahl said 
there was not. Domhoff concluded that Dahl was correct to suggest that Mayor 
Richard Lee and his Redevelopment Administrator, Edward Logue, governed New 
Haven, but the First National Bank of New Haven and Yale University ruled New 
Haven. For Domhoff, Dahl started from the perspective of resisting the notion that a 
dominant economic class had ‘preponderant power’ and allowed this to cloud his 
ultimate judgement and miss the subtle distinction between those who govern and 
those who rule.   Nonetheless, Dahl’s approach was certainly innovative and reflected 
elements of both institutionalism and ethnography. He has made a significant 
contribution to our understanding of the power relations between elites, including how 
those who govern actually govern and how to analyse local structures and institutions 
and their relationship to power.  
The pioneering work of Heclo and Wildavsky and their innovative study of the 
Treasury did open doors on a previously largely cosseted and secret world – but it too 
is not without its critics. It also contains hints of an interpretivist ‘turn’. Weller argues 
that it was probably one of the key forerunners of the interpretive approach to studying 
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politics and government. They may not, he contends, “identify themselves as 
interpretivists ….but the innovative methodology lit the way for other researchers in 
the 1970s and afterwards.”173 Parry argues that the study lacked what he describes as 
the ‘normally strong American angles’, that is, “the rigorous analysis of quantitative 
data, discussion of the influence of key personalities, and delineation of the policy 
process on particular issues.”174  
Central to these pioneering studies was the notion, as Heclo and Wildavsky would 
have it, that in order to ‘understand how political administrators behave we must begin 
by seeing the world through their eyes.’175 All three case studies are rooted in the 
observation and analysis of the key actors. They represent, in their various fashions, 
significant progress in our understanding and knowledge and offer insight to an 
approach that I have taken further forward by utilising my perspective as participant 
as well as the researcher. 
Up close and personal: interpretivism and ethnography 
Rhodes has argued that one way to get to the core of these issues is to study political 
elites ‘up close and personal’. He argues that academics must look well beyond the 
descriptive in order to understand these key factors such as networks, memories, 
rituals and symbols. Ethnography reconstructs the meanings of the actions of actors 
by recovering “other people’s stories from practices, actions, text, interviews and 
speeches”. It encompasses many ways of collecting qualitative data about beliefs and 
practices – for example, diary analysis, shadowing, elite interviewing and participant 
accounts.176  
He has utilised this approach in a number of studies177 and argues that the main 
difference between a ‘mainstream’ approach and his ‘interpretive’ approach is that 
that mainstream assumes that the beliefs and practices of elites such as minister and 
civil servants can be ‘read off from their institutional positions and socioeconomic 
background’. An interpretive approach is far less deterministic. This entails political 
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scientists having to ‘study the texts – the writings, lectures, interview transcripts and 
actions – of civil servants and ministers to identify their beliefs and use private 
documents as an invaluable check on public pronouncements.’178  
Rhodes studied three ministries – the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs – during the 2001-2005 Parliament. He reports on the 
government and departmental settings; the role of the key actors, the ministers and the 
permanent secretaries; and then looks at the ‘departmental court’; protocols, rituals 
and languages; networks and governance and a specific ministerial resignation that 
occurred during the study. His account of the respective roles of minsters and 
permanent secretaries is based on an analysis of their ‘engagement diaries, repeat 
interviews with ministers and a qualitative analysis of their work drawn from... (his) 
fieldwork notebooks.’179 
By ‘departmental court’, Rhodes means both the ministerial court – the ministerial 
Private Offices, special advisers, press office and junior ministers – and the permanent 
secretary court – his/her Private Office, senior management team and director 
generals. He looks at the practices of this departmental court – its ‘protocols, rituals 
and languages that make up the willed ordinariness of everyday life’.180  
Gains181 suggests that such an approach is “ideally suited to uncover the informal 
processes that accompany the formal rules of the game and serve to structure the 
processes of policy-making and policy delivery amongst elites and other policy 
actors.”182 For her, the strength of ethnographic enquiry is in the uncovering of 
meaning in previously un-researched, hard to reach or newly emerging areas of 
governance and policy-making. This is achieved, partly, by the codification and 
analysis of these ‘protocols, rituals and languages’ in each department, between 
departments and across government generally.  
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Rhodes believes that his ethnographic approach to understanding the behaviour of 
political elites opens up the ‘black boxes of elite behaviour’ and provides an important 
corrective to research methods where political scientists make assumptions about the 
beliefs and interests of these key political actors.183 This is entirely right and is as 
important for the deconstruction and challenge to these assumptions about how 
politicians act and the beliefs and interests behind them, as it is for the insight it brings 
to the contents of the ‘black box’.   
Uncovering the understandings, beliefs and practices of actors in a governance setting 
can provide an “understanding of the meaning making of policy makers involved in 
policy framing; of policy deliverers, re-framing policy intent as they operationalise 
policy; of those who have demands and those to whom the policy is directed, to see if 
it has the desired effect.”184 It also provides texture, depth and nuance and lets 
interviewees explain the meaning of their actions, providing an authenticity that can 
only come from the main characters involved in the story. For the interpretive 
approach, narrative is a hugely important concept – and refers to both the stories by 
which the people studied make sense of their worlds and to the stories by which the 
researcher makes sense of the narratives and actions of the people studied.185  
Bevir and Rhodes admit to an increasing interest in the growing literature on 
storytelling that is consistent with their ‘use of narratives and an insightful way of 
analysing the everyday life of political actors.’186 Such story-telling has three 
characteristics – a language game, performing game and management game. They 
report how political actors use “stories to make sense of the world, to gain and pass on 
information, to inspire movement, to persuade other to act in certain ways, and as their 
repository of the organisation’s institutional memory.”187 Bates et al. have said that in 
building up such narratives they ‘… identify the actors, the decision points they faced 
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the choices they made, the paths taken and shunned and the manner in which their 
choices generated events and outcomes.188 
Bevir and Rhodes also relate how government departments use stories as the 
‘repository of the organisation’s institutional memory’.189 Whilst I agree with this 
point, and the notion that the department is one of the actors concerned in any analysis, 
I would also contend that there are differing institutional memories. I was at the Home 
Office for almost three and half years and worked with three different Home 
Secretaries. At various stages of this time in one department, it would be fair to say 
that I became the ministerial keeper of the department’s institutional memory – and 
probably has a different view of that memory than the permanent secretary did. There 
would certainly have been overlaps, but I suspect we would both have been worried if 
the memory was entirely the same. Superficially, the ethnographic researcher could 
pick up this nuance, but it might not have been obvious. 
Ethnographic research has taken things further in terms of assisting our understanding 
of the multi-dimensional and multi-layered environment within which ministers 
operated, but also has its limitations. Rhodes recognised this. His main concern was 
about his role as a nonparticipant observer. He comments, ‘I report the interviews as 
if I am neutral and as if the data are given to me in pure or unmediated form. I am not 
that naïve.’190 He agrees that all observers construct their material drawing on prior 
theories, accepts that the department’s story is his construction of how his interviewees 
see their world and ‘that it is crucial to locate people’s beliefs and practices against a 
background of traditions.’ This is not to say that Rhodes’ use of ethnography in pursuit 
of his interpretivist approach to understanding government and politics has not been 
useful – it has. But, if interpretivism is “useful in helping us understand the processes 
that social actors engage in to make sense of their reality and to guide their actions,”191 
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it should also be remembered that the “interpretive processes used by social actors 
requires an act of interpretation on the part of scholars.” 192 
Rhodes contends that interpretivism “takes a variously constructed world, the 
unintended consequences of human action and contingency of public affairs as its 
basic building blocks. It urges us to look for more and better ways of …. studying 
politics.”193 Others, such as Crewe and Rai, try to understand and explain so that, 
perhaps, we all might live in the world of politics. They seek to deconstruct the world 
of politics and make it more tangible for the non-expert observer and student. Rai and 
Crewe’s recent works have focussed more readily on parliamentary rather than the 
governmental or legal institutions such as on the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords.194 This is more easily done by the insider, the participant. This is not just the 
case in terms of the equivalent of the local ‘argot’ or ‘patois’ – the discernible local 
language of bureaucracies – but also the local ‘contextual knowledge’. Yanow argues 
that this is the “knowledge that develops in interaction among people with their 
programs, operations or objects (physical artefacts) that are specific to a local context, 
such as a work practice in an organisational setting….and much of it is tacitly 
known.”195  Hafner describes it as a “kind of nonverbal knowing that evolves from 
seeing and interacting with someone over time—there’s something about actually 
seeing people and experiencing whatever it is they’re carrying with them that gives 
you a sense of how they’re feeling that day.”196 Yanow reinforces this when describing 
local knowledge as ‘the very mundane, yet expert understanding of and practical 
reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience.”197 The point is that 
to understand this array of differing planes of truth, knowledge and understanding, the 
researcher needs to get as close as possible to the subject as possible, for as long as 
possible. As we have already seen, this relationship between “the particular [that is, 
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local knowledge] and the universal is closely related to his (Geertz’s) arguments 
concerning ‘thick description.”198 But, as an insider, I need also to resist the attraction 
of Riddell’s ‘private patois’.199 
Geertz refers to the ‘interpretive turn’ in theorising as  
… turning from trying to explain social phenomena by weaving them into grand textures of 
cause and effect to trying to explain them by placing them in local frames of awareness.200 
 
In reality, both approaches are needed to fully explain what has happened and why. In 
terms of this thesis, there does need to be an understanding of the ‘grand textures of 
cause and effect’ within which the policy options in each of the three case studies are 
developed. However, there also needs to be a full understanding of the ‘local frames 
of awareness’ and the local knowledge and texture. Geertz understands this as he talks 
of ‘a rather dialectical movement, tacking between…. the small imaginings of local 
knowledge and the large ones of cosmopolitan intent.’201 Flyvbjerg contends that 
researchers have to “begin their work by phenomenologically asking ‘little questions’ 
and that such a process, whilst it ‘may often seem tedious and trivial,’ was essential. 
This focus on minutiae is rooted in the notion that ‘small questions often lead to big 
answers.” 202 This approach is ‘marked less by a perfection of consensus than by a 
refinement of debate … what gets better is the precision with which we vex each 
other.’203  
I have both ‘been there’ and observed my colleagues and now seek to relay these 
‘stories’ in the role of dispassionate researcher. Hammersley and Atkinson state that 
ethnography ‘captures the meaning of everyday human activities’ and encourages the 
researcher to ‘get out there and see what actors are thinking and doing.’204 They 
summarised the concept of ethnography by saying 
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… the ethnographer participates, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended 
period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions; in fact, 
collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues with which he or she is 
concerned.205 
 
Gains argues that it is “ideally suited to uncover the informal processes that 
accompany the formal rules of the game and serve to structure the processes of policy-
making and policy delivery amongst elites and other policy actors.” 206 Westbrook 
suggests politics ‘however and by whoever conducted, is done in accordance with 
some set of beliefs held by the powerful, an imagination of what can, and should be 
done.’ 207 Ethnographic enquiry can prioritise and uncover these factors. It has 
‘strengths in uncovering meaning in previously un-researched, hard to reach or newly 
emerging areas of governance and policy-making, a ‘method of discovery’ to allow 
for grounded theorising.’ 208 As Gains indicates 
… uncovering the understandings, beliefs and practices of actors in a governance setting can 
provide an understanding of the meaning making of policy-makers … involved in the policy 
making process209  
Such an approach can also inform a detailed look at the innards of government. It can  
show how rituals, symbols, language, rhetoric and practice can all usefully inform our 
understanding of policy processes within parliaments.  
In addition to these three key approaches, it is also important to understand the 
literature on policy failure. Central to this is the notion that success and failure are not 
simply reductionist options, but rather sit on a continuum. As McConnell postulates  
… “failure” resides at the extreme end of a success/failure spectrum where it is characterised 
by absolute non-achievement. Such a situation will be unusual … failure is rarely unequivocal 
and absolute … even policies that have become known as classic policy failure also produced 
small and modest success.210  
 
Whilst it may be convenient for political pundits and the media in general to measure 
the success or failure of a policy in stark black and white terms, the reality is much 
more complicated. As we shall see, each of the case studies under discussion in this 
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study can be seen as both, to varying degrees, successful in some ways and failing on 
others.  
Policy Failure 
As an active participant in the political world and from my ministerial perspective, I 
can identify a range of factors that I would expect to be central to the decision making 
and policy making process of the public policy case studies that are the subject of this 
thesis. This experience allows me, as insider, to bring a ‘theoretical sensitivity’ to the 
research process,  that is,  an ‘ability to recognise what is important in data and to give 
it meaning. It helps to formulate theory  that is faithful of the phenomena under 
study.’211  This range of factors is now considered within the context of both this 
ministerial experience and the literature on policy failure.  
The epistemological roots of the policy failure literature are rich and varied. They 
range from discussion on policy evaluation and improvement which is very process 
and outputs focussed; the concept of ‘public value’ as originated by Moore in defence 
of the role of government;212 writings on good practice in the process of policy making 
and management; writings on the political aspects of policy and the implication for 
political success; a limited body of work on the explicit treatment of policy success; 
and an extensive literature on failure including policy ‘fiascos’, scandals, crises and 
disasters.213 The purpose in this section is not to rehearse all the various arguments in 
the literature but to draw out the dimensions that will be of use in this study.  
McConnell concludes that there are three forms of policy failure – processes, 
programmes and politics - and this is a useful starting point for considering the utility 
of the policy failure literature for this study.214 It can be argued further, that the three 
forms dovetail neatly with the notion that to understand phenomena completely – and 
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certainly beyond the realms of rational choice – one needs to understand the roles of 
structure, agency and ideation.215  
The model suggested in Figure 2:1 is rooted in the work of McConnell and others but 
is offered only in a very general sense as a device to further explain the case study 
policy areas that this thesis. I recognises that these distinctions are blurry at best and 
not as rigid as some would have it. Each of the public policy case studies will be 
assessed within the context of McConnell’s ‘processes, programmes and politics.’ I 
argue that there are also overarching factors that need to be taken into account when 
looking at policymaking processes in general and policy failure in particular.  
  
In Figure 2:1, these overarching factors are electoral (and other temporal) pressures 
and political processes in general. These are important beyond the narrower focus of 
structure, ideation and agency – or indeed, process, programmes and politics – and the 
factors I have identified in the third column are related to these dimensions. These 
factors are rooted in both the academic literature and my extensive experience as a 
former government minister.   
I argue that to understand structure and process it is necessary to understand the 
‘political ground’, that is the context, historical, political and structural. As we have 
seen, neither decisions nor policies are made in a vacuum. McConnell argues that 
‘governments engage in processes to produce policy decisions.’ Importantly, 
understanding the failure of these processes may be the key to understanding a specific 
policy failure. He goes on to suggest that ‘process failures can be dissected … in order 
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to help us grasp key aspects of such failures, as well as providing us with standard 
criteria for assessment.’216 Such process failures can help us understand the paucity of 
preparation or protection of the structures needed to implement policy ideas in the first 
place and link back clearly to an absence of rigour in the design of processes and both 
each stage of Kingdon’s policy streams and Campbell’s discussion on the process of 
framing policy processes as discussed above.217 
The political ground has to be prepared well to elicit consensual decision and policy 
making. An example that illustrates poor preparation would be the rebellion by 
government backbenchers on welfare benefits for single-parents in December 1997.218 
The ground had  not been well prepared  and 47 Labour MPs voted against the 
government, with at least 60+ abstaining.219 How the cuts in these benefits fitted in to 
the wider perspective of welfare reform policy and how much better off single parents 
might have become after the full policy was implemented were not explained.  Failure 
stemmed from lack of preparation of the political ground. The political ground also 
needs to be protected, there must be an ability for a policy and its proponents to garner 
support to protect their ground from both friends and foes.  
For McConnell, the policies that government produce are always designed to succeed. 
They are designed to address goals and achieve outcomes. They are the result, 
arguably, of ideational struggle both about the ends and the means to be achieved. 
Programme (or policy) failure  
can be characterised by varying degrees of failure to be implemented as intended, achieve 
desired outcomes, benefit target groups, meet criteria which are highly valued in the public 
domain… and attract opposition to, and attract little or no support, for either the policy goals 
and/or the means of achieving them.220 
This implies that there are alternatives at every stage in the policy process and that the 
role of the policy entrepreneurs and advocates referred to earlier is a very real one in 
the development and potential success or failure of policy. Further, as discussed above, 
framing matters to. As Béland (2005) maintains: 
Policy entrepreneurs succeed in imposing certain policy ideas partly because they appeal to 
the public through the mobilization of political symbols ever-present in the shared ideological 
repertoires available in their society.221 
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It matters too in the context of policy failure. Edelman argues that a policy failure ‘is 
a creation of the language used to depict it; its identification is a political act, not a 
recognition of fact.’222 In other words, the ideational contest continues throughout the 
life of the policy. That is 
… the verdict about a public policy, programme or project is shaped in ongoing ‘framing 
contests’ between its advocates and shapers on the one hand and its critics and victims on the 
other.223 
The assessment of the relative success or failure of a policy is as rooted in framing and 
discourse as is the analysis of the policy alternatives and agenda in the first place. This 
is an important regard in the assessment of both the policy making process and the 
success and failure of the policy.  
The development of policy is important too. The ideational dynamic of framing and 
assessing paradigms, generating alternatives and ensuring that all stages of the 
development work are carried out  are all important. It is essential that there is no 
‘missing middle’, no missing level of policy development or missing links in the 
process overlooked that could prove to be problematic or dysfunctional later in the 
process. Politicians also need to be clear too that they are not only asking the right 
questions, but also finding the right answers.  This sounds straight forward, but often, 
either the problem identified is not described appropriately, or the solutions offered do 
not address it.  The real problem or solutions  are ‘hiding in plain sight’ and are 
overlooked with invariably dysfunctional consequences further down the line.  
As the housing and planning minister in 2002, I had innumerable meetings about the 
number of new houses that local councils would commit to allowing in their planning 
documents. This was not a commitment to actually build anything, but agreement of 
the numbers to include in local plans. Sometimes, very acrimonious meetings on 
policy development would end up in litigation and court cases. It seemed, at times, 
that both department and the local councils spent more time, energy and resources on 
the detail of these numbers than on the work entailed in actually building houses.224 It 
seemed to me that sometimes the department spent more time on developing the rules 
and regulations around private housing developments than it did on supporting 
                                                 
222 Edelman, Murray (1988) Constructing the Political Spectacle University of Illinois Press Chicago, 
Il. P. 31 
223 Bovens, Mark and ‘t Hart, Paul (2016) ‘Revisiting the study of policy failures.’ Journal of European 
Public Policy Vol.23 No. 5 pp.653-666 p.654. See also Boin, Arjen, t’Hart Paul and McConnell, Alan 
(2009) ‘Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests.’ Journal of European 
Public Policy Vol. 16 No.1 pp.81-106 
224 Personal recollection of Author 
66 
 
developments in the council and social housing sector, so houses could actually be 
built. The lack of  affordable housing in the social sector was a problem ‘hiding in 
plain sight.’ Equally, it was never completely clear that all aspects of government were 
committed to the same policy that joined-up government was anything other than 
always talked about, but rarely achieved.  
Many policies were increasingly delayed, modified, resisted, watered down or 
scrapped because the ‘joined-up’ elements were too difficult. As a Home Office 
minister there were few examples of policy development or implementation that were 
completely and only the purview of the Home Office. Every other government 
department, to some degree, had a view or were impacted upon by counter-terrorism 
policy, immigration policy, or indeed policing. I had, for example, extensive meetings 
with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) prior to a 
European Council I was attending as the security minister over the level of nitrates in 
fertilisers. The Home Office Council wanted to restrict the level of materials that could 
and indeed had been used as a key ingredient in explosives, but DEFRA’s interests 
were more readily about the commercial agricultural sector. The Home Office, of 
course, prevailed.  
As transport minister, I was the sponsoring minister for the British Transport Police 
(BTP) force and one of the key policies I developed with them was the creation of a 
police authority for the force. This was a largely non-contentious issue and was 
welcomed. The only problem was that, as the BTP was not a recognised police force 
under police legislation, the authority was not created under the laws that pertained for 
Home Office forces. This might have not been an issue, except that the police 
authorities which oversaw the activities of forces recognised under law by the Home 
Office were exempt from VAT – the BTP was not. This would cost £4m per year225 
which had not been provided for. A system that had ‘joined-up government’ much 
more readily bedded into the intra-government structures and processes would have 
picked this up automatically.   
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Thirdly, McConnell maintains that politics represents the final form of policy failure. 
He argues that ‘public policies can shape and be shaped by politics from the careerism 
of public officials to the pursuit of ideologies.’226 Politics in the context of the policy 
making process is essentially the situated agency of the key players. People are central 
to the politics of policy making and are not  
… autonomous, so their agency is always situated against an inherited web of beliefs and 
practices … [that] draw on inherited tradition.’227 
Agency matters as well, but individuals operate in hierarchies and power relations 
prevail.  In my experience, it was always useful if a policy had both a strong ministerial 
sponsor, usually within the originating department,  and at least the tacit support of 
Number 10 and the Prime Minister. However, neither of these alone is a guarantee of 
success.  All players come to a policy process with their own situated agency, but 
senior politicians matter more in politics and possess an array of beliefs, practices and 
narratives. A strong internal ministerial sponsor may still have difficulties with the rest 
of government – for example, Charles Clarke and tuition fees or Alan Milburn and 
foundation hospitals.228 Equally, the position of the Prime Minister and Number 10 on 
a particular policy can be very important, but it does depend on part on the relative 
strength of the PM and the electoral and temporal pressure. The support of Blair, for 
example, in the spring of 2007 was less effective than at any other stage in his 
premiership. Much more than I observed at the time, the impending changeover 
between Blair and Brown was a real fin de siècle moment – and the end of an era, 
rather than the smooth internal transition of leadership from one to the other.  
In Figure 2.2, I have presented the seven key variables as a schematic, analytical 
framework based on my ministerial experience that complements the theoretical 
framework outlined in this chapter. It makes clear the  interdependent nature of the 
relationships.  All these variables need to be developed in the policy process to ensure 
success  and governments do not organise for failure, but failures happen.  All of the 
variables presented here are important,  as are the substantive contextual factors – 
electoral and temporal pressures, and political processes. The importance of a policy  
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matters in the context of the start, middle or end of the government’s term of office; 
the accession of a new leader; the perceived reasons for the success or failure of a 
policy; the role of ministers and other similar variables. Sometimes, but rarely, failure 
may be fatal and can only be recovered from if there is either a change of government 
or a change of leadership.229 Recovery will also depend on the stock of political capital 
that the minister or government possess; how cogently the failure is explained and 
framed; how long they have been in office; and, crucially, whether the prevailing view 
is that the causes rested with the government (endogenous) or were beyond the 
government’s fault (exogenous).230 
These three forms of policy failure sit comfortably with an interpretive approach – 
albeit with an understanding of the contribution that new institutionalism can make. It 
is important to understand that there is a clear role for situated agency as discussed 
above but if an inherited web of beliefs and practices matter, then so does the 
prevailing history, context, informal and informal processes within institutions. It is  
equally important to understand that the policy failure literature does not, in an 
ontological sense, sit easily with a rational choice approach.  
McConnell offers three substantive outcomes for policies to ‘help us think about 
degrees of failure and their relationship to success.’231 These are a ‘tolerable failure’  
(or resilient success); a ‘conflicted failure’ (or conflicted success); and an outright 
failure (or marginal success). In essence a tolerable failure does not impede the 
attainment of goals, a conflicted failure is one whereas many goals are achieved as not 
achieved with as much defence as criticism, and outright failure does not achieve the 
goals that it set out to achieve with opposition optimal and support virtually non-
existent.   
The thesis will look at each of these elements in more detail in each of the chapters on 
the public policy case studies. It will also consider the model offered by Hudson et al 
in the context of persistence policy failure.232 They offer four broad contributors to 
policy failure: overly optimistic expectations; implementation in dispersed 
governance; inadequate collaborative policymaking; and the vagaries of the political 
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cycle. It may well be that the seven factors offered in Figure 2:2 fit naturally into these 
contributing factors. Optimism, for example, implies an absence of either preparing or 
protecting the political ground in a policy area; dispersed governance implies elements 
such as ‘the missing middle’ or ‘hiding in plain sight’; inadequate collaborative 
policymaking is essentially the role of ‘joined-up government’ and, to an extent, the 
role of No.10 and ministerial sponsors; and the vagaries of the political cycle is similar 
to the electoral  and temporal pressure and the political processes discussed earlier.  
Summary  
This discussion of the three core approaches of rational choice theory, new 
institutionalism and interpretivism, and the analysis and review of the academic 
literature in the field has shown that there may indeed be some political science 
theories that can usefully be deployed to analyse the case studies. These are the 
informal dimensions of interpretivism, such as the beliefs, practices, norms and values 
of a decentred approach; and a path-dependence and critical juncture approach from 
new institutionalism. Although I have established that Hindmoor’s interpretation of 
the Downsian spatial framework and vote-maximisation model will also be very useful 
in discussing how policies are arrived at and  how narratives are developed to explain, 
support and promulgate a policy, the same cannot be said for rational choice theory in 
general.  
Central to both the discussion on these theories and the analysis of the policy failure 
literature has been the notion that structure, agency and ideation matters – and that the 
most successful and worthwhile theoretical framework will be based on a hybrid of 
these three areas. Rational choice theory is too prescriptive, its assumptions too 
positivist and naturalistic and its commitments too normative. As Daddow maintains 
the interpretivist perspective allows us to 
… focus not only on the ideational structuring effects of traditions but also on the part 
individuals play in responding to – and remoulding – those traditions as they respond to 
perceived dilemmas. In doing so … [it] … is explicitly historicist in encouraging an 
appreciation of the significance of ‘situated agency’ and attentiveness to the history of 
events.233 
This approach, together with the key elements of the new institutionalist approach and 
the most important aspects of the literature on policy failure, form the building blocks 
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of the theoretical framework of this thesis. All of these factors will need to be 
considered within the context of the theoretical schema outlined in this chapter. The 
next chapter looks at the methodological framework used in this thesis – how we are 
going to take matters further and analyse these case studies more fully and add to our 
understanding of the development of policy and the art of decision making. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodological Context:  case studies, elite interviews, and ethnography 
Research design  
In his insider view of life at the centre of the Labour Government, Diamond argues 
that it felt as though it was a “search for a coherent story and narrative about the 
government’s strategic purpose.” A search that, he contends, was a “constant, 
ultimately irresolvable preoccupation.”234  The search for strategic purpose is easier 
looking back and on reflection than it is at the time – when, clearly, getting on with 
governing itself takes precedence.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology used in the research design 
and why it was chosen as the most appropriate for the thesis. Diamond’s work comes 
from a similar ontological standpoint as this thesis, although, there are very real 
differences between the insider perspective of an official – he worked as a special 
adviser and then in the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit – and that of a government 
minister. It will be argued that the perspective of a minister is also different from the 
perspective highlighted in the ethnographic, interpretivist research of Bevir and 
Rhodes and can therefore offer insights that both complement and go beyond their 
ground-breaking work.235  
The research design for this thesis involves the use of case studies that concern key 
aspects of the formulation, development and implementation (successfully or 
otherwise) of government policy during my time as a minister in the Home Office. 
The research material that makes up the case studies has been drawn from a wide range 
of different sources. It comes from primary official departmental sources; the 
recollections, reflections, notes and meetings schedules of the author as participant; 
secondary sources – such as media, newspaper and TV coverage and analysis of 
events; output from academics both in general as well as specific to the case study 
subject areas; memoirs and other written material by politicians, journalists and public 
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officials; and a series of interviews with a range of participants in these events - 
ministers, MPs, civil servants and others. The interviewees include other former 
government ministers – both those involved in the case studies and those in wider and 
more senior leadership posts; civil servants – both those in leadership roles and those 
policy specialists  in the areas of policing, immigration and counter-terrorism; special 
advisers – both across government as well as in the specialist areas of the case studies, 
in the Home Office and beyond; and journalists and academics – both broader political 
generalists as well as specialists in home affairs and law and order. This combination 
of key sources and the key reflections of the author as participant makes this a unique 
piece of work that will add significantly to our broader knowledge and understanding 
of policy making in government.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain in further detail why this is the most 
appropriate research design for this project. It will discuss the issues surrounding the 
use of case studies and the cross-comparison of different case studies. It will look at 
the potential problems with the use of case studies and the accumulation of the material 
necessary to inform them. It will then explore the issues surrounding the process of 
interviewing elite participants as well as the problematic dimensions of using 
interviews at all. It will consider in more detail the policy making process that is at the 
core of this thesis, the policy context within which the case studies were developed 
and  the role of the ministers within these processes and this context. It will also look 
at the notion of ideas as frames and the sub-texts and undercurrents of policy 
development that occur as paradigms unfold and alternatives emerge.  
This study will then examine the role of the researcher as participant – the ‘auto-
ethnographic’ dimension of the thesis. It will focus on the issues that arise when the 
author is a participant in the political events under discussion as well as being the 
academic carrying out the research. While these issues are not unduly problematic, 
they need to be understood and recognised.  
As indicated in chapter two, there is a growing use in political science of ethnographic 
techniques that principally come from anthropological and sociological traditions. 
Bevir and Rhodes argue that ‘while no method can guarantee the accuracy of data and 
stories’ there are heuristic contexts for checking the veracity and reliability of data.236 
Crucially, Bevir and Rhodes do not rely simply on elite interviews alone. They 
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interviewed others beyond ministers and permanent secretaries, and they had access 
to written records of meetings. They also carried out fieldwork and used this ‘non-
participant’ observation as a way of corroborating some of the claims of those 
interviewed. The ethnographic researcher as participant adds another dimension to the 
corroboration and validation of these processes. Arguably it offers greater insight than 
their non-participant model does, whilst also presenting more challenges. 
Case Studies: Why and how to use them  
The use of the case study in political science is not undisputed. Some argue that it 
undermines the entire purpose of social science. Gerring recognises that the case study 
“occupies a vexed position in the discipline of political science.”237 He describes how 
a ‘range of methodologists view the case study method with circumspection’ whilst 
the ‘discipline continues to provide a vast number of case studies, many of which have 
entered the pantheon of classic works.’238 He contends that the method of the case 
study is ‘solidly ensconced and, perhaps, even thriving.’ It would certainly be accurate  
  
to say that the use of the case study in political science has grown in recent years. For 
Gerring, the term ‘case study’ is a “definitional morass”. 239 He describes a range of 
definitions, as in Table 3:1 but dismisses all of them as inadequate.240 The first three 
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are inadequate because they are not inclusive enough and might be subtypes of case 
studies, the fourth because it equates the case study with a single case, whilst the fifth 
definition is more accurate, it also remains ambiguous.  
The case studies that will be used in this thesis – specific policy development on 
immigration, police force mergers and pre-charge detention – do not readily fit any of 
these definitions. Clearly, there are elements of the first three in them – they could 
each be described, to a degree, as qualitative, ethnographic and concerned with 
process-tracing – but each go beyond these narrow definitions. Each of the case studies 
goes beyond a single case – the fourth option - or, at least, is rooted in a prior case or 
cases. The discussion of the introduction of the points-based system for immigration 
in the United Kingdom, for example, can only be fully understood in the context of 
the immigration policy that has gone before, the prevailing political context within 
which the policy had been developed and the context of the presumed impact on the 
policy area foreseen by the politicians and the officials.  The fifth option is appropriate  
but ambiguous – what is the instance or phenomenon?    
Gerring offers an alternative definition of case study as an “intensive study of a single 
unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”.  A ‘unit’ 
connotes a ‘spatially bounded phenomenon – e.g. a nation state, revolution, political 
party, election or a person - observed at a single point in time or over some delimited 
period of time.’241 In terms of each of the case studies under review, this definition is 
appropriate and can be used. Each policy area represents a single unit, limited over 
time, with a limited number of people involved and with a view to adding to our 
understanding of the wider policy process. Although there are variables specific to 
each of the case studies, how they can translate to and inform our broader knowledge 
of policy development and process is central to this thesis.  
Notwithstanding this, Flyvbjerg reports that some say that ‘you cannot generalise from 
single case’ and ‘social science is about generalizing’ or that the case study ‘is 
subjective, giving too much scope for the researcher’s own interpretations’242 He 
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challenges conventional scepticism about the validity of case studies and outlines five 
misunderstandings about case study research, as seen is Figure 3:1.  
 
Figure 3:1 Five Misunderstandings about Case Studies 
General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, 
practical (context-dependent) knowledge. 
One cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot 
contribute to scientific development. 
The case study is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total 
research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory 
building. 
The case study contains a bias towards verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the 
researcher’s preconceived notions. 
It is often difficult to summarise and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of 
specific cases.  
Source: Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006) Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research Qualitative 
Inquiry Vol. 12 Number 2 pp.219-245 p.221 
The first misunderstanding is that critics of the use of case studies argue that ‘general, 
theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical 
(context-dependent) knowledge.’243 He contends that ‘proof is hard to come by in 
social science because of the absence of ‘hard theory’, whereas learning is certainly 
possible. Learning requires the type of context-dependent knowledge to allow people 
to develop from ‘rules-based beginners to virtuoso experts’ and in the study of human 
affairs, ‘there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge which thus presently 
rules 
out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction.’244 In other words, context-
dependent knowledge is more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and 
universals. Case studies help us to ‘learn’ and not to ‘prove’ – case studies are not 
meant to be predictive, to suggest otherwise is either a misunderstanding or 
oversimplification. 
The second misunderstanding highlighted by Flyvbjerg follows from this. Critics 
would argue that if the knowledge in the case study is not context-independent and 
therefore predictive, then one cannot generalise on the basis of an individual case. If 
one cannot generalise, then the case study cannot contribute to scientific development. 
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Flyvbjerg contends that generalisation is overrated as a source of scientific 
development whilst the ‘force of example’ is underestimated. He also invokes 
Popper’s notion of falsification – ‘all swans are white’ - and argues that the case study 
is well suited for identifying ‘black swans’ because of its in-depth approach. What 
appears to be ‘white’ often turns out on closer examination to be ‘black’.245 He argues 
that the case study can be used to generalise. Eckstein maintains that  ‘it is impossible 
to take seriously the position that case study is suspect because problem-prone.’ And 
continues that 
… aiming at the disciplined application of theories to cases forces one to state theories more 
rigorously than might otherwise be done – provided that the application is truly ‘disciplined’ 
i.e. designed to show that valid theory compels a particular case interpretation than others. 
 
He laments the notion that this is rare in political study not least because of the lack of 
compelling theories. Case studies do have value and are able to inform our greater 
understanding, not least of the public policy process.246 
The third misunderstanding is that if the case study cannot be generalised from then it 
is of little value in hypothesis testing and theory building even if it might be of value 
in generating hypotheses. If, as established, one can generalise from the case study, 
then is can be useful for both the generating and testing of hypotheses as well as 
contributing to theory building.  
The fourth misunderstanding about case study research is that the method maintains a 
bias towards verification – in other words a tendency to confirm the researcher’s 
preconceived notion. That, once again, the study is of ‘doubtful scientific value’ – that 
it is seen as less rigorous than quantitative, hypothetico-deductive methods. Flyvbjerg 
contends that, if anything, case study researchers have a greater bias towards 
falsification of preconceived notions than towards verification as the process demands 
prerequisites for advanced understanding and intense observation.247 Such 
prerequisites lead to challenges of existing preconceived notions, not to bias.  
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The final misunderstanding is that it is often difficult to summarise and develop 
general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies – partly because 
good case studies often contain a substantial element of narrative. He argues that good 
narratives typically approach the complexities and contradictions of real life and such 
narratives may be difficult or impossible to summarise into ‘neat scientific formulae, 
general propositions, and theories.’248 This makes for some difficulties in summarising 
case studies, especially as concerns case process, but it is less correct as regards case 
outcomes. He also argues that good case studies should be read as narratives in their 
entirety not least for fear of losing Bourdieu’s ‘virtuoso social actors’ and their studied 
reality.249 Over-summarising a case study may mean that ‘something’ gets lost and 
some case researchers tend to be sceptical ‘about erasing phenomenological detail in 
favour of conceptual closure.’250  
Clearly, one can draw conclusions from case studies without losing the detail of 
Geertz’s ‘thick description’. Bates et al. describe the process of developing this ‘thick 
description’ as “we identify the actors, the decision points they faced, the choices they 
made, the paths taken and shunned, and the manner in which their choices generated 
events and outcomes.”251 They go on to move from ‘thick’ accounts to ‘thin’ forms of 
reasoning – in other words, they 
… tread the tightrope between the general and the particular, the ahistorical and the 
antiquarian, to essay Geertzian ‘thick description’ but with theoretical overtones.252  
 
This ‘thick description’ is rooted in observation and will form a central part of this 
study. For Bevir and Rhodes, the everyday phrase is ‘seeing things from the other’s 
point of view’, interpreting the meanings that particular actions have for social actors 
and saying what these thick descriptions tell us about the society in which they are 
found.253  
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Case studies in the real world 
Developing, studying and analysing these case studies can illuminate subsequent 
policy processes. This means that the iterative way in which policy is determined can 
be better informed and repetition of mistakes obviated. It may also help limit the 
‘carousel’ nature of policy development. Across successive governments and across 
separate policy areas, the British polity is locked into policy cycles where the same 
issues, problems and solutions come up again and again. Now, of course, the 
environment within which policies are determined is ever changing, ever complex and 
fast moving, but this militates in favour of a greater understanding of what has gone 
before, not less. There is a greater need to understand such processes precisely because 
more change, more complexity, and less time to react means that it is no longer 
appropriate to constantly relearn and reinvent the policy making process. Such an 
understanding is better found, it can be argued, in the detailed analysis of case studies 
determined by a participant as researcher, then it is through the usual post-hoc 
rationalisation of the civil service or the political world. It is certainly the case that the 
‘evaluative feedback loop’ has never been the strongest aspect of the UK polity.254 
Care needs to be taken in constructing retrospective narratives in the course of creating 
case studies. As Yanow contests ‘…policy analysis often involves trying to identify 
cause and effect patterns in the action of politicians and officials after a decision has 
been made without ever being certain that such patterns existed at the time.’255 
Watkins argues that in ‘the history of all governments there come times when their 
characteristics, good or otherwise, are, as it were, suspended for inspection.’ 256 He 
goes on to say that ‘the insect can be briefly pinned down. A slice can be detached and 
put under the microscope.’257 This is essentially the approach that this thesis is seeking 
to follow. His commentary, however, contains serious warnings about such an 
approach. He continues by saying that ‘…political observers can go wrong in selection 
[of the events]’ and that  
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… political events which appeared significant or typical at the time can recede in 
importance…conversely a seemingly minor episode can assume a retrospective importance.258 
Atkins contends that ‘to maximise its chances of success, a party must consider a 
number of factors when formulating an argumentative strategy to promote a new 
policy initiative.’259 Such factors include the history of the policy area, the need for a 
degree of consistency between their chosen arguments and the ‘party’s core values, 
the prevailing political climate and the audience they will address. Essentially,  there 
needs to be a full analysis of the paradigms in the area and the policy alternatives 
available. She also contends that scholars “must take these same factors into 
consideration if they are to supply a full account of the dynamics of political 
justification.”260 It is important that the case studies chosen for this thesis have a 
relevance to today’s politics and today’s decision and policy makers.  
The case studies have been chosen on four key criteria: –  
 they reflect important and substantial events in the history of the Labour Government;  
 the author played a significant role in each of them;  
 they all contain lessons of partial success and ultimate failure that add to our knowledge of 
that particular government and to politics more broadly; and  
 they all have domestic and international ramifications and remain relevant to the ability of both 
the government and the UK polity to respond to globalisation, interdependency and the broader 
efficacy of politics.  
They vary in that they represent different forms of policy failure and are different in 
content and context – the immigration case study highlights systemic failures across 
government and a failure of leadership and narrative; the policing case study 
represents a failure of the centre to recognise the agency and power of its constituent 
bodies and the wider community; and the counter-terrorism case study represent a 
failure of learning on the part of government and elements of groupthink. All these 
differences will be explored in detail as varied forms of policy failure. The discussion 
will go far beyond the concerns of Bovens and t’Hart who maintain that: 
The analysis of policy failures is, by definition, not a neutral endeavour, since policy fiascos 
are not neutral events. Moreover, they are often, usually implicitly, but sometimes explicitly, 
permeated with prosecutorial narratives, blame games and a search for culprits.261  
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Indeed, it could be argued that such analysis perpetuates policy failure as it promotes 
the risk averse at the expense of the policy innovators. Such an analysis has to be as 
much about how these various sources relate to each other as well as their individual 
contribution. Interviewing the key participants involved in these processes is another 
key source of the information needed to develop the case studies in full.  
Interviewing elites: whose truth?  
Bevir and Rhodes note that ‘to write a story that vexes the reader’ draws on three 
sources of information – custom, interview and documents.262 Or, as Oakeshott would 
have it, “the pattern of practice, talk and considered writing – the first is the most 
reliable, the second is the most copious and revealing and the third is the most difficult 
to interpret.”263  
As with Bevir and Rhodes, for this study, the ‘practice’ is the observations and 
reflections of the researcher – but, unlike them, from the dual perspective of a 
participant and researcher. This perspective is that of someone at the centre of the 
networks and power relationships that underpin the narratives of the case studies. In 
any sense, this must influence and underpin the development of the case studies – 
certainly in phenomenological terms as well as in the ontological context.  The ‘talk’ 
is the interviews with a range of the participants in each case study and the ‘considered 
writing’ is the range of documentary sources. Bevir and Rhodes tentatively describe 
Oakeshott’s approach as triangulation, as can be seen in Figure 3:2.  These three key 
sources form the base of the information that will help explain the decisions, processes, 
and outcomes under discussion.  
The narratives that emerge for each case study will synthesise the information as they 
explain and analyse the events concerned. To achieve this, one of the key tasks has  
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Source: Bevir and Rhodes (2010) and Oakeshott (1996) 
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Study 
Narrative
Practice
Talk
Considered 
Writing
Figure 3:2 Oakeshott’s triangulation (as suggested by Bevir and Rhodes.) 
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been to interview the key participants involved. Yet, interviewing elites can be 
problematic in general and is, perhaps, even more so when the interviewer was a key 
participant as well as the researcher some years later.   
The use of interviews to assist in the study of political elites is not a new phenomenon 
– it is a long-established tool for researchers. Seldon suggests that “...warm vivid 
contemporary history has almost always been written by authors who have conducted 
interviews; dull clinical history is often produced by those who have buried themselves 
away in libraries and archives.”264 Whilst this might be a touch unfair to the deskbound 
archivist, it does suggest, as Lilleker would have it, that ‘interviews are only 
necessitated when a researcher wishes to produce a work with textural depth as well 
as empirical strength.’265 That said, Seldon understands the limitations of 
interviewing.  He reports that “…the author frequently had reason to wonder whether 
some former ministers had served in the same administration so at variance were their 
accounts of the way coordination took place at the heart of Whitehall.” 266 The 
recollection of politicians is often as frail, as selective, or as self-serving as the rest of 
the population’s. The purpose of these types of interviews is to understand the 
interviewee’s perceptions and memories of events – it is not necessarily to establish 
the chronology or the facts of any particular event.  
Lilleker notes that  
...interviews do provide insights into events about which we know little: the activities that take 
place out of the public or media gaze, behind closed doors.267  
He goes on to caution against ‘exaggerations or even falsehoods’ but accepts that 
interviews can ‘provide immense amounts of information that could not be gleaned 
from official published documents or contemporary media accounts’ but that 
‘interviewing does have severe limitations which means they (sic) cannot be relied 
upon as the sole methodology.’268 Hunter argues that politicians have many secrets 
and are not often trustworthy, which means that their backstage may have a further 
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backstage – and it is the backstage where the power itself is often most wielded.269 
Whilst this is not ‘to argue that there is an infinite regress of backstage’, Geddes 
cautions that, ‘researchers must remain alert at all times in their research and should 
not become complacent in their position’270 – and should understand the various 
dimensions at play.  
So, interviews can be important – but not without support from other sources and not 
if taken at absolute face value. Interviews can also help in interpreting documents – 
especially if the actors who commissioned them, or indeed, the authors themselves, 
can be interviewed. They can also help to build a picture of the relationships between 
various actors that are party to the events under discussion. They can provide 
information not yet public, or not yet released in quite the terms that have been elicited 
from the interview. They can help the researcher understand where the interviewee fits 
into to the events studied and also where they fit with the emerging picture of the 
networks and relationships that have developed as part of the narrative of these events. 
As Richards states “…they can help you to understand the context, set the tone, or 
establish the atmosphere, of the area you are researching.”271  Interviews can add 
colour, context, and tone in ways that Seldon’s dull archivist could never achieve – 
but it is a colour, context and tone that is unique to the interviewee and may well differ 
from the next interviewee. 
The problems with interviews are therefore varied – but they do not militate against 
using them. The researcher needs to understand both the limitations of the process and 
what they want to achieve from the process. They need to have sufficient interviewees 
to make the process both legitimate in methodological terms and worthwhile in 
constructing the narrative needed. It is the task of the researcher to ensure that they 
have interviewed enough of the key actors and players to make the research and the 
emerging narrative robust enough to withstand criticism and answer the research 
questions posed. The researcher is not writing a memoir or a set of biographies of 
some sort but must have insight from enough of the key actors to add to the overall 
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knowledge of events, provide a defensible narrative of them and to analyse, explain, 
assess and understand the events in the broadest context – for this thesis, in the context 
of the new Labour Government 1997-2010 and the broader field of political science.  
Famously, the distinguished biographer of President Lyndon Baines Johnson, Robert 
Caro, sought to interview every single person at every single meeting of any import 
that LBJ attended before writing up his account as he wanted to be as comprehensive 
as possible. Seemingly, only death was accepted as an excuse for not being 
interviewed.  This is fine for the biographer – but it means that he has spent over forty 
years at his task – he began in 1974 and is yet to complete the project. Four volumes 
later – with 8, 12 and 10 years between them - LBJ has only just become President.272 
I do not have forty years to develop the narratives for these case studies – and have 
chosen those I wanted to interview very carefully. This thesis is about the role of 
minister and the processes they are involved in – so the pool of interviewees has been 
almost self-selecting. Those interviewed were significant participants in  the matters 
under discussion – as politicians, policy officials, civil servants, special advisers or 
other public officials.  
As Richards contends, ‘the reliability of the interviewee is sometimes questionable’ 
and not always for nefarious reasons.273 The interviewee may have a failing memory, 
events may have been some time ago, or they may have simply changed their view on 
events and have confused their role at the time because of their new view. Seldon 
suggests that ex-politicians ‘often encounter pathological difficulties in distinguishing 
the truth, so set have their minds become by long experience of partisan thought’ 
whilst civil servants ‘tend to be dispassionate creatures by nature and profession…. 
they observe action, storing the information in mental boxes that can yield a rich 
harvest to those who take the trouble to prise them open.’274 This is probably both 
unfair on the ex-politicians and unduly favourable a view of the civil service, but 
nonetheless the point is well made – know your interviewee and know what you 
require from the interview. During the course of the interviews for this thesis, I have 
found as many civil servants keen to offer a partisan perspective with concern for their 
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legacy as I have encountered former politicians objectively seeking a dispassionate 
truth regardless of their legacy. 
Crucially, an interview is interrogative, but it is not an interrogation. The interviewee 
may change their view on events and their role within the events if pushed too far in 
any one direction by the interviewer, particularly one who was a participant in the 
process. The interviewer needs to be very aware of this and his own subjectivity. 
Equally, the interviewer needs to be robust enough to secure the information required 
from the interview. If the interviewer is too deferential, then the interview will only 
elicit the information that the interviewee wants to give. Richards is clear that there is 
an issue of power relations in any interview. He says that 
… an interviewee concerned with presenting his/her viewpoint may want to control and 
dominate the interview. If so, the interviewer may not be able to control the format, or direction 
of the interview.275  
 
Ultimately, the interviewee has the power in any interview which is why it is so 
important that the interviewer carefully considers the approach to the interview. It 
should be a semi-structured affair – with enough scope to get the interviewee to open 
up on the matters that the interviewer wants, but also enough scope for the interviewee 
to get his/her points across.  
So, in summary, the power of the interview is as a key contribution to the narrative. It 
is how the results of the interviews combine with the results of all the other aspects of 
documentary analysis – of primary, secondary, official sources and memoirs – and the 
results of the participant observation and reflections – that adds up to a powerful 
method. It is only in this combination that each element works validly as a research 
method. 
Triangulation of sources 
Lilleker maintains that ultimately the safeguard is to ‘corroborate facts, where 
possible, using primary or secondary sources and to compare the results gained 
systematically.’276 More routinely, as Davies suggests, ‘the optimum solution appears 
to be a triangulation triad of primary sources (interviews, published first-hand 
accounts; and documentary sources (published or archival)), with published 
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secondary-source information available in cautious reserve’277 as in Figure 3:3.  In 
addition to Davies’ triangulation of sources, this study has to add the unique dimension 
of the researcher as participant as well as academic. This implies a primary filter – that 
of the insider’s perspective – on every leg of Davies’ triangle. This secondary filter 
will add further dimensions to his ‘goal of triangulation’ which is to ‘provide a parallax 
view upon events.’278 This ‘parallax paradigm’ colours all aspects of how sources are 
used in this study. 
Morris says that it is important that interviewers are clear and explicit in the 
ontological and epistemological assumptions on which their research is based and that  
they should approach the research process self-critically and reflexively.279 Reflexivity 
refers to the ‘recognition of the influence that the researcher brings to the research 
process’ and this is all the more important for the researcher that brings the experience 
of a participant in the events and narratives that are being studied. Kuper et al go on 
to suggest that such reflexivity  
… highlights the  potential power relationship between the researcher and the research 
participant…. It also acknowledges how a researcher’s [characteristics]…influence the choices 
made within the study, such as the research question itself and the methods of data 
collection.’280 
The level of ‘reflexivity’ that I have to bring to the process is all the more heightened 
as all the interviewees are known to me, I have already met them all, even if my 
respective relations with them now – ten or more years on from the events – is different 
from what is was then. This special degree of ‘reflexivity’ will not do the researcher’s 
job, but it certainly helps. The researcher/participant also has various dimensions  to 
explain and reflect on as seen in Figure 3:4.  
My reflections and recollections – my ‘memoir’ – is an important dimension and is 
duly sourced in the text of the narratives of the case studies, where appropriate. This 
‘memoir’, it could be argued, is the result of an ongoing debate or ‘interview’ that I 
have had for this thesis with the 2005-2008 ministerial version of myself. 
There are also secondary sources and documents that reflect my ministerial role at the 
time and my participation in these events. In order for the reflexivity to be of any  
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epistemological value, I have also, where appropriate, had to be critical of my role 
then – as a participant – as I develop and analyse the narratives for the case studies 
under review now – as a researcher. If all researchers have to be imbued with the spirit 
of this reflexivity – then the researcher participant has to be all the more cautious to 
sustain the necessary rigour and validity. This is also why, in addition, to the use of 
case studies and interviews, it is important to understand both the context of policy 
formulation and how an ethnographic approach as a research methodology helps the 
researcher who is also a participant in the events under analysis and discussion. But 
before returning to the subject of ethnography, it is important to look a little deeper 
into the role and value of memoirs. 
 
Memoirs: reflections of ‘court’ politics? 
Richards and Mather note that there is a ‘long-established tradition of ministers 
providing memoir-style accounts of their experience of government, most commonly 
in the form of either autobiographies or diaries.’281 McGrath argues that they tend to 
be characterised by ‘their self-serving perspective’ and are concerned with 
establishing the ‘author’s self-defined role in the history books.’282 More crudely, in 
his review of Thatcher’s memoirs, Nigel Lawson described them as “setting standards 
of self-regard hitherto unknown”. 283 Gamble agrees that ‘not all memoirs are equally 
useful’ and that perhaps ‘even the majority, offer relatively little to the political 
scientist.’284 He suggests that, at worst, they can be deemed as poor sources which are 
little more than “self-serving, bland and highly selective.” 285 He does concede that 
the best of memoirs can offer a range of insights into three areas – political ethos and 
style; argument and doctrine; and policy formulation and implementation. He also 
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argues that whilst these ‘inside stories’ are useful as “valuable sources on the inside 
story” they often have less to say, “on the outside story, the wider context in which 
governments operate, in particular the structures of power that shape British society 
and the British state.’286    
There is, then, value in such memoirs, but it is limited. They are not scientific accounts 
of the truth rooted in evidence, but they offer “heavily skewed, agency-centred 
construction of Westminster’s court politics” and, often, central to their production is 
an abiding concern for the ‘legacy’ of the author – their ‘historical impact’, as Richards 
and Mathers would have it. 287 
For Gamble,  although ‘court politics and its follies are always entertaining’ focussing 
on them too much can mislead’. If the dominant model of memoirs is that of an 
“historical-impact (legacy-seeking), agency-centred account”, then the key 
methodological question is how can these accounts, rooted in an often “idealised view 
of the core executive power relations they tend to depict”, be interpreted. 288  
The danger with memoirs is that political scientists may want them to be much more 
than they are. The political scientist wants to look at them in the context of their 
“usefulness as “evidence” and whether they meet “political science’s standard of 
reliability, validity, accuracy and objectivity.”289 It is commonly agreed that despite 
the plethora of ministerial biographies, autobiographies, memoirs and diaries ‘few are 
of much use to the student of Whitehall’.290 Notwithstanding this apparent 
disappointment, memoirs should be viewed for the contribution, albeit limited, that 
they can make – and, crucially, the context within which they are made.  They should 
not be viewed as a scientific assessment of a minister’s role and actions – anyone 
searching for a definitive truth should not look in this direction at all. Memoirs are 
what they are – a view,  a social construct,  a version of history drafted by a participant 
in the interest, perhaps, of their legacy, their ‘historical impact’. Rhodes is right to 
contend that “if intellectual respectability is the goal, then biographers must engage 
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with the broader literature on theory and methods.”291 He discusses this in the context 
of the interpretive cause and qualitative research methods in general and suggests that 
memoirs or more specifically, life histories, are seen as incompatible with ‘modern-
empiricist political science’.292  
Although assorted memoirs have, with varying degrees of success, offered some 
insight into ministerial life and many of the policy and decision-making processes of 
government, most have been very thin on analysis or intellectual rigour, sometimes on 
veracity too. The same is the case with diarists, an increasingly rich tradition for 
former Labour officials and ministers. The cautionary approach suggested by Richards 
et al293 is well made. They state that ‘scattered throughout such reflections are a variety 
of criticisms of the machine, the way it functions and, in particular, frustration over 
ineffective delivery.294 They go on to suggest that, as with their illustrious 
predecessors such as Benn, Castle and Crossman, they  
…can only provide a narrative on events as they unfold; they do not offer coherent blueprints 
for reform or restructuring.295 
It is quite disconcerting occasionally to sometimes read a version of events in 
someone’s memoirs or diaries in which I was involved and know that the version 
reported is completely untrue.  The academic world does not take memoirs or diaries 
as seriously as their authors do, but nevertheless appreciates, as does this study, that 
some do have an insight to offer.   
Up close and personal: interpretivism and ethnography revisited 
Interpretive approaches, and the use of an ethnographic methodology, seem to be a 
useful way to help analyse the contextual and organisational development of case 
studies. As Rhodes suggests, such an approach begins with the insight that in “order 
to understand institutions, the researcher needs to grasp the relevant meanings, the 
beliefs and preferences, of the people involved.”296  By choosing case studies that I 
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was fully involved in personally as a minister, I am seeking to provide ‘constructions 
of my own and other people’s constructions of what I and my compatriots were up to’, 
as Geertz would have it, 297 in the development of public policy.  
As far as possible, I am doing so as both a dispassionate academic inquirer and 
researcher as well as an active participant. In other words, an auto-ethnographic, 
interpretivist approach with the author as both subject and researcher will be used – 
with, perhaps, an element of what Rhodes describes as ‘para-ethnography’ too. He 
defines this as involving a “critical reading of technical documents to reconstruct a 
decision” and that “given that observer and observed both interact and are inseparable, 
a full understanding needs a reciprocal, dialogical relationship.” 298 This is further 
complicated by what Van Maanen describes as his ‘phenomenological war whoop’ 
declaring that ‘there is no way of seeing, hearing, or representing the world of others 
that is absolutely, universally valid or correct.’ He adds that ‘ethnographies of any sort 
are always subject to multiple interpretations. They are never beyond controversy or 
debate.”299  
As indicated earlier, not everyone agrees with the efficacy of the interpretivist 
approach. As Smith contends ‘rational choice theorists suggest that there is little point 
in gathering the view and beliefs of officials because of the ‘they would say that’ 
principle.’  Bevir and Rhodes disagree and use ethnography ‘to provide evidence of 
the action and beliefs of key actors, and historical narratives to provide explanations 
of why they hold these beliefs and so perform these actions.’300 They argue that 
analysing these beliefs and practices is central to understanding the people involved 
in these processes and this is central to understanding change in the public sector. For 
them, the relationship between ministers and public servants may be shaped by the 
traditions of the department, but it is not determined by that history.301  They accept 
that the researcher must tread wearily between Geertz’s ‘diary disease’302 and Van 
Maanen’s ‘doctrine of immaculate perception’303. They are also keenly aware that that 
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‘too little reflection and there is no point. Too much reflection and there is a danger of 
provoking the response, ‘I don’t care.’304   
It is clear that all approaches have their limitations. An ethnographic approach must 
be used fully in the knowledge of the ‘contested terrain’ of each meeting, each 
decision, each event and the success or failure of each policy and each policy area. 
Bevir and Rhodes understand this too and state that ‘every method has limits and 
weaknesses. Observation is no exception. All any researcher can do is come clean and 
face up to those limits and weaknesses.’305  
Summary  
Heclo and Wildavsky quote Sir Samuel Goldman, the Second Permanent Secretary at 
the Treasury from 1968-1972, as saying “No government has so far yet been prepared 
to display to Parliament or to the public the actual processes by which it reaches 
decisions in this field…”306 Notwithstanding the advances that have been made in 
terms of access, scrutiny and the role of the media – especially the Cockerell-esque 
fly-on-the-wall endeavours - the processes still remain fairly obscure. This study will 
offer some significant insight on the work of a government minister. It has been shown 
that, in methodological terms, by utilising the case studies and creating narratives; 
interviewing a broad range of participants and commentators; using and understanding 
the value of, but also the limitations of, memoirs; understanding the context within 
which policies are made; and an overall ethnographic approach – the research 
framework is robust and rigorous. It will help to explore, explain, assess and analyse 
these key areas of public policy. All these assorted sources will be both triangulated 
to take into account the key filter of the researcher as participant – auto-ethnography 
– and the narratives of the case studies that result will form the core academic analysis 
of the study. 
By carrying out such a detailed analysis, our knowledge of how policies are 
determined and developed within government will be enhanced as will our ability to 
determine why some policies succeed, and others fail. Central to the thesis is whether 
or not political science and politics can have the dialogical relationship that Béland 
identifies between policy paradigms and alternatives, that Rhodes sees between 
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observer and the observed and that Diamond argues can and should happen.  That is, 
politics can inform political science and political science can inform politics. Before 
looking in detail at each of the case studies in turn, it is important to briefly set  them 
in the broader context of the new Labour Government. The next chapter will locate 
the three case studies in the context of the overall strategy, outlook and approach of 
the government. 
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Chapter Four 
New Labour in Context: the contested terrain of home affairs 
New Labour: schools of thought  
This chapter will look briefly at the context within which New Labour was developed. 
It will then set the development of its home affairs agenda in general, and its policies 
in the three areas under discussion in particular. Whilst there has been extensive 
discussion of the historical roots and origins of the New Labour phenomenon,307 there 
has been relatively little academic consideration of its Home Affairs agenda and a 
growing body of academic work in the specialist areas of immigration, policing and 
counterterrorism and then mainly in terms of civil liberties and human rights. 308   
More often than not, Labour leaders invoke the past and the future in the cause of their 
vision and leadership. All have , to varying degrees, followed Gaitskell’s edict that 
they should  
… remember that we are a Party of the future, not of the past; that we must appeal to the young 
as well as the old–young people who have very little reverence for the past. It is no use waving 
the banners of a bygone age.309 
Many considered that New Labour was intent on destroying the ‘banners of a bygone 
age’ and were wholly embarrassed by its history. Much of the discussion on the party 
revolves around claims on its history and legacy. There are broadly three main schools 
of thought about New Labour. The first stresses the reformist works of the 1997-2010 
governments and sees them as ‘in continuity with the reforms undertaken during the 
two major periods of Labour government.’310It sees them as an updating or 
modernisation of Labour and a continuity with ‘Labour’s post-war social democratic 
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politics.’311 The second broad school of thought argues that Labour ‘had fallen under 
the spell of Thatcherism’ and was ‘accommodating itself to the New Right.’ 312 The 
third broad school of thought takes a more historical perspective and, in its various 
forms, argues in the space between the two previous perspectives. 
Modernise or die 
One of the key  architects of the New Labour ‘project’ posited that, by the early 1990s  
Labour had become a party to be feared. Gould reported that just before the 1997 
elections, a woman told him that when she was a child she was scared of a wardrobe 
in her bedroom. She was always scared that one night, out of the blackness, a monster 
would emerge. She told Gould, ‘That is how I think of the Labour Party.’313 He argued 
that this was a typical response on the run-up to 1997 and that Labour had become ‘the 
party of the shadows; of deep irrational anxiety. Only modernisation would save it.’314 
Gould saw such modernisation as ‘the need to build a new Britain, and the need to 
build a new model of social democracy.’315 He wanted a ‘completely new model of 
social democracy as ‘halfway solutions linking old models don’t work…New Labour 
must be positioned at the centre.’316 
Some contend that New Labour was only ever an electoral machine. For Heffernan, it 
began, ‘in essence, as an electioneering strategy.’317 Electoral considerations certainly 
influenced the development of New Labour and its modernisation project. For Blair, 
‘the worse thing about opposition is its impotence …however beguiling, never forget 
what matters. Not passing resolutions or winning debates but taking power and 
changing lives for the better.’318 
                                                 
311 Driver, Stephen and Martell, Luke (2006) New Labour Polity Press Cambridge pp.3-4 
312  Driver and Martell (2006) Op.cit. p.3. See also Clarke, J (2004) ‘Dissolving the Public Realm? The 
Logics and Limits of Neo-liberalism.’ Journal of Social Policy Vol. 33 No. (1), pp. 27-48. 
doi:10.1017/S0047279403007244 
313 Gould, Philip (2011) The Unfinished Revolution: How New Labour Changed British Politics 
Forever Abacus London pp.18-19 
314 Gould (2011) Ibid. p.19 See also Finlayson, Alan (2003) Making Sense of New Labour Lawrence & 
Wishart London especially Ch.3.  
315 Gould (2011) Ibid. pp.245-246 
316  Ibid. p.246 
317 Heffernan (2011) Op.cit. p.163 
318 Gould (2011) Op.cit. pp.xxiv-xxv.  
98 
 
At its most extreme, the modernisation school is represented by the ‘Third Way’.319 
By 1994, Labour had not won an election outright for twenty years – and then only by 
a majority of three. The last significant outright Labour victory with a large majority 
was in 1966 – 28 years before Blair took over as Labour leader320 and ‘Labour’s share 
of the vote fell from a high of 48% in 1966 to only 27.6% in 1983…’321 The concept 
of the Third Way helped Labour to ‘… resolve a crucial dilemma … the need to accept 
some of the key reforms introduced by Thatcherism, while not turning away from the 
tenets of social democracy.322  
In other words, a view that whilst Labour could not simply return to the certainties of 
the pre-Thatcher world, neither should it just take on in full the new certainties of 
Thatcher and her political heirs. Indeed, ‘while all agree that the policy paradigm 
enacted by Thatcherism… played some role in the emergence of  New Labour’s 
political stance,’323 only the most ardent New Labour supporter would resist the notion 
that the party was not influenced at least in part by the 1979-1997 governments.  
Equally, some ‘have taken the Third Way rhetoric at face value and concluded that 
New Labour has indeed abandoned its social democratic values and traditions.’324 In 
other words, it is a politics beyond class. It implies that ‘the theorists of this new 
politics [including Giddens] think that we are now living under conditions of ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ where the adversarial model of politics, of us versus them, does not 
apply anymore.’325 That is the Third Way as a way of ‘superseding ideology and 
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partisanship as central forces in the process of policy-making’ and as a prelude to 
Burnham’s ‘politics of depoliticisation’.326 For others, the Third Way is 
… a metaphor for centre-left parties … to help them to forge ‘political settlements’ that 
combined a recognition of the increasing importance of the global economy with attention to 
the importance of social cohesion.327  
The implication, for detractors, was that globalisation mattered more than cohesion. 
Adherents of the Third Way would argue the opposite, namely that the key motivation 
was how to achieve social cohesion in a globalised world that was here to stay. 
Others have recognised in New Labour that ‘beneath the rhetoric of radical change 
and new policies for “new times,” it is possible to detect significant continuities with 
a number of Labour traditions.’328 There was, then, an acceptance that the world had 
changed so the party had to change with it. Whatever one’s view, the notion of 
‘socialism in one country’ had long passed – globalisation had seen to that. Competent 
economic management would provide the resources to expand welfare and provide 
the funds for other social and political projects.  
So, the modernist interpretation of New Labour revolves around the degree to which 
there is an acceptance that it is a continuation of Labour’s values and traditions or a 
departure from them. In the same fashion, the starting point for many on the 
accommodationist side revolved around the distance from or absence of Labour values 
and traditions in New Labour – but both schools are on continuums, not simply binary 
choices or positions.  
Accommodating Thatcher and neo-liberalism   
For this school of thought, Blair and his governments were neo-liberal ‘gravediggers 
of the Labour Party, consolidators of the results of Thatcherism, and the most rabid 
defenders of market mechanisms.’329 As some would have it, however,  
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there is an undoubted tendency … to deploy a rather ambiguously sketched concept of neo-
liberalism as a catch-all analytical framework for understanding the present. ‘Neo-liberalism’ 
too often here means ‘everything we don’t like.’ 330   
Whatever vestiges of Labour values and traditions existed were largely decorative or 
seen as necessary to secure electoral advantage on some sort of ‘Downsian desire to 
meet electoral preferences.’331 All views and opinions on the Labour Government 
were seen through this distorted ‘neo-liberal’ prism, and the accommodation of 
Thatcherism was complete and unremitting.  
One commentator argues that ‘…New Labour’s ideology was closer to a hybrid than 
to social democracy because of its uncritical embrace of market capitalism and its 
acceptance of inequality…’ 332 Looking back, the economic data does not entirely 
sustain this view either. It is clear that much more could have been done in terms of 
inequality but nonetheless: 
Between 1997-98 and 2010-11, there was an £18 billion annual increase in spending on 
benefits for families with children and an £11 billion annual increase on benefits for pensioners 
by 2010-11. As the IFS pointed out, ‘…child and pensioner poverty would either have stayed 
the same or risen…had there not been these big spending increases.333 
The tax credit regime was redistributive and raised nearly 2m children out of poverty. 
It could be said that, ‘If New Labour can be said to have ‘crashed the car’… it is on 
inequality’334As a participant in both the Labour Party and the subsequent Labour 
government, I do not recognise this description – in terms of market capitalism or in 
terms of inequality. To assert that, by implication, New Labour under Brown and Blair 
had little or no regard for equality, democracy and community is an assertion too far, 
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notwithstanding that the fight against poverty and inequality could have gone further. 
Figure 4:1 shows the varied record of the government on relative poverty rates. 335 
Whilst it would certainly be fair to say that the government’s record was a ‘mixed’ 
record, evidence shows that it did not neglect inequality in the way suggested.  
 
Academics that ascribe to a broadly accommodationist view start from a similar 
perspective to the modernisers – that is, how to facilitate social democracy in a post-
Thatcher world. They accept that New Labour takes as read that the state is smaller 
and there is a smaller central core to the state and the public sector should be reduced. 
Further, that there had to be an accommodation with globalisation. This needed 
flexible labour markets and a low tax base. There was broad acceptance, it was argued, 
that the ideal view of the electorate was for a Scandinavian style welfare state, with a 
US style low tax base and a broadly authoritarian streak on matters like law and 
order.336 Elements of the package presented by New Labour emphasised macro-
economic stability, not least because of the legacy of Labour’s previous economic 
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failures in office and public service efficiency (for the same reasons). Shaw contends 
though that it was not the 
…legacy of the party’s past as such that permeated the New Labour mentality and so governed 
its behaviour in office – it was that past as re-imagined and reconstructed in a very particular 
way.337 
In other words, New Labour proponents were reacting to their own view of previous 
Labour governments and this view of Labour’s history was one of the contributing 
lodestars to the develop of their new perspectives. As Bale contends, ‘New Labour 
needs Old Labour. A new improved version must have an old unimproved one from 
which to distinguish itself.’338 It is instructive that subsequent critics of New Labour 
have done the same thing. They have created their own re-imagined and reconstructed 
view of what New Labour was in order to critique it. Sometimes this is presented in 
so reductionist a fashion that ‘neo-liberal’ sums ups this entire period of Labour in 
government. Diamond argues that the party’s revisionist dimension would have be 
better served if ‘New Labour’s debt to the past had been properly acknowledged.’339 
At its most extreme, the accommodationist view would have it that all New Labour 
was about is the ‘search for votes’ and the politics of ‘what works’.340 Accommodation 
becomes convergence and there is little to distinguish between the parties. As part of 
this process, accommodationists would argue that the leadership attempted to ‘paint a 
portrait of their own Party’s [past] in which accuracy was sacrificed not to enhance 
but to belittle the original [Old Labour].’ They did this so as  
…to engage in pre-emptive auto-strikes acknowledging the truth of much of the tabloid 
version…demonstrating that ‘New Labour’ had learnt its lessons and wiped the slate clean.341 
Some contend that not only did New Labour run away from its historical legacy in this 
way, but also that in the rush to accommodate the immediate post-Thatcherite world, 
it endorsed the same broadly neo-liberal approach as the Conservatives as a matter of 
political choice, not electoral or pragmatic accommodation. The accommodation was 
                                                 
337 Shaw (2007) Op.cit. p.152 
338 Bale, Tim (1999b) ‘The logic of no alternative? Political scientists, historians and the politics of 
Labour’s past.’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.192-204 p.199 
339 Diamond, Patrick (2005) Equality Now: The Future of Revisionism Fabian Society London p.3 
340 Mair (2014) Op.cit. p.51 
341 Shaw, Eric (1996) The Labour Party since 1945 Blackwell Oxford p.217 – Quoted in Bale (1999b) 
Op.cit. p.200 
103 
 
not just with Thatcherism, but with  neo-liberalism and some described it as a ‘social 
democratic neo-revisionism’. 342 
A hybrid Third Way?  
Generally, this school of thought is termed the ‘historical critique’ approach. This 
school argues that both the modernisation approach and the accommodation approach 
ignore historical continuities and the pragmatic nature of Labour in office. Some 
historians, sympathetic to a purer socialist strand, would have it that the modernisation 
school affords New Labour too much weight and it is does not represent the unbroken 
continuity of Labour traditions and values that it suggests. They argue, in essence, that 
the parliamentary road to socialism inevitably fails as the system does not need reform 
it needs transformation.343 Further, that such a view underplays ‘the impact of 
Thatcherism on Labour in the 1980s and 1990s’ 344  
Historians of the social democratic and revisionist school would argue that the 
accommodationist approach affords the rhetoric of New Labour too much weight. 
They assert that the reality and substance of what the Labour government actually did 
belies the simplicity of New Labour as the scion of Thatcherism. Equally, they would 
argue that casting New Labour as ‘Thatcherism Mark Two’ and an accommodation to 
neo-liberalism overplays the impact of Thatcherism on Labour.’345 These broader and 
more sophisticated approaches are probably more useful than the binary views – social 
democrat vs. neo-liberalism, Labour vs. Thatcherites and similar dichotomies.  
Heffernan argues that the two approaches could in fact be complementary. He 
contends that it may be that ‘New Labour, while reflecting a genuine form of 
‘modernisation’, was thus at the same time a form of ‘accommodation’ to 
Thatcherism’. That is, New Labour can and does have its roots in Labour’s values and 
traditions, but it has made some accommodations to the reality of a post-Thatcher, 
post-eighteen years of a Conservative government. Often in the course of discussion 
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on New Labour, the presumption has been that its predecessor, was ‘supposedly 
homogenous’.346 It was not. As Meredith continues  
… Labour’s has always been a complex political culture of systematic and recurrent intra-party 
struggle and competition between different traditions, strands, tendencies and groups over 
assorted understandings, interpretations and applications of party principles and policy.347 
In this context, both social democracy purity and neo-liberalism that owed nothing to 
Labour’s traditions and values are too simplistic and are redundant as serious 
arguments, but useful nonetheless as bookends for the continuum representing 
dimensions of New Labour and its political origins. It may also be the case that ‘… 
although at the time many denied it was a social democratic government at all, in 
retrospect its social democratic character is likely to become more and more 
obvious.’348 This may prove to be the case, but for now, the important point for this 
thesis is that there are a variety of views about the ideological and historical nature 
and antecedents of New Labour. 
New Labour as post-Thatcherite  
Driver and Martell eschew these simplistic approaches and define new Labour as 
‘post-Thatcherite.’ They argue that the modernisation argument that New Labour is 
merely a continuation of Labour tradition is unrealistic. Having understood the 
‘changing economic, social and cultural conditions of the contemporary world and 
how that world should be governed’,349 the Party knew it could not simply return to 
the politics of the post-war social democratic consensus. By accepting this, it meant 
that there had to be some engagement with the politics of the New Right too – if only 
to understand it in order to combat it. As  a result, they argue 
…New Labour drew a line under many of the political, theoretical and policy arguments of the 
1980s and the 1990s… most clearly seen in questions between the balance between state and 
market in policy-making. Post-Thatcherism, social democracy would never be the same 
again.350 
This immediately feels like a much more sophisticated and intellectually rigorous 
argument about the roots of New Labour. Driver and Martell are clear, however, that 
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‘New Labour has not simply acceded to some neo-liberal consensus on how to run the 
country.’351 It was certainly more neo-liberal than Labour had been before 1994 but 
was not neo-liberal in the Thatcherite sense. In addition, like all governments, the party 
in power experienced a range of successes and failures in each area. Both 
accommodationist and modernising schools can therefore find elements of the 
performance of the government to justify their ontological perspective. 
 For Faucher-King et al, the government should be judged on its ‘actions, on the 
policies that have been implemented and on their impact on British politics and 
society.’352  They talk of the importance of the desire of New Labour  to transform 
society within the context of an understanding of history; a mobilisation of the state 
that differs from the traditional social democratic version but eschews a ‘neo-
liberalism aiming for the retreat of the state’ and also a ‘societal project for the middle 
classes’.353  
In purely demographic terms, Labour thought it could no longer rely simply on its 
working-class base to secure power and targeted middle England.354 Its views of the 
‘legacy of the party’s past’ as Shaw 355 would have it, meant that ‘Labour had to 
demonstrate its competence to govern after the disastrous performance of the last 
Labour government (1974-1979). Hence, Brown’s insistence as Chancellor… on 
sound economic management, refusal to raise taxes, courting of the business 
community and particular indulgence of … the City’356 or, as Shaw described it - 
Labour’s ‘Faustian Pact.’357 
There is also much debate about the nature of the economic programme of New 
Labour. Clift and Tomlinson thought it was essentially Keynesian although this could 
not be ‘definitively demonstrated because of the absence of a severe deflationary 
shock’.358 Hay demurs and argues that ‘Keynesian’ is ‘perhaps one adjective we 
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should associate with New Labour with extreme caution’. 359 Keynesian or otherwise 
– for a variety of reasons, the new government was given a much freer rein on the 
economy for much of its first two terms than most governments experience.  
The Conservative opposition had been traumatised by the 1997 defeat and had little to 
say on the economy. Given Labour’s position, the only ‘safe space’ the Conservatives 
had for any sort of policy discourse was on Europe and the potential entry of the UK 
into the European Currency system – the Euro. Beyond this policy area, the disunity 
and trauma of defeat, in 2001, as well as 1997, prevailed. By 2007, they had moved to 
a much more consensual position with the government when Osborne360 confirmed 
that a ‘possible Conservative government would not only match the overall spending 
plans of the Brown government but also increase public spending.’361  
Faucher-King et al. contend that New Labour was indeed 
… a hybrid of economic liberalism inspired by American reforms, the legacy of English-style 
social democracy, illiberal policies in the political sense (that is, those that coerce individuals), 
and openness or democratisation, the whole being seasoned by a marked taste for 
experimentation.362  
They allude to the notions of coercion and illiberal policies – the home affairs agenda 
– as part of this hybrid model. Whilst the description of these policies as ‘illiberal 
policies’ is a point of debate they are right to point to the area of home affairs as an 
increasingly ‘contested terrain.’  
In  order to fully understand the complexities of New Labour home affairs agenda, we 
need therefore to look at a liberal-coercive dimensions of policy as well as an 
accommodationist/modernising dimensions. Figure 4:2 represents this view 
diagrammatically – each quadrant of the diagram represents a dimension of Labour 
policy at the time.   
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The Home Affairs narrative : a contested terrain 
 Whilst it is clear that home affairs did become the ‘contested terrain’ of UK politics, 
to claim that it did so as a result of Labour’s overall electoral strategy appears to be 
simplistic. The notion that because the Labour Party needed the middle-classes to 
support it in securing power and that the price was less ‘social democrat red blood’ in 
its economic policy ignores the complexities of the changing psephology. Labour has 
always needed a broad coalition of class support to secure power. This view gives 
insufficient weight to the political and economic ambitions of the middle classes. 
Equally, the notion that the working-class voter base, having been disappointed with 
Labour’s economic timidity in power would be brought off by an increasingly 
authoritarian outlook on home affairs, is a limiting and simplistic view. 
Klug has argued precisely this. In discussing New Labour and the distribution of 
power, Klug  notes that as New Labour 
… increasingly disappointed much of its ‘core’ constituency on tax and income redistribution 
policies, it could appeal … to a section of its traditional supporters with tough anti-crime 
initiatives and a burgeoning prison population.363 
She relates that many of the ‘harshest measures’ were ‘in the context of the severe 
pressure the government faced in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7’ and that the New 
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Labour years might have had a different flavour if these atrocities had not happened. 
She also notes that it is a ‘matter of speculation whether other parties in power would 
have acted differently.’364  
As with other commentators, Klug mistakes rhetoric for action. For example, she cites 
Reid’s call for ‘reform [of] our human rights’ because the ‘world has changed’.365 She 
does not go on to say that no such reform was ever proposed or that all of the 
government’s policies had to be, and were, Human Rights compliant. She does not go 
on to say that there were extensive debates inside the government and reform of human 
rights, dropping the Human Rights Act or derogating from any article of the ECHR 
were never seriously discussed in government. 366 It is very easy to ‘hear what you 
want to hear’. More appropriately, she quotes Blair saying, ‘the rules of the game are 
changing’,367 a frame that certainly informed the government’s view on counter-
terrorism legislation for some time to come.368 
A narrative developed that placed the Home Affairs agenda pursued by the New 
Labour Government in the context of an authoritarian approach that historically had 
been quite common on the Left.369 Table 4:1 summarises much of this narrative.  
One version of this narrative sees the overall policy as a manifestation of ‘tough on 
crime and tough on the causes of crime’ Or, that there is an ongoing contest between 
the liberal and the coercive. Others claim that the government was far too statist and 
relied far too much on the state for defence of civil liberties. This is a classic critique 
of social democracy. It argues further that this was a traditional leftist authoritarianism 
rooted in a deep rift between ‘the left’ and ‘what might be called [a] ‘radical’ or 
‘progressive’ liberalism and that it  reflected in an inconsistent approach by Labour to 
the values of civil liberties … and a neglected attitude to the power of the state.’370  
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Many felt that Labour was playing tough in order not to look soft and that the 
government utilised both rhetoric and declarative law in lieu of clearly thought out 
policy. By ‘declarative’ laws, I mean laws that are as much about declaring a position 
or preferred outcome as concrete legislation. These declarative laws were laws that 
sought to ‘make a point’ rather than make a law. Examples included a proposal to 
remove passports or driving licences from recalcitrant fathers who did not pay child 
support, and a law that would permit police to fine drunks instantly and permitted 
police to ‘frogmarch’ them to cash machines to collect the fine.371 Often ill-thought 
out, such declarative laws made the headlines but were impractical. Sometimes, 
‘Labour’s Respect’ agenda [based on the eradication of anti-social behaviour and low 
level crime particularly in the poorer areas of the country] angered those who 
invariably see the criminal or the vandal as victim, not perpetrator.’372 The Respect 
agenda, the challenge of anti-social behaviour and the use of anti-social behaviour 
orders (ASBOs)373 and the use of local community-based police officers to deal with  
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them, was, for others, all about addressing the needs of those communities left behind 
in a world that was now ‘global’ in outlook. It was rooted in a ‘localism’ and 
communitarianism that was eschewed and dismissed by the civil liberties lobby. 
Table 4:2 outlines the key criticisms offered of some of the key areas of home affairs. 
Considered together, they offered the beginnings of a cogent narrative that could point 
to an authoritarian focus by the government. But those who wanted to challenge each 
criticism felt they had answers to them. As a participant, I can certainly point to 
evidence that refutes them.  The figure – variously of over 3000 to 4300 new criminal 
offences – is based on research by the then Liberal Democrat spokesperson on Home 
Affairs, Chris Huhne, and is always used without qualification and out of context.374 
Many of these new ‘offences’ are repeat offences, specific to new legislation or are 
replacement offences updating outdated laws. There is no doubt that, at times, the 
government confused ‘legislating with governing’, but for all these new offences, 
violent crime went down 40% over the period. 375 
Many objected to the growth in the DNA data base, but more and more ‘cold cases’ 
were being solved – including rapes and murders. Critics accused the government of 
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‘criminalising a generation of young people with ASBOS – although barely 25,000 
ASBOs were issued from 1999-2013.376 By any measure, this does not represent the 
‘criminalisation of a generation’. Whilst there was an increase in police powers, this 
was also a time when there were record numbers of police officers and a huge 
investment in community and neighbourhood policing. Although the pre-charge 
detention powers were increased to 28 days (from first seven and then fourteen days), 
only six people have ever been held for more than 14 days since 2006.377 The UK has 
supposedly the highest level of CCTV and surveillance in Europe – yet these are 
overwhelmingly on private buildings in the private sector or, for example, throughout 
modernised transport fleets of buses and trains. The narrative of an authoritarian 
approach is, at the very least, debateable, if not ‘contested terrain’. Labour’s Home  
Office was not embattled or the ‘Millwall’378 of departments – that is ‘No-one likes 
us, and we don’t care’ – as suggested by Davies. 379  
The bifurcation of the Home Affairs agenda 
In their discussion of a ‘bifurcation of politics,’ Jennings and Stoker posit the existence 
of ‘two Englands’ and this would seem to be a concept worth exploring further . They 
contend there is  
… a growing divide in the political outlook of citizens in different places…some citizens are 
living in cosmopolitan areas of growth, and others in provincial backwaters experiencing 
decline. This bifurcation of experience and circumstances is already impacting political 
outlooks and behaviour.380 
They argue further that with the ‘decline of traditional class cleavages and associated 
political loyalties, place-based experiences provide a new dynamic that is pulling 
cosmopolitan and backwater locations further apart and increasingly framing the 
political choices of citizens.’ Superficially, this looks like a variation on New Labour’s 
‘Middle England’ strategy – that is, Labour’s core has nowhere to go and will stick 
with Labour, so the appeal had to be to the middle classes. I would posit that there is 
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a similar bifurcation when it comes to Labour home affairs agenda. The 
‘cosmopolitans’ are ‘global in outlook, liberal and plural in identity’, the ‘backwaters’ 
are ‘inward-looking, relatively illiberal and English in identity.’ 381  
The ‘cosmopolitans’ would broadly agree with the New Labour government’s home 
affairs agenda on the liberal half of Table 4:3, the ‘backwaters’ on the coercive half. 
New Labour’s overwhelming desire, within its electoral strategy or the development 
of its home affairs agenda was to win support from both sections of the community. 
 
The bifurcation is not always as neatly delineated as it is in the example given by 
Jennings and Stoker. Many ‘backwaters’ would baulk at supporting the more liberal 
aspects of Labour’s asylum and immigration record. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, Labour was trying to develop a positive message on a system of ‘managed 
migration’ that meant a liberal disposition based on a  points-based system but with 
strong controls to implement the law strongly. Equally,  not all ‘cosmopolitans’ would 
resist the strong anti-crime measures of the government or the strong counter-terrorism 
measures. Some of the extensions to policing powers would be welcomed by both 
groups, some would be rejected by both.   
For every criticism of its home affairs agenda by those of a ‘cosmopolitan’ persuasion, 
there was an answer in its broader narrative for home affairs. Its policies were not just 
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about rhetoric and declarative laws382, but also about substance, for example in the 
decline of crime figures and the record number of police officers. Some would argue 
that, as in other areas, the rhetoric and declarative laws were spun much more than the 
actual reality that prevailed underneath it. In Figure 4:3, the rhetoric and spin might 
put New Labour in one of the four corners, but the reality was likely to be much closer 
to the centre of the diagram. For Hindmoor, the government’s task was to persuade 
 
the public who gravitated to one of the four corners to come more towards the centre 
– through a mixture of policy and position, creativity, spin and choice.383  
In common with Jennings and Stoker, some would argue that it is entirely fair to 
contend that Labour spent more time concerned about the ‘gap’ between reality and 
rhetoric in the bottom ‘liberal’ half of the schema in Figure 4:3 than it did in the top 
half.384 This may well be the case – the core of their submission is that ‘backwater’ 
England had been left behind and that ‘Labour is … struggling to develop a policy 
platform that reflects the concerns of backwater areas’ 385  
In reality, Labour was trying to placate both sides. Much of its natural base sat in both 
camps. The notion that Labour only had to appeal to its own class base to succeed was 
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simply no longer the case, if it had ever been. Labour had always been most successful 
when it combined its middle-class and working-class support. New Labour’s strategy 
was in this similar vein and, historically at least, not that new but more a reflection of 
the increasing demographic reality of the late twentieth century. Its appeal to middle 
England was about securing power as much as it was about changing the nature of the 
party – a reflection of the accommodationist/modernising continuum. 
It would be wrong to see the emerging narrative that arose from the concerns around 
these two Englands, the two continuums, as simply a function of Shaw’s ‘search for 
votes.’ 386 I know from my experience in government that Labour wanted to secure all 
of its policy objectives – the liberal and coercive – as highlighted in Table 4:3. They 
formed the core of a narrative that was concerned about all aspects of safety and 
security as much as it was about equality and social reforms, such as civil partnerships. 
It was just as concerned about all aspects of the communities left behind through crime 
as it was about rights – and responsibilities. It wanted to develop a managed migration 
system as well as bring in a Human Rights Act; it wanted freedom of information 
legislation and devolution of power from the centre as well the development of anti-
social behaviour orders and the Respect agenda; it wanted equality legislation and a 
new race relations framework as well as counterterrorism legislation that it thought 
would keep the public safe. It had developed a narrative rooted in responsibilities as 
well as rights and security as well as freedom.  
The Case Studies  
A very useful example of this policy bifurcation is in the area of immigration. Labour 
was seeking to develop a narrative that Jennings and Stoker alluded to many years 
later, saying ‘…it is possible that a compromise over immigration policy could be 
designed to appeal in both cosmopolitan and backwater areas.’387 On taking power, 
the outlook was both very coercive for example, changing the law so as to remove 
people who had either failed to secure asylum,  and therefore refugee status,  and 
seeking to remove undocumented migrants and liberal, for example the instant 
                                                 
386 Shaw, Eric (1996) Op.cit. p.181 
387 Jennings and Stoker (2016) Op.cit. p.7 
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removal of the primary purpose law.388 But the emphasis was more towards a 
‘backwater’ rather than a ‘cosmopolitan’ view. 
As the government ‘fixed and repaired’ the asylum and immigration system, it then 
developed a more confidently liberal narrative around ‘managed migration’ and the 
economic value of migration – a shift towards the ‘cosmopolitans’. Then, despite 
developing a ‘points-based’ system for migration, the narrative shifted back to 
language that was all about control, back, in fact, towards the ‘backwaters’.   
Thus, a cogent story which contained a synthesis of elements that would be supported 
by both halves of the Jennings and Stoker bifurcation – both Englands – was, it will 
be argued, undermined by a lack of will or confidence in propagating the narrative.  
 
Sometimes it was too ‘cosmopolitan’, sometimes too ‘backwater’ – and in the end 
pleased no-one. Detractors were allowed to paint it as an era of ‘open borders.’ A 
policy that could be positioned as the dark A box in Figure 4:4389 could be painted as 
either much more liberal and much more rooted in the modernising school, almost a 
Third Way policy, as at the white A box, or as a policy rooted in the neo-liberal 
exploitation of migrants in a globalised world, as at the lighter A box.  
                                                 
388 See Chapter Five below for more detailed discussion 
389 In Figure 4:4, the white box reflects a modernising position, the lighter box an accommodationist 
position and the darker box represents my view of the making of the Labour narrative actually.  
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In terms of the police mergers case study, the three B boxes are much closer together 
than the other areas. This reflects, in part, the notion that this policy was much more 
of a technocratic response than a matter debate. This is certainly the case save for one 
crucial point – locality. The ‘cosmopolitan’ areas of the Jennings and Stoker 
bifurcation consist largely of urban England, big city urban England. Many of these 
areas were already policed by strategic forces – West Midlands, Greater Manchester, 
Merseyside and the various Yorkshire forces, for example – so the key debate was lost 
on them. Indeed, often, as we shall see in Chapter Six, many of the smaller forces 
threatened by the mergers would use the argument about being ‘swallowed whole’ by 
large urban forces or of mergers being ‘takeovers’ by urban forces rather than 
mutually-based mergers. 
Many of the 43 forces in England and Wales that were faced with extinction played 
up this local identity dimension and this played well with the ‘backwaters’ who would 
have resisted change as a matter of course. They would have seen mergers as  a top-
down policy imposed from outside by a political elite that had left them behind. They 
would have seen it as a policy that was an administrative convenience for the urban 
‘centre’ that could not care less about their local ‘backwater’ communities. Worse than 
this, just as the Labour government was doing something they supported – 
implementing neighbourhood policing – they were threatened with the nonsense of 
mergers, and the loss of local police.   
The counter-terrorism policy is spread as far as it is possible to be across Figure 4:4. 
The white box reflects a broadly modernising position – a recognition that such 
policies were more coercive than liberal, but that they were considered essential for 
the protection of the public. The lighter box more readily reflects an accommodationist 
view – that the policies were inherently coercive and a result of a neoliberal view of 
the relationship between the state and the citizen. This means an increasingly small 
state still retains coercive policies to supress freedoms. The darker box, close to centre 
of the diagram, reflects what, I would suggest, was broadly the actual government 
view – that these policies were certainly more coercive than liberal, but were a matter 
of necessity rather than choice because of the government’s commitment to public 
safety. 
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As explored in Chapter Seven, there were discernible periods of counter-terrorism 
policy and legislation during this government’s time in office – up to 9/11, 9/11 to 7/7, 
post 7/7 to 42 days and post 42 days. In the case study, I  explore in detail the debates 
over both 90 days pre-charge detention and the provision for 42 days. However, the 
discussion is firmly within the wider context of the threat and an acceptance that there 
needed to be a balance between liberty and the law, between defending the public and 
defending rights .  
Summary  
Thus, the development of a points-based system (PBS) for immigration needs to be 
put in the historic and political context of the government’s immigration policy and 
narrative. There also needs to be an understanding of how this policy related to another 
key government decision - not to impose transitional controls on the free movement 
for work of the A8 nations citizens in 2004.390 
 The policy on police force mergers needs to be put into a broader historical context 
as well as within the government’s overall policy narrative. How the policy evolved 
and came about will be discussed as well as how it related to the other key policing 
policy – the implementation of neighbourhood policing. Clearly, and intuitively,  the 
mergers policy had an inherent relationship with  neighbourhood policing policy in 
much the same way that the PBS had with the decision on A8 nationals. 
The development of counterterrorism policy needs to be understood in the context of 
the broader home affairs agenda and narrative that we have discussed in this chapter. 
In particular, as Klug would have it, how did Labour go from ‘the party of Freedom 
of Information Act…the Human Rights Act… to a party…’casual’…about civil 
liberties … and an advocate of anything from 42 to 90 days detention without 
charge?’391 Unlike the other two case studies,  this one is much more focussed on 
legislation and the Commons, and on two distinct events – the 2005 proposals for 90 
days in the aftermath of 7/7 and the 2008 proposals on 42 days. There were a number 
                                                 
390 The ‘A8’ nations were the next eight countries ready to accede to the European Union – Malta and 
Cyprus – and six of the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe – the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. For greater discussion on these 
countries, see chapter five below.  
391 Klug (2011) Op.cit. p.S78 
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of occasions when the government could have shifted its narrative and moved away 
from this legislative path, as we shall see, but on each occasion, it chose not to do so. 
Stuart Hall contended that ‘one law of the Medes and Persians’392 is that ‘Labour is 
always more cautious, more conservative, in office than before it’ and continued by 
saying that  
… the 1970s immigration legislation was the paradigm case where, having failed to campaign 
to educate its own…while out of office, it found itself driven in office hurriedly to legislate in 
a basically anti-immigrant and racist way.’393 
 Whether the legislation was racist or otherwise is a matter for debate but having been 
out of power for almost twenty years, the Labour  Party was given the chance to revisit 
the subject of immigration law in office and to effect change if needed. It faced a very 
different world and context from that which it had inherited in 1974 – the last time it 
had acceded to power. In the next chapter I look at whether Labour had learnt any 
lesson in opposition about immigration or indeed, whether it had ‘failed to campaign 
to educate its own’ on the issue – and how it faced Jennings and Stoker’s ‘two 
Englands’. 
 
                                                 
392 The emphasis here on the ‘law of the Medes and Persians’ is mine – it is simply a phrase that mean 
‘an unalterable law’. The emphasis on ‘always’ is Hall’s and is more contentious.  
393 Hall, Stuart (1995) ‘ Parties on the edge of a nervous breakdown’, Soundings Vol.1, pp.19-34 at 
https://www.lwbooks.co.uk/sites/default/files/s01_02hall.pdf   pp.30-31 
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Chapter Five  
Case Study  
Immigration: What is the point of a Points-Based System?  
Labour’s Achilles Heel ? 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how an apparently successful policy 
intervention – the development of a points-based system for non-EU migration into 
the UK – has come to be seen as part of an enormous failure by the last government 
in the whole area of asylum and immigration. Many of the officials involved in this 
area reported that it was not a period where the government was ‘soft on 
immigration… there was no permissive attitude to immigration.’394 The apparent 
failure was caused, at least in part, because EU migration was seen as somehow 
different from other migration – at least by the political world. As a key official 
relayed, this was not ‘just a Labour party view, a Labour government view, it was … 
the whole political establishment.’395 The problem was, as we shall see, that this was 
not the public’s view and the Labour government failed to develop and sustain a 
narrative that might have persuaded an antipathetic public that its immigration policy 
was the right approach. This chapter also looks at why the impact of these  two clearly 
linked aspects of policy – EU migration and the points-based system for non-EU 
migration – were not accounted for and assessed together.  
A former special adviser reported that the whole issue of immigration was problematic 
for the party at the advent of power and that he thought Blair knew that it was Labour’s 
‘Achilles heel.’396 For some in the party ‘any policy on immigration is racist’ and so 
little advance work had been carried out in the policy area.397 The former special 
adviser was also clear that where the party had done a significant amount of policy 
work prior to the 1997 election, in areas such as constitution, the economy, defence 
and some aspects of criminal justice, it was successful in the first term of the 
government. 398 No such advance work was carried out in this area, but it was an area 
                                                 
394 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F1) and (F22) 
395 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F1) 
396 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F25) 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
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of increasing importance to Labour’s support base.399 This was one of the key 
dilemmas of the new government as it assumed power. According to Rob Ford 
… public opposition to immigration is widespread and is particularly intense among the less 
educated, the working classes and those who feel migrants represent a threat to the national 
culture.400 
 
This is another dimension to Labour’s dilemma on immigration. The people that were 
part of the traditional support base for the party were those most opposed to 
immigration. Notwithstanding this view, and the ‘bifurcation’ of Jennings and 
Stoker‘s ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘backwater’ Englands,401 - the Labour Party decided to 
make ‘a decisive break with the previous policy model.’402 The previous policy model 
had been rooted in the sort of ‘coercion and control’ policy. The decisive break was, 
counter-intuitively perhaps, towards a more liberal and permissive policy of ‘managed 
migration.’ Before we can begin to understand the reasons for the success or failure of 
such a shift in policy, we need to look at its origins.   
Some commentators suggest that, notwithstanding some early liberal noises on 
immigration, the government developed and ‘intensified’ ‘tough policies towards 
asylum-seekers’ and ‘followed rather than contradicted restrictive public 
preferences’403 There is certainly no doubt that the emphasis was on asylum in the first 
term and that the approach was one of control and seeking to ‘get a grip’ of significant 
increases in the number of applications for asylum.404 This coercive approach to 
asylum, some argued, provided a ‘certain amount of political cover for the more liberal 
approach to economic immigration.’405 This is not quite right. In looking at the 
emerging narrative for the government on these issues and, given my experience as 
Immigration Minister from 2005-2006, I would argue that the government was 
developing both coercive and liberal policies on each aspect of immigration and 
asylum as a matter of strategy. It was trying to build a complex consensus on these 
                                                 
399 See discussion of salience of issues with MORI and others below.  
400 Ford, Robert (2011) ‘Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration 
in Britain is Affected by Migrants’ Region of Origin.’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 
Vol.37, No.7, pp.1017-1037 pp.1017-1018 
401 Jennings and Stoker (2106) Op.cit pp.372-382 
402 Somerville, W (2007) Immigration under New Labour The Policy Press Bristol pp.29 and passim. 
Chapter One. 
403 Consterdine, Erica and Hampshire, James (2014) ‘Immigration policy under New Labour: 
Exploring a critical juncture.’ British Politics Vol.9 No.3 pp.275-296 pp.277-278 
404 See Figure 5:4 below 
405 Mulvey, Gareth (2011) ‘Immigration under New Labour: Policy and Effects’ Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies Vol.37 No.9 pp.1477-1493 pp.1479-1480 
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issues – with an accompanying narrative that was just as complex. It wanted a strategy 
that both allayed some of the fears of the ‘cosmopolitans’ that the government was 
being too harsh and too coercive, and the concerns of the ‘backwaters’ that the 
government was being too lenient and pursuing an open-door policy on immigration 
and asylum.  
Neither the policy nor the strategy was completely formed when the government took 
power. The government developed immigration policy from a restrictive ‘coercive’ 
model to an economistically-driven, liberal, ‘managed migration’ model. For this 
model to succeed, it had to develop procedures that both facilitated a welcome for the 
migrants that were needed by the economy and processes that controlled, and 
eventually removed, those who were not required. 406 It would also have to develop a 
narrative that explained this complex policy on all its different levels. .  
A confused narrative or just another New Labour triangulation? 
Whilst it is easy to discern the negative, coercive, elements in the policy on asylum 
and immigration and criticise the government for such an approach, I would contend 
that this is not entirely fair. There was a clear and discernible strategy, and 
corresponding narrative, that ran through the government’s record like a ‘golden 
thread.’ It is the rhetorical equivalent of Blair’s ‘tough on crime, tough on the cause 
of crime’ language in the area of law and order. Simply put, in a very difficult and 
sensitive area for the Party, the government sought to develop positive policies and a 
compelling narrative on both asylum and immigration. This included the welcoming 
of refugees, the celebration of the role and contribution of migrants and the need and 
desire for further immigration for the economy to grow and prosper. This would 
require fair and efficient processes to deal with applications and the management and 
control of these processes were central to getting a positive message heard. It felt that 
this positive message would only break-through if the government took control of 
what could be termed ‘abuses’ in both the areas of immigration and asylum. It would 
have to discourage those who sought the asylum route simply in preference to 
economic migration and deal as well with the significant backlogs of asylum 
applicants then in an administrative limbo. It would also have to deal with the issue of 
undocumented migrants who had overstayed or were in the country illegally, the need 
to streamline the appeals processes and thirdly, increase the efficacy of removals and 
                                                 
406 See Ibid. and Consterdine and Hampshire (2014) Op.cit. and Somerville (2007) Ch.1.  
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deportation procedures. In short, the government had to demonstrate its competence 
on the coercive side as well as on the more liberal side. This competence bought the 
government the space to develop the liberal dimensions of the policies. 
The problem with this approach by the government was that it required the narrative 
to be hardwired into the policy framework.  The development of the government’s 
policy change needed to be reflected in the overarching and overriding narrative. From 
my ministerial perspective, I would argue that the government frequently 
overemphasised the negative aspects – its coercive, control and enforcement (CCE) 
aspects - to the detriment of the more liberal, managerial and consensual aspects 
(LMC). This was at a cost to the overall message and strategy.   
 
 
Figure 5:1 sets out the spatial relationships of the strategy and shows how each aspect 
of the strategy relates to the others. The strategy represents a sophisticated attempt to 
calm public disquiet on the issue. However, to succeed, it requires that all aspects of 
the strategy to treated equally.  A combination of 1 and 2 or 3 and 4 would be logical 
strategies but in the early days of the government something more like 1 and 3 were 
being pursued, but before the development of the points-based system. It caused 
confusion.  
The government needed to be careful to distinguish between each element of the 
narrative and its relationship to the whole strategy. Asylum is very distinct from 
123 
 
immigration as a route in the UK. It is governed by international treaty407 and a set of 
rule and obligations that were very different from the routine paths into the country 
through the migration process. As will become clear, language matters and how it is 
used to craft frames, images and narratives can be the difference between the success 
and failure of a policy.  
Further, such a complex narrative was dependent on the government not only being 
efficient and competent across all of the processes involved but also being seen to be 
efficient and competent. Furthermore, if the language of government spokespeople 
and ministers consistently problematised some or other aspect of the integrated policy, 
then this had an impact on the whole narrative.  
The evolution of a policy 
Somerville suggests that there were two distinct policy phases between 1997 and 2007 
– 1997-2001 and 2001-2007.408 With the passage of time and based on my experience, 
I would suggest three periods. I agree with him that 1997-2001 was the first such 
period and that this was broadly an ‘efficiency drive,’ as he describes it. Its focus was 
on dealing with the legacy issue from the previous government, particularly the huge 
increase in the number of asylum applications. The second phase, 2001-2006, was the 
more liberal period – when a managed migration approach was developed, and a 
correspondingly positive narrative was crafted. The third phase, 2006-2010, began to 
respond to growing public disquiet, at least in tone and rhetoric, by developing a more 
coercive narrative around controls and borders.   
This case study looks at these three discernible policy phases largely within the context 
of the duality between the development of the points-based system and the decision 
not to impose transitional controls on migrants from the A8 nations in 2004. It also 
looks at the tone and narrative of the government’s rhetoric on these issues and argues 
that during the 1997-2001 period, Somerville’s ‘efficiency drive’ was weighted 
towards the coercive elements (CCE in Figure 5:1) of the strategy and narrative, with 
only some shading towards the liberal (LMC in Figure 5:1) elements.  
The real shift came in the 2001-2006 period. Although the coercive elements were 
consolidated , there was a discernible shift towards the liberal elements – and a more 
positive message on immigration. This was rooted in the development of the points-
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based system at the heart of the ‘managed’ dimension of ‘managed’ migration. It was 
also firmly influence by the decision not to impose transitional controls on the A8 
nations. At the time, many of those involved did not feel as though it had any 
relationship at all to the area of immigration.  
It will be argued that such tolerance faded in the 2006-2010 period and the balance of 
rhetoric reverted back to the coercive elements despite the developing implementation 
of the points-based system, based, as it is, on the liberal side of the equation. The 
government faced a real dilemma across this period. This dilemma, it will be argued, 
had its roots in the ineffective and disjointed way that it developed strategy and 
narrative in the area. Just as the points-based system was implemented in full in 2009, 
the government’s rhetoric had reached the level of Prime Minister Brown talking about 
‘British Jobs for British Workers’ – hardly the most liberal of sentiments. It was 
dismissed by a former senior cabinet minister as ‘dishonourable and wrong’ and it 
‘…gave a licence to others to criticise’ the government.409  
The chapter looks at these three phases in detail, but first it is important to clarify the 
facts behind the discourse, in terms of the categories of pathways into the country and 
the numbers and trends with each category. 
What exactly are we talking about?  
Paths 
Figure 5:2 highlights the four key migration pathways into the UK – work-related, 
family reunion, study and ‘other ways’.  It also shows that work and study are the two 
most important migration pathways.  
It is too easy to use phrases such as ‘immigration’ and ‘asylum’ interchangeably but 
to do so is completely wrong. Asylum is not a migration pathway, applicants are 
fleeing oppression and seeking refuge. It is easy to discern the difference between a 
‘migrant’ and a ‘refugee’. Things get a little more difficult when one tries to discern 
the difference between economic migrants and non-economic migrants, highly-skilled 
migrants and low-skilled migrants, legal and illegal migrants, documented and 
undocumented migrants, overstayers and other individuals who have broken rules but  
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are not necessarily illegal – and the list goes on. 
In Figure 5:3, the term ‘illegal’ is used for those who are undocumented or overstaying 
– both of which statuses are strictly illegal. There is no such thing as an ‘illegal’ asylum 
 
 
asylum seeker under the convention410 only successful applicants (refugees) or failed 
applicants, hence the phrase, ‘failed asylum seeker’ (FAS). Whilst the main focus of 
this case study is the points-based system, that is the formal system of migration to 
work and its relationship with the accession of the new EU nations into the European 
Union, careful analysis of these aspects of public policy demands at least some 
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reference to the other categories. The five categories are – Asylum, Economic Migrant, 
Study, and Family Reunion and the A8 nations route.  
The top half of Figure 5:3 shows how these categories relate to the ‘coercion and 
control’ functions of the state. This layer of the diagram shows the ‘illegal’ dimension 
of these pathways to the UK and shows that the state’s response is to remove, disperse 
or at least ensure only temporary provision in the UK.  
The black band  across the middle of Figure 5:3 has been entitled ‘The Twilight Zone’ 
and would contain those applicants, in each category, who have yet to get a decision 
on their application. An example might be a putative asylum seeker whose application 
has failed but who cannot be safely returned to their country of origin or a family 
reunion applicant still going through the process. This Twilight Zone is where much 
of the casework that MPs face in their constituencies in the areas of asylum and 
immigration sit. It is here where decisions end up stalled for some reason or other – 
sometimes for up to 15-20 years.411 
The lower part of the diagram reflects the more ‘managed and consensus’ based 
functions of the state in relation to the applicants in each category. In this part of the 
process, the successful applicants face integrating into broader society, consolidate 
their role in the UK and do so on a permanent basis. Both of these dimensions of the 
decision-making process – ‘coercion and control’ and ‘managed and consensus’ – can 
be prone to dysfunction.   
Some have argued that the core of Labour’s difficulties on these issues is much more 
‘one of governance’ rather than substance and that this is can be evidenced across each 
of the five categories. If Labour had ‘staked its credibility on having a rules-based 
policy for management and enforcement’ then when it goes wrong, it is because ‘they 
[the Labour Government] have not properly enforced what they have set up.’412 
Confidence and competence would prove to be important in this area and would 
certainly influence the public’s assessment of the success or otherwise of the policy. 
Too often, the Labour government responded to the growing salience of these issues 
amongst the public with ill-thought out or under-resourced initiatives. These  
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invariably failed on competency and governance grounds and therefore, as explained 
later in the chapter, ultimately fuelled the salience of the issues amongst the public.    
Although this study will concentrate on the path to work - economic migration - it is 
essential to look at some of these other areas as a prelude to the broader discussion of 
the relationship between the points-based system (economic migration) and the A8 
decision. Above all, we need to be clear not to use these five distinct pathways 
interchangeably – as many often do. The difficulty with this, as we shall see, is that 
the broader public narrative conflates each of these pathways into one. Equally, it is 
difficult to discuss the development of economic migration and a managed system, 
without relating this path to the other paths, especially the asylum path as well as the 
‘A8’ path. As we shall see, whether they conflated all these different pathways or not, 
the one thing the Labour government could not be accused of is ignoring the debate 
entirely and doing nothing about it. But before we look at the policy development, 
decisions and activities in these policy areas by the Labour Government, it is helpful 
to understand what happened to the numbers.  
Numbers  
The concerns here are not for the detailed numbers, but the trends that they indicate. 
When Labour came to power in 1997, the annual rate  of asylum applicants was 
trending upwards from about 20,000 applicants per year as shown in Figure 5:4.  
 
Applications peaked in 2001-2002 and then declined rapidly. The decision-making 
infrastructure was creaking at the seams at the higher level and the rate inexorably rose  
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upwards. Initially, the language used around this phenomenon was negative – the issue 
was problematic, a crisis, there was abuse, the government had to ‘get a grip’, take 
control, exert more authority and enforce more readily. It was the language of coercion 
(CCE). There was not the time or space to find a positive narrative. It would prove 
difficult for the government to go on to develop a positive narrative on asylum because 
of the rhetoric used in this phase. Unsuccessful applicants could not always be returned 
home – and were left in the ‘twilight zone,’ as shown in Figure 5:3. Naturally they 
gravitated towards London and the South-East, especially Kent. The government then 
made two panicked decisions to try to get a grip of the issue that, I believe, merely 
exacerbated the problems in the long-term. They decided that unsuccessful asylum 
applicants would not be allowed to work, even when they could not be returned home 
and that they were to be dispersed from London and the South-East to other 
communities in the North and the Midlands especially.413 Both decisions heightened 
the dysfunctionality of the system and left unsuccessful applicants dependent on a 
support system that was under resourced and in communities that were already poverty 
stricken. This is because that was where the cheapest housing was and where Jennings 
and Stoker’s ‘backwaters’ lived.414  
Trends  
The other ‘half’ of this policy equation was also in need of positive narration and 
policy development. As can be seen from Figure 5:5, the broad trend since 1975 was 
for more or less a balance between the inflow and outflow of people to and from the  
UK. For much of the time, until around 1996, there were roughly 200,000 people going 
each way. By 2007-2008, the trend had changed. The net balance shifted towards the 
inflow – but both the inflow and outflow increased significantly.  
By 2007, roughly 550,000 came in and about 380,000 went out – a net inward flow of 
180-200,000, significantly more than the pre-97 trend. The net balance tipped over the 
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100,000 in 1998-2000 and never dropped below throughout the government’s term. 
One former minister noted that 
There was a sense that here were these high new numbers and we must bring them down, rather 
than planning for a new normal. There was a refusal to face up to the fact that this was just a 
new world.415 
If, as the government thought, the increase in numbers was inevitable, then the key 
policy becomes how to ameliorate, control and manage, rather than discourage and 
prevent in some sort of Sisyphean task. The same former minister lamented that there 
was an ‘an unwillingness to speak openly about the change and to educate the country 
about what was going to be different.’416 This was the positive narrative that the 
government should have developed more quickly and more comprehensively than it 
did.  
Figure 5:6 shows the ‘salience’ of immigration as an issue for voters, that is, in 
psephological terms, how important a factor they think it is in deciding how they vote. 
Immigration had been growing as a salient issue over time. This trend broadly tracks 
the increasing numbers, peaking in 2006 and 2008. It only went above 25%  after 
2003/04 but has maintained at that level since. It is difficult to tell how closely the  
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salience trend reacts to the increase, but the trend is clear, even if sometimes the 
salience increases before the numbers do. For example, the growing salience of the 
issue starts to grow after 2000 and does not neatly fit into a traditional narrative about 
the flow of EU nationals from the newly-formed states of Eastern Europe from 2004 
onwards causing the increase.417  
Mulvey contends rightly that ‘… there is no evidence to suggest that immigration has 
ever been a deciding factor in British general elections.’418 Nonetheless, all parties 
were clear that it did have an impact on what might be called ‘second-order’ elections 
– especially local and European parliament elections. Apparently, this salience was 
ignored by the politicians and there was a taboo on speaking about asylum or 
immigration at all.  
Taboo or not taboo? Narratives matter 
A cursory look at a range of the measures that Labour took in the area whilst in 
government shows clearly the absurdity of the charge that the government did little or 
nothing on the issues of asylum and immigration. The two tables in Appendix One 
show how wrong this accusation is. It can certainly be argued, by the government’s 
opponents or indeed its critics on its own benches, that what the government did, in 
                                                 
417 The Telegraph (2013) Labour made a ‘spectacular mistake’ on immigration, admits Jack Straw 
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terms of either legislation or policy direction, has proved to be ineffective, misguided 
or just plain wrong, but inactivity or an absence of debate on the issues of asylum and 
immigration is a charge easily and summarily dismissed.  
Appendix Table One shows that, in every year of that government, except 1997, 2003 
and 2010, there was a piece of legislation, a white paper or a significant policy 
document on immigration or a closely related area. It is also clear, however, that this 
high-level of activity on the subject area seemed unconnected from the growing 
disquiet of the public as seen by the salience levels. There was certainly ‘no obvious 
electoral dividend in opening up the British labour market to migrants.’419 Public 
perception was that Labour was ignoring the issue and indeed were discouraging 
public engagement on the matter.420 
Much of the framework that governs both asylum and immigration are codified and 
delineated in rules and regulations and administrative law. In many instances, changes 
and reform to the immigration system do not require primary legislation. It is also 
important to note that because of the preponderance of the legislation to devolve power 
to a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly, parliamentary time slots for 
legislation were keenly fought over and sought after by the various departments of the 
new government.421 Nevertheless, immigration secured a significant amount of the 
government’s time.  
Whilst the entire approach could be called into question in terms of substance, the 
notion that these issues were somehow taboo and not discussed or dealt with by the 
government is simply not sustainable. Appendix Table Two shows a high level of 
activity on a  range of areas that was essentially concerned with making sure that the 
UK economy had the skills it needed to develop and grow. The activity shows the 
building blocks towards a points-based system. It also highlights key speeches and 
research on immigration or a related area.  Towards the end of this period  –  2008-
2010  –  many in the party started to challenge the government’s record in this area 
and they were afforded the space to do so because the government shifted the narrative 
from a hybrid of the coercive (CCE) and liberal (LMC) elements to a simpler 
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problematised and negative lexicon around control and enforcement. Every time a 
labour politician feigned bravery to speak out on the issue, they underlined further 
how the government was resisting and failing its own detailed narrative.  
All of the policies, initiatives and legislation highlighted in these two Appendix Tables 
need to be viewed through this coercive/liberal (CCE/LMC) prism. It is difficult to 
understand why more explicit attention was not given by the government to 
underpinning them. They are, collectively, the building blocks of the very narrative 
that the government should have developed and sustained throughout its time in office. 
This chapter now looks at some the key decisions in each of the policy phases adapted 
from Somerville. 422  
Room to breathe: responses to a dysfunctional legacy 1997-2001 
Interestingly, for all its resonance with the public, in 1997 ‘the [immediate electoral] 
futility of immigration as a primary issue [for the Conservative opposition] was 
undeniable.’423 Saggar goes on to say that 
… if the chief aim was to raise a large question mark about Labour’s trust and competence [on 
immigration], the task took on absurd proportions when prosecuted by a party that was fighting 
hard to defend its own trust and competence on a much wider range of issues. 
 
Competence, then, would matter; but, as we have seen, little preparatory work and 
thinking was carried out by the Labour Party before 1997. Nevertheless, four elements 
stand out in this period – the abolition of the primary purpose rule; the emphasis on 
asylum; the language of the 1998 White Paper ; and the slow formation of a managed 
migration type rhetoric and policy. 
The first focus of the government’s attention was asylum. This phase of the 
development of immigration policy was rooted in a bureaucratic response to the real 
shambles that was the asylum system. Asylum applications increased significantly 
from 1995-2001, from an annual average of approximately 30,000 applications per 
year to a peak of nearly 80,000 per year in 2001-2002. The rate then started to go down 
but it took until 2005 to get the yearly application rates down to 1995 levels. For some 
officials, this emphasis on asylum was misplaced. One said that ‘a collective mistake 
was made, which saw the problem of immigration as a problem of asylum’. He related 
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that the Home Office had suffered as a department under the last government and did 
not feel able to respond to the new Prime Minister and his emphasis on asylum. For 
this official, ‘the Home Office had never equated immigration with asylum…’424 So, 
the New Labour government brought a shift of focus in the Home Office away from 
immigration and more towards asylum, at least until No.10 thought asylum was under 
control. 
The White Paper, Fairer, faster, and firmer: A modern approach to immigration and 
asylum425 published in 1998 and the subsequent legislation, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999426 tightened up processes and made matters more restrictive. However, it did 
not provide the resources and staff necessary to deal with the backlogs. Its language 
was overwhelmingly ‘coercive and control’ focussed with little scope for a more 
liberal, permissive approach. There was little evidence of a comprehensive, cogent 
and detailed strategy or narrative emerging.  
Like many policy areas that are essentially determined by quite mechanistic processes, 
the central bureaucratic feature of the asylum system, and indeed the immigration 
system, was all about ‘stock and flow’.427 Both processes were tightened up in the 
1999 Act and the subsequent reduction in flow afforded the Home Office the potential 
to deal with the backlog – the stock – but only if the appropriate level of resources 
were invested in these processes. This investment was not forthcoming. 
In such a scenario, it was difficult to develop the ‘managed migration’ dimension of 
an overarching strategy – but whilst small advances were made, the accompanying 
narrative did not emerge. As Spencer reports 
…with little public acknowledgement, the Conservatives had quietly overseen a steady 
increase in the number of work permits to meet skills shortages in the health service, teaching 
and parts of the private sector.428 
 
Labour built on this. It did so, I would argue, because of its overwhelming desire to 
succeed on the economic front, given the Party’s previous history in government as 
discussed in chapter four. Others ascribe broader ideological views to this shift – but 
the evidence for this is not convincing. The main reason behind the shift was 
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essentially economistic rather than ideological. There is an argument that the 
government committed to a managed migration policy because it fitted with a belief 
the inevitability of globalisation and so could claim to be ‘simply reacting to 
exogenous uncontrollable forces’429 and applied this logic ‘at least initially 
unconsciously’ to immigration policy. 430 This is simply not the case,  not least because 
the flows logic ‘at least initially unconsciously’ to immigration policy. 431 This is 
simply not the case,  not least because the flows increased by globalisation are 
invariably those at the lower end of the skill spectrum whereas the managed migration 
system developed – the points-based system – was concerned with the middle and 
higher ends of this spectrum.  
Somerville is right to describe this first period as an ‘efficiency drive’.432 The 1998 
White Paper barely mentioned economic migrants other than in the context of the 
abuse of the asylum system.433  However, there were elements of advance such as the 
identification of future skills in the DTI’s paper, ‘Building the Knowledge-driven 
economy’ document, the Innovators Scheme and the Prime Minister’s Initiative on 
International Education and the reduction in the criteria for work permits. All of these 
developments were small building blocks to support a change in direction that was 
economistically driven. 434 While I differ with Consterdine on the apparent ideological 
roots of this change in direction, she is right to attest that the new Labour government 
had ‘been considering the idea of expanding economic immigration and initiating the 
managed migration agenda’ long before non-state actors became engaged in the 
issue.435 
Much has been made of the importance of both a joint research paper from the Home 
Office and the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), ‘Migration: and economic and 
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social analysis’ 436 and a speech by the then Migration Minister Barbara Roche,437 
reflecting a shift in government policy towards a much more permissive immigration 
environment. 438 In addition to the sharp focus on asylum in the immediate post-1997 
period, the Home Office was already starting to address a shift towards an economistic 
view on migration, as we have seen above. I would argue that the PIU and Roche 
responded to these developments rather than creating them. They were both 
nonetheless serious and important developments, but it was still early days and the 
focus of rhetoric and narrative was on the coercive (CCE) not the liberal (LMC).  
This first phase is characteristic of the government’s developing narrative in that in 
contained both elements – CCE and LMC – but with the emphasis on getting control 
of asylum. The public face was very much one of ‘dealing with problems’ and ‘getting 
tough’ with asylum seekers. The weakest element, perhaps deliberately, of the 
emerging strategy and accompanying narrative was a ‘positive’ approach to refugees, 
to go along with the ‘tougher’ focus on unsuccessful asylum applicants. So even 
though the early elements of what would eventually be a shift to a more positive view 
on migration were developed here, the emphasis was still strongly on asylum. This 
made sense as part of Somerville’s ‘efficiency drive’, but it hindered the development 
of a more positive narrative on immigration and asylum in general. 
Stunted narrative development 2001-2004 
Observers differ on the date of a shift in attitude by the government. Somerville posits 
that ‘the late 2000 and early 2001 was a crucial period.’439 He asserts that the 
‘legislation in 2002 was a turning point’440 This phase, Somerville argues, was pro-
active and marked a change in direction, rather than being reactive. Consterdine and 
Hampshire called the phase from 2001-2005 a ‘critical juncture’ for ‘economic 
immigration policymaking in the United Kingdom.’441 The focus certainly shifted 
towards a much more economistic view of migration during this period. The 2002 
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White Paper, Secure borders, safe havens: Integration with diversity in modern442 
described migration as a positive economic asset that could contribute positively to 
the macro-economic health of the nation.443 The legislation that followed the white 
paper – the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002444; the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004;445 and the Immigration, Asylum 
and Nationality Act 2006446 – were still principally rooted in the ‘tough’ policy 
approach of the earlier ‘efficiency drive’ phase. This was not a refutation of the more 
economistic approach towards migration policy as outlined in the 2002 White Paper, 
but more of a pre-cursor to the broader approach that would be adopted later. The 
government was still struggling to elaborate a narrative to correspond to the shift in 
policy. This is why the significant shift in policy, the real ‘critical juncture’, whilst 
having its roots in the 2002 White Paper, owes more to Blair’s 2004 CBI speech, the 
Home Office’s five-year plan for managing economic migration and the growing 
confidence of the government that it was getting to grips with the asylum numbers447 
- but all, crucially, within the context of the development of the government’s relations 
within the EU.  
Asylum numbers finally started to drop from 2001 onwards, as can be seen from 
Figure 5:2 above. A much stricter legal framework was in place. Nonetheless, it is 
difficult, as Thielemann argues, to ‘attribute the ebb and flow of asylum applications 
to [the government’s] reforms.’448 He continues by saying that ‘policies do not always 
matter’. It may well have been the change of policies in the migrants’ country of origin, 
or in other domains, more readily explain changes in migration flows, not government 
interventions at all.  
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This troubled many of the more experienced officials in the Home Office as they saw 
this confusion or conflation of asylum and immigration as problematic and 
disruptive.449 They felt it was politics that dictated that something be done and seen to 
be done on asylum so that the application trend upwards was arrested. Yet there was 
little or no evidence that any of the more coercive elements implemented had achieved 
anything at all in terms of the flow of applications. It may be that Thielemann was 
right, but one thing that is certain is that the government would need to shift its 
language and narrative as well as its policy, if a managed migration strategy was going 
to succeed. The negative narrative of coercive control on asylum reform had the 
potential to undermine this policy shift completely.  
A significant actor at the higher echelons of the government at the time would contest 
this view. He argued that it was essential that the government understood that ‘there 
was a cultural anxiety’ – it was not just economic. In terms of asylum and immigration, 
he argued that  
… the asylum stuff… was really tough at the beginning, to bring down asylum claims, dealing 
with the immigration issue by which we just managed to fend it off and keep our heads above 
water.450 
Thus, this interviewee would not only challenge Thielemann’s view that it is not 
always policy that matters, but also felt, some ten years later, that the government had 
only just coped. Notwithstanding this view, the government developed the confidence 
to move towards a narrative on managed migration. Yet, the quote above shows that 
it did not understand fully that there needed to be a full and comprehensive narrative 
on this crucial matter. However, much I, as immigration minister, and many across 
government understood that asylum and immigration were very different processes, 
the public treated them as a singular phenomenon. The ‘cultural anxiety’ referred to 
above needed to be satisfied by a narrative on both issues. One of Blunkett’s special 
advisers, Huw Evans, said that his boss and the Prime Minister  
…could foresee the 2005 General Election and how it was going to be fought. Winning this 
battle on asylum they saw as not only central to New Labour’s reputation for competence, but 
also showing they understood the concerns of middle- and working-class Britain.451 
 
The clear implication here is that, between them, Blair and Blunkett had neutralised 
asylum as an issue the opposition could use to attack them. It was clear that the decline 
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in the numbers of asylum applications afforded the government the space to move 
towards a more liberal managed migration process. 
The policy bifurcation between the liberal and the coercive, the controlled and 
managed, could be effective, but only as a comprehensive, integrated whole. The 2002 
White Paper452achieved this on economic migration, but coercive noises on asylum 
still prevailed and the policy development in that area were not encouraging. The 
White Paper and subsequent legislation presented the government with an opportunity 
to take hold of this issue, develop a positive narrative and make it much more 
favourable to the public that it had been.  
As the policy was being formulated, few were looking at developments in the EU as 
this had nothing to do with the Home Affairs agenda. The EU was the carefully 
protected domain of No.10 and the Foreign Office – with the Treasury having a 
significant influence because of the Euro – the new European currency - and the 
importance of the EU to the UK economy. Yet, decisions were made at about the same 
time as the introduction of the White Paper, that would have a profound effect on the 
public’s view of immigration. They would not, however, be reflected in the 
government’s narrative in the area and would challenge its competence and ability to 
deal with the cultural anxiety discussed earlier and the bifurcation of  England that 
Jennings and Stoker 453 have referred to. But it was not seen or treated as an 
immigration decision at all – it was a matter of diplomacy and alliances beyond the 
Home Office.  
No transitional controls  
           At the EU summit in December 2002, in Copenhagen, the government 
announced that there would not be any controls on access to the UK labour market for 
workers from the A8 countries. Workers from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia would be allowed unrestricted 
access to the UK to work from their accession to the EU in 2004. This announcement 
went largely unreported and it was not perceived as being any part of the wider issue 
of immigration. Former Home Secretary, Straw related later in his biography that this 
was  
…another issue on a slow burn. It really only hit our radar a few weeks before accession in 
April 2004 when the tabloids starting running scare stories.454 
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At the time, he was reported in the Independent as saying that  
…  the move "makes sense for the accession countries and for the UK… It will attract workers 
we need in key sectors and is part of our managed migration agenda. It will ensure they can 
work here without restrictions and not be a burden on the public purse."455 
This ‘slow burn’ issue certainly did grow in importance as the 2004 accession date 
came close, but a former senior BBC correspondent reflected that, at the time, he did 
not ‘think the A8 [decision] was a story at all.’456 The notion that the public concern 
about immigration and an antipathy to migrants would focus on EU citizens would 
have been rare in 2003-2004.  
At Prime Minister’s Questions,457 Michael Howard raised the issues of transitional 
controls and the government’s apparent unpreparedness for the accession on 1 April 
2004 and whilst Blair comfortably dealt with Howard, he was not very clear on the 
issues and doubts lingered about how prepared the government was. In a statement on 
the 23 April, Home Secretary Blunkett set out the government’s position and 
announced a Workers Registration Scheme (WRS). This was a post-entry registration 
scheme that all accession country nationals seeking employment would have to sign 
up to on a compulsory basis.458 Under EU law, it could not cover the self-employed. 
Many felt that this was a hurried response. A senior Home Office official at the time 
agreed.  She said  
…we’d been saying all along we’d let people in with accession… and Tony Blair had 
cold feet and said ‘I want them to have work permits’. What we did instead was we introduced 
the WRS…but [the WRS] was not a response to opposition, it was a response to the prime 
minister’s cold feet. 459 
 
The Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, charged that the government’s 
preparations were a complete shambles and attempted to link the accession migration 
to the wider immigration issue. In essence, though, as Blunkett made clear, the 
difference between the two parties was that the government opted for a post-entry 
registration scheme, whilst Davis wanted a pre-entry work permit system. It should be 
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said that neither approach covered the self-employed, a point the opposition failed to 
mention or highlight.  
One could be forgiven for thinking that, given the way events have unfolded since that 
time, the accession of the eight was a point of high controversy and debate in the 2002-
2004 period, but it was not. Many of the studies at the time, that looked at what might 
happen to the UK labour market after the A8 accession to the EU, broadly predicted 
low levels of migration for work from these countries.460 Many have reported since 
that one report finally persuaded the government not to impose controls. Straw noted 
that the report, ‘The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows’461 indicated that 
the net effects with no transitional controls would be ‘between 5,000 and 13,000 
immigrants every year up to 2010.’462 He repeated the point in 2013 calling the policy 
of no transitional control on the A8 citizens, a ‘spectacular mistake’.463 Sriskandarajah 
and Cooley reported the study ‘predicted net annual flows of A8 migrants of between 
5,000 and 13,000 to 2010.’464 Balch reported that the decision was made on ‘(as it 
turns out, wildly inaccurate) evidence about potential flows [from the same document] 
and so can be linked to the managed migration narrative…’465 The ’13,000’ figure 
became totemic and a shorthand for government incompetence. Shadow Home 
Secretary Davis also raised the issue of the’13,000’. He said “If the government is 
right in saying only 13,000 people…. will come to work in Britain...then the work 
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permit system would cope.”  Blunkett responded by saying that “… I have never said 
that only 13,000 will come…the figure of 13,000 has never crossed my lips…”466  
  
Figure 5:7 shows what actually happened in the years immediately after accession, but 
this figure of 13,000 still haunts the whole issue of EU migration as a ‘gross 
underestimate of annual flows’ after accession. The figure was suggested in a piece of 
research commissioned by the government, but it was not a government endorsed 
figure.467  Indeed, on the front page of the report it states clearly that “...the views 
expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home 
Office (nor do they reflect Government policy)”. Nonetheless, in future, critics would 
throw this figure at the government every time the issue was debated. They could be 
forgiven as even Straw described the figures as ‘Home Office Estimates’ 468 – they 
were not.  
In fact, the jibes about the inaccuracy of the report were misleading. The image given 
was that the only reason the government decided upon free access with no controls 
was because of this report – this was equally inaccurate. It was independent research 
commissioned by the Home Office to look into the detail of the outcome of the 
decision already made and announced in December 2002. The figure of 13,000 was 
based on all 15 EU countries opening their labour markets to the new countries from 
accession onwards. Dustmann has said that ‘The German labour market was basically 
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closed for Polish workers and that kind of changed everything.’469 One of Straw’s 
quotes above was from page 58 of the report, yet Dustmann et al made clear on page 
57 that if the 100,000 migrants predicted did not go to Germany, then about a third of 
them might come to the UK. This would provide a figure closer to the later estimates 
 
 
by the Office of National Statistics of a flow of approximately 50,000 per year, as can 
be seen in Figure 5:8. The ‘myth’ that has arisen around this figure is, arguably, 
symptomatic of the power of incompetence in terms of public narrative. It does not 
matter that the way the figure has been used is both wrong and misleading, it tells a 
story about the incompetence of government. This made the development of an 
integrated and positive strategy even more difficult. 
Nonetheless, unlike Straw, both Blunkett and Clarke stood by the decision not to 
impose controls. Clarke has argued that ‘it is nonsense to suggest it has terrible impact 
on public services – most of the people coming here were working.’ Blunkett thinks 
that the alternative was more illegal immigration which would have had ‘far more 
negative impact on pay rates and standards of work.’470 I would agree with both rather 
than Straw.  However, there was certainly a case that had the decision been clearly 
recognised as an ‘immigration decision’, then the government collectively could and 
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should have made sure that the impacts were seen as positive and any potential issues 
with public services, social infrastructure and cohesion resolved. It could also have 
more readily developed an immigration narrative that it could impart to the public. 
Treating the A8 decision as an EU matter, not an immigration matter, just made the 
government look all the more incompetent than many in the public already thought 
they were in this area.  
An emerging narrative? 
In the run-up to accession and subsequently, a leading Home Office official relates 
that the department still held to the view that 
… we can’t do anything about it [A8 migration] anyway because after all it is the EU and we 
have free movement…and we should …put all our efforts into controlling immigration from 
outside the EU.471  
There was still little recognition that the two key issues – the A8 nations and 
immigration - were interrelated. As the day of accession approached, Blair made a 
significant speech on migration to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI).472 In it 
he talked about a strategy that had a ‘number of interlocking elements’. The list was a 
clear example of the integration between liberal and coercive issues that was at the 
core of the government’s emerging narrative. It recognised the ‘benefits that controlled 
migration brings’; ‘the major achievements of migrants in this country and the success 
of the uniquely British model of diversity’; and acknowledged there is no longer a 
‘neat separation between the domestic and the international…our policies on 
migration cannot be isolated from our policies on international development or EU 
enlargement.’473 These were all broadly liberal and consensual elements of the 
strategy.  
At the same time, Blair said that ‘those who come here to work, and study must be 
able to support themselves’; promised ‘action on illegal immigration through ID 
cards…border controls… and heightened enforcement’; and would continue to ‘tackle 
abuses in the asylum system,’474 all elements from the coercion and control side of the 
integrated strategy.  
The speech was also a clear exposition of the decision not to impose transitional 
controls on the A8. He made the telling point that ‘… in practice, thousands of workers 
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from Eastern Europe – around 100,000 of them – are already living, working and 
studying perfectly legally in Britain.’ He went on to argue that given the facts the 
country faced a clear choice   
…use the opportunities of accession to help fill [skills] gaps with legal migrants able to pay 
taxes and pay their way, or deny ourselves that chance, hold our economy back and in all 
likelihood see a significant increase in illegal working and the black economy as Eastern 
European visitors attempt to get around arbitrary restrictions.475 
 
This was probably the closest the Prime Minister got to recognising that the A8 
decision was part of immigration policy. After all, the above comments were in the 
core of a speech that looked at, inter alia, subjects such as migration, asylum, 
accession/Eastern Europe, a diverse Britain and rights and responsibilities. It also 
contained key phrases such as ‘immigration and politics do not make easy bedfellows’, 
‘we will neither be Fortress Britain, nor will we be an open house’ and he said in the 
penultimate paragraph that 
…over the coming months, we will do two things at once: make the argument for controlled 
migration as good and beneficial for Britain; act to root out the abuses that disfigure the debate 
and bring the system into disrepute.476 
This was a very accurate summary of the integrated strategy that I have argued the 
government was trying to establish. It also indicates that Blair was clear that he had to 
use both halves of the strategy for it to succeed. Wright argues that Blunkett and the 
Home Office ‘ …promoted the view that, if the government-imposed restrictions on 
A8 nationals in a climate of high demand for labour, it risked undermining its managed 
migration policy.’ 477 The notion that the decision on the A8 nations and transitional 
controls was a mixture of the economic and diplomatic, but little to do with 
immigration, is not sustainable.  
The issues of asylum and immigration were gaining more and more media coverage 
in the run-up to an election that would have to be held by May/June 2005, but Blunkett 
had to stand down as Home Secretary in late 2004.   
Finally, a cogent narrative?  
The next significant event in the development of immigration policy was a speech by 
Clarke in February 2005 when he launched the Home Office’s five-year plan entitled 
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Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain.478 Clarke announced a 
new points-based system for migrants who wanted to study or work in the UK. He 
also declared that ‘it is a lack of confidence in our systems of control that can foster 
bigotry.’479 In the Foreword, he declared that:  
When I became Home Secretary I said that my top priority is public confidence in the 
immigration system. Migration is vital for our economy. Moreover, it is our moral duty to 
protect those genuinely fleeing death or persecution.480 
 
In this short paragraph, he presents a strong positive message on these issues. Clarke’s 
speech pointed to the more innovative shift in the policy framework that had been 
trailed for the last few years – managed migration. This is the point that, I would 
suggest, is more readily the ‘critical juncture’ that Consterdine and Hampshire claimed 
for the whole 2002-2004 period.481   
To the critics who argued that the policy was long overdue and had taken too long he 
retorted that "This requires a long, hard patient slog, not a magic bullet."482Arguably, 
Clarke was able to talk about and develop a points-based system for the migration 
because asylum numbers had fallen considerably, and it was much less of an issue. 
This was precisely the time when a more liberal, integrated policy and narrative should 
have been pursued – and it was.  
The five-year plan aimed to rationalise some 20+ categories and 80 different routes 
into the UK into a points-based system based on different ‘tiers’ based on clearly laid 
out criteria. ‘Labour from the new member states’ would, the five-year plan made 
clear, ‘over time, enable us to  phase out our current low skill migration schemes for 
people from other parts of the world’.483 In order to help with this process, an 
independent body would be established to advise on labour market needs – the 
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). It would advise on shortage occupations  and 
would work alongside another important body, the Migration Impact Forum (MIF) 
which was charged with looking at the social impacts of migration. The MAC and 
MIF represented the nascent infrastructure that a managed migration system would 
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need to be effective. Overall, this was a clear rational policy rooted in an economistic 
assessment of what skills the country needed that could not be provided by the UK or 
EU labour market. It was the logical culmination of the previous piecemeal attempts 
at managed migration policies.  
Interestingly, the BBC reported the electorally surgent UK Independence Party as 
saying that it also wanted a points system for economic migration but complained that 
there were ‘no limits on the number of EU workers coming to the UK.’484 One of the 
key Conservative slogans in the 2005 election, plastered on billboards all over the 
country, was ‘Are you thinking what we’re thinking?’ There were various thematic 
posters all with the similar unifying slogans on them. The Immigration poster read 
‘It’s not racist to impose limits on immigration. ’ Conservative Leader Michael 
Howard said that immigration ‘must not be swept under the carpet’ and that it was out 
of control and Blair was ‘pussyfooting about’ with the subject.485  
 Howard made a major election speech on immigration in Telford yet, in what was one 
of his most detailed expositions of his Party’s policy on immigration, he made 
absolutely no reference to EU migration or the accession of eight nations. He said that 
a points system without an upper limit to immigration was ‘quite literally pointless’.486 
This upper limit was central to their plans, clearly the A8 nations were not. Blair 
responded to Howard’s speech in a detailed speech of his own which he made  
symbolically in Dover, then a Labour seat. He dismissed the Tory policy as ‘incoherent 
babble’ and made it clear that he thought the way the Tories were raising the issue was 
“an attempt deliberately to exploit people’s fears, to suggest that for reasons of 
political correctness, those in power don’t dare deal with the issue.”487 He re-iterated 
Labour’s plans for a points system for economic migrants, more immigration officers 
and more detentions and tagging for asylum seekers. He maintained that Labour had 
cut asylum claims faster than anywhere else in Europe to its lowest level since 1997.488 
In a very wide-ranging speech that set out an extraordinary level of detail on 
immigration and asylum policy, Blair never once mentioned the A8 nations or the 
impact of migration from the nations of the wider EU. He mentioned the Poles – but 
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in the context of the 160,000 that settled in the UK after the Second World War. The 
policy issue that both Clarke and Blair were addressing was clearly the framework of 
non-EU migration and a shift towards a much more overtly economically based 
system. Equally, Howard was addressing the issue of immigration and asylum within 
the same policy framework. At the end of the speech, Blair said:  
So, the next time you see a Tory poster …. Remember - words are easy, change is tough; 
frightening the people is easy, fighting the problem is tough. Not ignoring the issue and not 
exploiting the issue but dealing with the issue - that is our duty, that is our pledge.” 489   
This is hardly ‘sweeping the issue under the carpet’ or ‘attacking anyone who raises 
the issue of migration’ as many have since contended. Kavanagh and Butler described 
it as Blair’s ‘best speech of the campaign.’490 From my viewpoint in a north-west 
London seat that was very culturally diverse and where matters of asylum and 
immigration were very important, the speech went down very well indeed. It seemed 
to finally present a logical, cogent and well-argued policy and narrative on the coercive 
and liberal elements that would constitute a modern policy on asylum and 
immigration.491 
Were you thinking what they were thinking?  
The atmosphere in the House of Commons after a successful election is very strange. 
The 2001 election had been so straightforward for Labour that it felt like a minor 
interlude momentarily getting in the way of the important business of running the 
country. The 2005 election was different. Firstly, it was much more competitive than 
the previous two, although Labour still looked  likely to win.492 Secondly, it was taking 
place in the shadow of the Iraq War. The government’s honeymoon was most certainly 
over and the public’s trust in the government was a central issue.  
There were lessons here for both parties. The Conservatives remained well ahead of 
Labour on the issue of immigration and asylum, but never got close to Labour on key 
issues such as economic management. Bale reports that 
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…the campaign focus on immigration and asylum had got the party noticed but it did not sway 
many votes, most of which were decided on bread-and-butter issues (Health, education and, 
above all, the economy…areas where Labour enjoyed solid leads.493 
 
The problem for the Conservatives was ‘image’ – whilst many voters responded 
favourably to some of their policies, they did not respond favourably to the 
Conservatives as a party. As King would have it, “It was not Tory policies that were 
disliked: it was the Tories.”494 Offered a range of positive and negative statements, 
respondents associated positive statements with Labour and negative statements with 
the Tories. When asked which sections of society the parties were seen as close to, for 
the Tories it was rural people, businesspeople and ‘the rich’. When asked, on the eve 
of poll, if they preferred a Blair-led government or a Howard-led government, 
respondents preferred Blair by 17%,  52-35%. 495  
Although the electorate clearly had many misgivings about Labour, they had even 
more concerns about returning the Tories to power. So, notwithstanding the 
Conservative lead on issues such as law and order and immigration, Labour could have 
confidently continued to develop its managed migration programme. These poll 
findings reinforce the point that this was the time to pursue this balanced strategy and 
narrative with vigour – but crucially, if it was to succeed, such a strategy needed 
leadership. It also needed competence and efficiency as well as management and 
control.  
A ‘rotten job’, get out before you are scarred 
Labour won the 2005 election but had lost 5.5% of its national vote and lost 47 seats, 
which, against the backdrop of the two hegemonic victories in 1997 and 2001, looked 
like a very humbling victory. Yet, in terms of electoral  history, a government majority 
of over 60 was have generally been considered a strong one. The verdict was that 
‘voters appeared to want a result that punished Tony Blair in a way that would not 
produce a Conservative return to power, and they got it.’496 
These were the issues running around as I shared a pot of tea with two colleagues who 
were also successfully re-elected in 2005 Bill Rammell497and Gerry Sutcliffe. 498 
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Across the parliamentary estate, similar clusters of MPs would have been gathered – 
waiting for ‘phone calls’ from No.10. This was the second day of the reshuffle that 
follows any election. Traditionally, most if not all the sackings were carried out on the 
first day, so we were meeting to give each other mutual support and solidarity. We 
were in the ‘Smoking Room’ just off the ‘Smoking Corridor’ of the House of 
Commons – it was squeezed in between the Members’ Library in one direction and 
the Members’ Dining Room in the other. Both Rammell and Sutcliffe had been 
ministers in the 2001-2005 government and had no reason to assume other than that 
they would continue to be so, although perhaps not in the same posts. As our 
discussions grew more heated, a phone rang and Rammell wandered into a small ante-
room near the dining room for a bit of privacy as he answered it. As he did so, my 
phone rang – it was No.10 teeing me up for the next conversation with the PM once 
Rammell finished. He came out of the ante-room beaming – he was going to Education 
as the Higher Education Minister – an area of particular interest to him. He left. As 
my phone went off again, Sutcliffe said that ‘the PM’s going to make you the 
Immigration minister – you watch…’ 
I popped into the ante-room as Rammell had done and was put through to Blair. He 
said that he had really appreciated all the work I had done in the Transport Department 
over the last two years, and he now wanted me to take on the enormous task of 
Immigration Minister. I remember saying something like ‘Thank you Prime Minister, 
I won’t let you down’ and Blair saying something like ‘Well you haven’t done so 
far…’ I wished him well for the rest of the day and hung up – rather stunned but also 
quite excited.499 I had had eight years of experience dealing with an array of asylum 
and immigration issues as a constituency MP but being the minister would be 
completely different. Blunkett later described the post of Immigration Minister as ‘a 
rotten job, and you are lucky if you get out of it quickly enough not to have been 
scarred.’ 500 
A cogent narrative revisited 
The development of immigration policy continued with the launch of the White Paper 
A points-based system: making migration work for Britain. Many of the rules and 
regulations covering the immigration system are not in primary statute or legislation, 
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but in administrative law, secondary legislation, and regulation. The development of 
the points-based system did not therefore require copious amounts of legislation or a 
legislative ‘big bang’, rather it required a review of the regulatory framework and an 
extensive consultative process with the relevant actors and interested parties. The 
executive summary of the White Paper made clear that “Our starting point is that 
employers should look first to recruit from the UK and the expanded EU before 
recruiting migrants from outside the EU”501 There followed an extensive programme 
of consultation on the details and practicalities that would be required for such a 
system to operate effectively.  
These consultation meetings were not an example of how ‘interest group preferences’ 
had an impact on policy development, as argued by Consterdine. The meetings were, 
in my experience as Immigration Minister, intensely dry and focussed on the details 
of the new points-based system as it would impinge on the various groups’ purpose 
and their ability to function. They were very practically orientated. The policy 
framework was already established so the consultation was about how the policy 
would work in detail.502 Balch is more accurate when he says that:  
…the new policy frame had been constructed, it proved relatively easy to get agreement from 
unions and employers on how to then develop the system, as shown by the joint statement in 
2005503 
 
The joint statement by the Home Office, the CBI and the TUC in support of the points-
based system was a recognition that there was a broad consensus for this managed 
migration approach.504 The TUC played as important a role in the genesis of this 
statement as the CBI did. As I recall from my role as Immigration Minister, the notion 
implied by Consterdine,505 that the TUC was somehow a secondary partner in this 
exercise was simply not the case.  
Somerville is correct when he suggests that the five-year plan and the White Paper 
represent a consolidation of the role of the Home Office and are not quite the victory 
for joined-up government that others have claimed.506 But if the strategy was to be 
successful, it needed to be fully resourced. A very senior former minister relates that 
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the points-based system was ‘chronically underfunded’ and that although the 
government  
…designed the architecture for connecting … migration policy and … labour market policy ... 
in truth, we just didn’t make that connection work properly.507  
 
In other words, while the MAC and the MIF were the correct way to develop the 
supporting mechanisms, ‘you should not take decisions on migration in isolation from 
decisions on investments in skills.’508 He concluded by saying that the whole approach 
to the points-based system was ‘… under-capitalised, financially and politically.’ 509 
So, by 2006, the Home Office had a clear and cogent policy framework in place and a 
linked narrative. However, the attention of Home Secretary was diverted entirely by 
the ‘foreign national prisoners’ crisis.510 This coincided with a round of significant 
local authority elections including London Borough elections in the first week of May. 
Even though this issue was principally one of a lack of communication between the 
courts and the prison services, because it involved foreign prisoners who were released 
on completion of their sentences rather than deported,  it was held up as a government 
immigration failure. The Home Office suffered a media firestorm that, it became 
increasingly clear, would end only with the sacrifice of a ministerial career. Charles 
Clarke was sacked the day after these May elections, despite being offered other 
cabinet jobs.511 Clarke’s departure was a blow to the embedding of the cogent narrative 
that he had worked to establish.   
Back to the future: coercion, control and enforcement  
Just before John Reid took over as Home Secretary, I was involved in the firestorm 
with Charles Clarke on the ‘foreign national prisoners’ crisis.512 This, I would 
speculate, was part of the reason why Reid decided within weeks that I should swap 
my role – Immigration and Citizenship – with my colleague, Liam Byrne, who had 
just been appointed as Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety. Reid  
reported to the Home Affairs Select Committee that in terms of immigration, he 
.. put in charge of that Liam Byrne because he has qualities which he brings to that job, 
including management experience …he has been put in that because of the quality he brings 
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to it; and Tony McNulty …has been asked to deal with …police restructuring, because of his 
experience and qualities in the field of parliamentary affairs and on local authorities.513 
 
At the same session, Reid went on to tell the Committee ‘our system is not fit for 
purpose. It is inadequate in terms of its scope; it is inadequate in terms of its 
information technology, leadership, management, systems and processes.’514 He was 
accused of saying that the Home Office was ‘not fit for purpose.’ This view appalled 
one senior civil servant, who described it as a ‘catastrophic’ thing to say that had  ‘lost 
him the Home Office before he started.’515 Reid did not say this exactly, as he was 
referring specifically to the immigration element of the Home Office when talking of 
‘our system.’516 Nonetheless, Reid did not clarify his words. The session was also 
noticeable for the fact that there was very little mention of the five-year plan or the 
White Paper – the building blocks of the point-based system and the managed 
migration narrative - that had only been launched a few months beforehand. 517 
Reid’s comments at the Committee caused ‘widespread unfavourable comment’518 
with Clarke reported as saying that ‘…it was wrong to describe the Home Office as 
not fit for purpose. It’s not true. Many aspects of it are good and getting better.’519 As 
the only member of the ministerial team who remained from the Clarke era, his 
approach seemed a destructive way to go forward, for the sake of finding space to 
encourage the media to become more supportive.  
Reid worked through each aspect of the Home Office’s policy areas and refreshed 
government strategy in each area. In the area of immigration and asylum, he launched 
Fair, effective, transparent and trusted: rebuilding confidence in our immigration 
system520 setting out how the points-based system was to be implemented and how the 
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Immigration and Nationality Directorate was to be transformed to meet the challenge. 
In many ways,  the document was simply  a rehash of many things that were already 
underway, but its tone, language and rhetoric were much harsher than the five-year 
plan or the earlier White Paper. 521 In the Foreword, Reid and the Permanent Secretary, 
David Normington (who as we shall see in the next chapter was described as being 
‘like a man chained to a radiator…a hostage…a kidnapped man.’)522 outlined four 
objectives and five ‘things we need to deliver’. Of the four objectives, three would be 
on the Control, Coercion and Enforcement (CCE) end of the continuum and used 
language such as ‘strengthen’, ‘tougher’, ‘fast-track’, ‘remove’, ‘enforce’ and 
‘compliance’. Only one objective sought to ‘boost Britain’s economy by bringing the 
right skills here’, a tangential reference to the points-based system.523 The emphasis 
on the five things that the Home Office needed to deliver was in a similar vein, 
‘deciding who can come before they travel; managing identity; cross-government 
enforcement action; removal of those not entitled to be here and dealing with the 
legacy of unresolved asylum cases.’524 
As I have said, many of these things were already underway in the Home Office. The 
purpose of this document was to shift the rhetoric and the cogent narrative that was 
implicit in the five-year plan, the 2005 White Paper and Blair’s election speech. 
Consterdine and Hampshire are right to detect that ‘official discourse and some aspect 
of immigration policy tightened during Blair’s last two years as Prime Minister 2006-
2007.’525 Reid was quick to ensure that the next wave of accession nations – the A2, 
Romania and Bulgaria – would be subject to transitional controls. The UK was the 
only large member state to impose transitional controls on the A2 countries, having 
opened its labour market with respect to the A8 nationals in 2004. As Spencer 
caustically noted ‘ …the economics said yes but the politics no.’526 
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The points-based system was subsequently phased in tier by tier, starting with tier 1 
in February 2008 and ending with tier 3 in 2010. A Migration Impact Fund was 
introduced in 2009, almost as an afterthought to help some communities that had been 
affected by immigration.527 It was another MIF to complement the MAC and the MIF 
that were already in existence – and it was as ‘under-capitalised, financially and 
politically’528 as they were. This former minister is correct when he says that ‘…we 
should have been much bolder in driving through proper investment, and we should 
have been much bolder selling what we are doing and how we are doing it.” 529  So, 
the absence of a positive narrative on managed migration was reinforced by the use of 
control and coercive rhetoric – that sounded tough but reinforced failure and 
incompetence.  
Even if the funds were available to make the managed migration system work as 
efficiently as possible, it would not have been possible to garner public support while  
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the rhetoric and narrative out of the Home Office was relentlessly negative. Asylum 
and immigration were invariably couched in problematic terms during Reid’s time in 
the Home Office.  
The points-based system worked and worked well as a public policy intervention – as 
we can see form Figure 5:9. The numbers for non-EU migration would have a natural 
lag behind the introduction of the various tiers in the new points-based system. By 
2010-2011, we can see a clear dip of roughly 100,000 in the numbers – from 340,000 
to nearly 240,000. Equally, whereas in 2006 the non-EU rate of migration was about 
twice that of EU migration, by 2013/2014 the figures were much closer.  
The interesting dimension to the convergence of these numbers is that the most 
significant recent growth in EU migration to the UK, as can be seen in figure 5:10 
below, has been from the states which were members before 2004 – and not from the 
A8 countries whose numbers declined from about 2011 onwards. It is difficult to 
assess whether the transitional controls on the A2 countries prevented significant 
flows from 2006 to 2013. The numbers remained at less than 20,000 until the controls 
were lifted, but, had not gone beyond 40,000 until very recently.  
 
A key concern of this case study has been the relationship between the development 
of the points-based system and the parallel decision not to impose transitional controls 
on the A8 nations that joined the EU in 2004. It is clear that the immigration policy of 
the government and the accompanying narrative would have been much stronger and 
more coherent if there had been some integration between these two policy strands. 
From the perspective of a participant with hindsight and from that of a researcher I 
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would also conclude that the government would have been  more effective had it 
continued to develop a cogent narrative containing elements of both a coercive, control 
and enforcement approach as well as of a liberal, managed and consensual approach 
– rather than lurch violently between the two extremes. 
What went wrong? 
Three factors – managed migration, asylum and A8 migrants – were at once separate 
policy areas but part of a broader narrative too. The Home Office would insist that 
asylum and immigration were two distinct areas, but the public conflated them into 
one. The government regarded  the decision on transitional controls on the A8 citizens 
as a matter of foreign policy for the Foreign Office and No.10 i.e. not an immigration 
issue at all. This seems rather strange given that the entire points-based system was 
predicated on skills gaps being filled by non-EU migrants only when the UK labour 
market and the EU labour market could not deliver.   
Over the period being discussed the interaction between these three distinct policy 
areas proved to be very important. Treating them as different policy areas was not the 
key mistake of the government. Failing to develop and sustain a narrative that 
integrated the three issues and fashioned them into a story that the public could 
understand was. It contained the seeds of the failure of this policy.  
Process - preparing the political ground 
In 1997, there was almost panic in the new government  as it came to understand the 
legacy that it inherited from its predecessor. A senior official related that ‘…you live 
with the inherited legacy of the past all the time.’530 But, it is important to understand 
this legacy in order to be able to deal with it. He continued by saying that  
… the longer people are here the harder it is in fact to do anything, and therefore if you’ve got 
a substantial backlog of undecided cases or unpursued overstayers, the rational thing to do is 
to front end your processes … so you’ve a chance of catching up.531 
The corollary of this is that if the backlog is not dealt with, applicants and their families 
remain in the country longer, getting on with their lives, and daily they become more 
and more difficult to remove if here undocumented or illegally.  
The government discovered two legacies in 1997 – the backlog of asylum applications 
and the backlog in the wider immigration process. The latter was much larger than the 
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asylum legacy context, but because this was more readily in the media’s focus, the 
government panicked. The result was that for  
… about 8 years… the Home Office was total reprioritising its efforts around asylum’ and no-
one in the Home Office, minister or official, ‘stood up…and said, “actually it’s part of the 
problem, but you’ve got to watch….[other policy areas].”532  
An enormous amount of time and effort was expended over this time to reduce the 
level  of asylum applications. Yet, having been involved on the front line of policy in 
this area, I agree with Thielemann533 when he argues that to ‘attribute the ebb and flow 
of asylum applications to [the government’s] reforms’534 is difficult. I certainly saw at 
first-hand how much this focus on asylum cost the Home Office – both in terms of 
resources and in terms of the opportunities lost in other policy areas.535 Nonetheless, 
the number did decline from 2001 onwards and the government finally achieved its 
‘tipping point’ target in early 2006. As the minister who was able to tell Blair that the 
government had reached the target, I was never sure how much various government 
interventions had to do with achieving it.   
The absence of clear narrative was central to the government’s ultimate failure in this 
policy area.  Although such a narrative would have been complex given that it would 
have contained coercive and liberal views on asylum and immigration. For example,  
positive messages qualified by a will to deal with ‘rule-breaking’ and abuses of both 
systems it was essential.  
Hindmoor’s adaptation of the Downsian model of voter maximisation based on a 
spatial metaphor of left and right is useful here. 536 Downs argues that parties gravitate 
towards the centre to maximise votes. Hindmoor essentially argues that the ‘political 
centre’ does not exist because  
…political space does not come so neatly packaged. Political space is unbounded, infinite, and 
both disarranged and changeable…537 
He argues that New Labour had ‘constructed a new centre ground,’538 rather than 
simply gravitate towards a pre-ordained centre. New Labour constructed this centre 
ground through framing, because the space is unbounded; through innovation, because 
                                                 
532 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F4) 
533 Thielemann, Eiko (2003) ‘Does policy matter? On Governments Attempts to control unwanted 
migration’, LSE European Institute Working Paper 2003 No.2 at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/europeanInstitute/workingpaperindex.htm 
534 Thielemann  (2003) Ibid. 
535 Personal recollection of Author  
536 For more on the original model see Downs (1957) Op.cit and for exposition of Hindmoor’s 
adaptation, see Hindmoor (2004) Op.cit pp. 11-15 et passim 
537 Hindmoor (2004) Ibid p.13 
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the space is infinite; and through rhetoric, because the space was disarranged and 
changeable. His notion that  
… parties cannot simply move to the political centre by abandoning one set of policies and 
adapting another. They must construct the positions the seek to occupy539  
is closer, I would contend, to political reality than the Downsian spatial metaphor 
along the single left-right continuum. It also goes beyond rational choice theory and 
is appealing in the context of policy development and formulation as well as the 
utilisation of narratives 540 This was how the ground should have been prepared – but 
it was not.  
Process - protecting the political ground  
The difficulty with the development of these policies in the context of protecting the 
political ground was that, on one level, there was no ground to protect. The other 
‘economic’ departments were reaping the rewards of the points-based system with 
their own stakeholders but were not inclined to help the Home Office. The Foreign 
Office had been central to the decision not to impose transitional controls on the A8 
nations – together with No.10 and the ‘economic’ departments’ – but had seen this as 
the end of their involvement. Straw relates that the policy is a ‘case study in how good 
intentions, and apparently good research, can lead the government in the wrong 
direction’. 541  
Clearly, his successor as Home Secretary was less than impressed. Blunkett relayed 
that he had not ‘realised … just how far the Foreign Office had backed down from 
their previous position in respect of wanting ‘open borders’.542 He continued saying  
…Jack, as Foreign Secretary, had been a great enthusiast for the expansion and openness of 
Europe, but now, with the political heat turned up by the Conservatives and the hysteria of 
some right-wing newspapers, he has changed his mind.543 
 
If these quotations represented the divisions within the government, then the 
increasing clamour Blunkett alluded to turned into a torrent as accession approached 
– in the media but, as we have seen, less so in the political domain.544  At least part of 
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the government’s problem was based on the public perception of its apparent 
‘powerlessness’.  
Policy development – hiding in plain sight 
By any measure, the introduction of the points-based system was one of Kingdon’s545 
‘focussing events’ and was a ‘critical juncture,’ as Consterdine and Hampshire 
suggest.546  It was a significant policy event that has endured and remains in place, one 
of the criteria for a ‘critical juncture’.547 Yet, this ‘focussing event’ was barely 
mentioned in the first phase of policy development because of the emphasis on asylum, 
and only then in the context of ‘economic migrants abusing the asylum system.’ It 
would have been even more so had the complex and integrated narrative been firmly 
established.  
The drumbeat of constantly negative refrain on asylum may have kept the media at 
bay but also, I would argue, stunted the development of the emerging narrative for a 
positive policy on managed migration. For the first phase of this policy, it was the 
whole notion of an aspiration towards a managed migration system that was ‘hiding 
in plain sight’. This was a key reason why the speech by Roche on managed migration 
was ultimately a failure.548 The work had not been done in terms of developing a 
positive narrative especially in the area where the default position is to confuse all 
these issues and conflate them into one. It is not possible to refer to the ‘1951 UN 
convention being used as a back-door route for illegal immigration’ on the one hand 
and then make a plea for a common-sense view and a ‘legitimate desire to migrate’ on 
the other549 - without the context of a detailed, integrated narrative. 
Policy development – the ‘missing middle’ 
The problem with the decision not to impose transitional controls on workers from the 
A8 countries was not the decision itself, but the fact that no-one across government 
set the decision clearly within the broader context of the government’s unfolding 
policy on immigration in general. The decision caused probably the largest and most 
significant migrant flow into Britain yet was not considered a part of immigration 
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policy. The Home Office understood that the points-based system had to be developed 
as a consequence of the A8 decision and welcomed the move towards a more liberal 
model but needed the policy to be ‘owned’, and therefore resourced, across 
government. In the context of Kingdon’s ‘pressing problems of the moment,’550 the 
new government had to get a grip on asylum, develop the points-based system and 
understood the impact of the impending A8 decision. All three elements should have 
been the subject of discussion and policy options as early as possible so that the  
… policy alternatives … [were] rooted in specific policy paradigms … that political actors 
frame…in order to sell them to the public while constructing the need to reform. 551  
The agreed policy option – managed migration – was rooted in specific policy 
paradigms: an economistic migration model: a firm and fair asylum system; the role 
of A8 and EU citizens in the UK labour market. Political actors frame and develop the 
narrative, in order to sell the policy to the public  and use messaging – to construct the 
need to reform. This, together with the approach adapted from Hindmoor above, would 
have started to build a coherent approach to both policy and narrative. This was the 
missing middle - the recognition that the A8 decision was important to this policy area 
– and should have been integrated into the development of the overall policy and 
subsequent narrative.   
Greater effort should also have been made to put the accession into the context of 
organisations such as the MAC and the MIF and they should have been more fully 
resourced. The second MIF, the fund, not the forum, should have been in place and 
fully resourced from 2004 onwards – to help lessen the impact of the A8 flows, if 
necessary, and to help bed in the points-based system. It is difficult not to agree with 
the former minister who said that the system was ‘under-capitalised, financially and 
politically’ and that the government ‘should have been much bolder selling what we 
are doing and how we are doing it.” 552   
Policy development – joined-up government 
So, the absence of a joint government message was the policy problem, not the range 
of policies that each government department was pursuing. As an active participant in 
government, I think the notion that certain economic departments  – such as DTI, 
Treasury, Education  and No.10 –  with ‘pro-migration’ arguments had to drag a 
recalcitrant Home Office towards a more liberal perspective on immigration had no 
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substance at all. If any of these tensions lingered in the New Labour government, then 
the advent of the points-based system – with full Home Office support - eradicated 
them. 553 
The problem throughout this period was not that the points-based system represented 
a victory of these more economically minded departments over a Home Office that 
was more focussed on coercion and control, but rather that No.10’s ‘victory’ in terms 
of the dysfunctional concentration on asylum undermined, and delayed, the 
development of a managed migration system. The development of a coherent liberal 
model would have happened earlier if it was developed alongside the concentration on 
asylum and would have pre-empted the piecemeal development of programmes by the 
‘economic’ departments.  
Apart from the separate policy tramlines that meant that the points-based system and 
the decision not to impose transitional controls were not integrated into government 
narrative and practice on immigration, the problem was not just joined-up government. 
It was also the absence of joined-up narratives to explain these complex issues on a 
government-wide basis. This became a particularly acute problem when processes 
failed or were perceived to have failed.  
Politics - potential of a strong ministerial sponsor  
There were a total of six Home Secretaries and eight immigration ministers during the 
lifetime of the government from 1997-2010.  The strongest ministerial sponsor in 
favour of the points-based system was Clarke, but it is likely that all of them supported 
the principles of it. There was a clear logic to the system and how it fitted in with the 
expansion of the EU and the accession of the A8 countries.  
The absence of a durable and integrated strategy for the policy area of immigration 
and asylum was further exacerbated by the sharp swings between the coercive (CCE) 
and the liberal (LMC) elements of this absent narrative. As I have shown, the period 
from 1997–2001 was concerned with ensuring that both systems, asylum and 
immigration, did not collapse under  the weight of the number of applicants and the 
backlogs. The period 2001-2005 moved more toward the liberal dimension, which 
only lasted until 2006 when the emphasis swung back towards a coercive environment.  
The key message of the government’s narrative should have captured both the coercive 
and liberal dimensions in a cogent fashion. In other words, as Blair said in 2004, ‘we 
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will neither be Fortress Britain, nor will we be an open house.’554 A complex message 
certainly, but one that could have been made clearer at each and every opportunity.  
The failure to develop this complex message meant that ministerial sponsors,  Béland 
and Kingdon’s ‘policy advocates and entrepreneurs’555, lacked legitimacy. Cox has 
determined that: 
In a political environment the advocates of reform need to employ strategies to overcome the 
scepticism of others and persuade them of the importance of reform. In other words, they must 
create a discourse that changes the collective understanding … because doing so ‘shapes the 
path’ necessary to enact reform.556 
 
Without such strategies and consequent narratives to explain the policy, the advocates 
of reform are sometimes ignored and disbelieved, as Roche was with her attempt to 
get a complex message across in a speech only remembered for the ‘rootless’ managed 
migration message in it.557 A speech signposting such a departure from policy was 
never going to succeed – the foundations of reform had to be constructed, as Hindmoor 
would have it, they were not. The discourse Cox refers to was absent and there was no 
‘shaping’ of the path to reform.558  
Equally, if unrooted, then careless words in support of a change in policy can challenge 
the legitimacy of the policy – especially if it represents significant reform. Blunkett 
was certainly a policy entrepreneur in the context of the shift to managed migration 
but did not help his cause when he was reported as saying that he saw ‘no obvious 
limit to the numbers of skilled migrants that could arrive.’559560 Such a sentiment 
would have been less problematic had the complex policy, strategy and narrative been 
in place – but with each of these key elements absent, it was a gift to the opponents of 
the policy. A gift not least because  
… when supporting significant changes, policy entrepreneurs have to justify the need to reform 
but, simultaneously, shake up the existing “policy monopoly” that favours the reproduction of 
previously enacted measures through institutional inertia.561 
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Roche and Blunkett were seeking to promote the liberalisation of the immigration 
framework through policy change and reform at a time when utilising an increasingly 
coercive regime on asylum policy. As they discovered, this proved impossible to do 
within a vacuum, but they did lay some of the groundwork for Clarke. The intense 
shift of policy away from the liberal to the coercive approach, following Clarke’s 
departure, favoured those keen on organisational ‘inertia’- and would last a 
considerable time.  
Politics – PM and the role of No.10  
Despite No.10’s concerns about asylum over the first eight years of the government, 
the Home Office was developing the building blocks of managed migration and a 
points-based system at the same time. The problem was that the broader public heard 
negative stories far more readily than they did positive narratives. Had No.10 been 
alive to this, it would have made sure that the Prime Minister started to relay the very 
positive message on immigration that he made during speeches at the CBI, the Labour  
party conference and the election campaign in 2005 - throughout the government’s 
first term. The government could have then responded to the foreign national prisoners 
crisis in an entirely different fashion. 
If the integrated policy on managed migration was going to have any chance at 
success, the government should have  
 ‘owned’ the A8 decision; 
 recognised it as a key element of immigration policy; 
 reinforced the approach with no transitional controls on the A2 nations; 
 rationalised the points-based system in the context of the A8 decision;  
 rationalised it in the context of the points-based system; 
 amplified the importance and legitimacy of the 1951 Refugee Convention; 
 developed the resources and infrastructure such as the MAC and the MIF to 
counter claims of negative impact on public services; 
 emphasised the coercive, control and management processes that would be 
used with those not permitted to remain in the UK. 
As Hindmoor would argue it should have constructed the policy and narrative on 
immigration, asylum and A8 migration through rhetoric, innovation, framing and 
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leadership.562 Hindmoor contends that spatial positioning is not simply a matter of 
policy but also a matter of position, creativity, spin and choice all assist parties in 
constructing alternatives and policies beyond simply spatial positioning. 563 The 
development of policy and narrative – especially policy rooted in reform and change 
– is difficult terrain that requires much investment and reflection.  
However, in this case, the  positive narrative was effectively ‘strangled at birth’ by the 
developments under Reid – transitional controls on A2 nations, an emphasis on 
coercion and control on borders and, more generally, and an acceptance that the 
government’s immigration systems were ‘unfit for purpose.’564 An integrated positive 
and comprehensive policy and corresponding narrative was not possible in this 
context. The development of the points-based system continued unabated but was lost 
as a policy response on immigration overall. The decision to install Reid and the 
subsequent shift in policy shows that the political cycle and the temporal dimension 
were important. Reid was an appointment to get through the pressures on a Prime 
Minister who had already served nine out of a ten-year term, it was not an appointment 
for the long term or the appointment of a government in only the first year of a five-
year term. It was a process appointment, a quick fix, to, in the area of immigration at 
least, manage policy rather than develop it creatively or positively.  
Conclusion 
This account of the introduction of the point-based system of managed migration and 
the decision not to impose transitional controls on the A8 countries upon accession 
suggests several conclusions. The analysis revolves around three or four crucial 
decisions that were made independent of each other, in a  policy area is both complex 
and integrated.  
The decision to concentrate on asylum as a matter of urgency as soon as Labour came 
to power in 1997 had powerful ramifications for this whole policy area. There was 
little or no attempt to link this decision to the policies being developed on immigration 
or, indeed, on EU accession, yet it consumed the Home Office completely as it sought 
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to deal with the asylum backlogs.565 The government allowed itself to be driven by the 
media, rather than showing some leadership on the issue. Even as it dealt with the 
asylum issue, this should have been put into the broader context of immigration and 
the A8 decision.  
Had this approach prevailed, the government could have got itself ahead of public 
opinion and led it, rather than otherwise. By the time the government got asylum 
figures ‘under control’ in early 2006, it had subsided as a media concern. By the time 
the government developed the narrative of the points-based system, non-EU migration 
was of less interest and the public focus was slowly turning to ‘migration’ from the 
EU. Had there been a developed narrative, the government would have been able to 
explain these events more readily. They may not have commanded support but would 
have been explained more readily and better than the government was able to.   
The decision to forego transitional controls on the A8 nations may well have been the 
right decision for the economy at the time, but it could and should have been put in 
the broader context of the development of the points-based system. The only way that 
the government’s narrative would have made sense is if this had happened. The 
starting principle of the system is that only when jobs cannot be filled from either the 
UK or the EU, should the country look to the rest of the world. Whatever way one 
looks at this decision, it was fundamentally an immigration and economic decision 
that should have been made within the context of the ‘critical juncture’ shift to a 
managed migration focus.  
One interviewee with very close links to No.10 related that: 
… there are things that the Prime Minister wants done, the ministers are doing, the PM and the 
minister are in absolute sync, not merely in terms of direction, but in terms of velocity… and 
then there are things that the minister wants to do that the PM can support, or not, if it proves 
difficult …566 
The Prime Minister was clear that asylum needed to be resolved and only then could 
the government move on to a more liberally managed migration system. The problem 
was that the balance between the coercive and liberal approaches of the Home Office 
was out of equilibrium and suffered when the government tried to shift to the more 
liberal perspective. The points-based system dealt with the flows from non-EU 
countries, as we can see in Figure 5:9. But at each stage, the processes were not 
properly resourced, and mistakes were made. Too often the responses by government 
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were reactions to public opinion rather than arguments in pursuit of a detailed, 
integrated and comprehensive narrative – stuck to and articulated from No.10 
downwards.  
It may have been that the problem was one of timing. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but these events happened in 2005-2007 – on the run-up to and beyond the 
change in Prime Minister. The mixture of Clarke’s departure, Reid’s appointment to 
the post of Home Secretary and Blair’s clear commitment to leaving the post of Prime 
Minister by July 2007 – all conspired against a focussed leadership and a  
comprehensive narrative approach that would take time, energy and resources. The 
easy narrative option was one that said that the immigration policy of the government 
and its processes were ‘broken’, and Reid was the man to fix it. Within this context, 
the scope for developing and enhancing the comprehensive, cogent and coherent 
policy disappeared from view and the opportunity to deal with Labour’s ‘Achilles 
heel’ passed.  
Ironically, on its own terms, the points-based system was a success and has endured. 
It remains in place now, modified over time but largely intact – for non-EU migration. 
It could have been such much more transformative and enduring. It could have allayed 
the fears and concerns of both backwater and cosmopolitan communities. 567 
The government should have used its leadership to have put in place a complex 
narrative that would have explained both the managed and controlled asylum and 
immigration system as well as providing a welcome for refugees and those who had 
the skills that the UK needed. If such a developed narrative had also explained why 
and how those who sought to work in the UK from the A8 and the A2 nations would 
be both needed and welcome, then much of the dysfunctionality that followed in terms 
immigration and the EU could potentially have been avoided. It may well be that the 
roots of the decision to leave the UK – Brexit – lay in the government’s failure to make 
such positive and courageous decisions on managed migration in 2004-2006. Beyond 
doubt, the road to the 2016 referendum originated in 2006.  
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Chapter Six 
Case Study   
Police Force Mergers: too many reasons to say no 
Forty-three forces for fifty-five million people?  
Untangling a policy that was previously a cornerstone of the government’s reform 
programme around policing was, it must be said, one of the strangest things that I have 
ever done as a minister – and completely contrary to all previous experience. Your 
role as a minister is to go out and sell, spin, argue, debate, and promulgate the policy 
of the day, the line to take, until everyone is eventually persuaded that it is the right 
and only true course for the government to pursue. It is not natural for a minister to 
then have to say, ‘no we have decided not to go that route after all, we have decided 
to do something different’ particularly when some people have made themselves less 
than popular by supporting that government line and others – people you respect in 
normal circumstances – fight against the policy as though their professional lives 
depended on it.  
The denouement of the police force mergers policy was a tricky period for me as the 
minister who, together with the Home Secretary, was responsible for the policy. What 
made matters all the more complicated was that the Home Secretary had  only been in 
post for a couple of months and had only just appointed me to the role of Policing 
minister. I had been at the Home Office for over a year but was new to this particular 
ministerial role.   
The demise of the government policy to merge the 43 police forces in England and 
Wales into some 12-15 larger strategic forces was met with a mixed response. For 
some, it was seen as entirely the correct, rational policy option and its passing was 
bemoaned. A senior, local government politician involved with police authorities at 
the time stated that ‘in hindsight, the government … should have pushed through with 
the mergers’.568 The notion, some would argue, that England and Wales, with a 
population of around 55 million, needed 43 police forces was an historic hangover 
rooted in unfinished business from a bygone age. A former senior Home Office civil 
servant remarked that he believed 
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… very, very strongly that 43 owed everything to accidents of history … nothing to the needs 
of the country as it then was … and almost nothing to what you would do if you were starting 
from scratch…569 
 
A former minister said that ‘it was definitely the right thing to do because we are still 
bedevilled by forces that have these significant capability gaps.’570 The current 
policing structure was perceived as ‘illogical and irrelevant…’571 One very senior 
policing policy official said of the failure to implement the mergers policy that ‘you 
and yours [meaning the politicians] lost your nerve’ 572 and he was at least partially 
right.  
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and analyse why the policy was not 
implemented and why the Home Office moved towards a policy of encouraging forces 
to work together, collaborate and, perhaps, merge on a voluntary basis, sometime into 
the future. However successful this new policy might be, what were the reasons for 
the failure of a mergers policy that seemed to have the apparent support of the most 
significant actors of the policing world? 
History does not always repeat itself 
When Roy Jenkins took over as Home Secretary after the 1966 election, he pushed 
ahead with police mergers.573 He reported that:  
On 18 May [1966] I announced a reduction in the number of separate police forces….This was 
operationally desirable and was well received by most police opinion, although greeted with 
predictable squeals by some of the chief constables who lost their commands.574 
 
The Police Act 1964 had made provision for such changes without needing specific 
legislation as long as the government was prepared to face a quasi-judicial local 
inquiry. Jenkins was clear that the 
… best chance of avoiding impalement on … well-entrenched local opposition was to 
announce advance on such a broad front that, first, everyone’s breath would be taken away 
and, second, as the proposals were likely to be accepted in quite a lot of cases, those who 
attempted to stand out would look selfish and obscurantist.575 
 
The result of Jenkins’ ‘advance on a broad front’ was that the number of forces went 
from 117 police forces in England and Wales to 49. This was reduced further, 
reflecting local government reorganisation, to 46 in 1969 and to today’s 43 forces 
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because of the Local Government Act in 1972.576 Nonetheless, Jenkins still bemoaned 
the fact that his reform ‘left a few county forces – Wiltshire, Hertfordshire, 
Bedfordshire – smaller than I would have liked but they didn’t fit conveniently with 
any other unit.’577  Seventy Chief Constables lost their jobs in 1966, but not all were 
antagonistic as a result. One who lost out, Robert Mark, the Chief Constable of 
Leicester, remarked that 
…the enforced amalgamation of police forces against the strong opposition of chief constables, 
local authorities and some civil servants … took real courage and determination.578  
 
Although there would appear to have been a less than well-developed strategy for 
policy implementation, it succeeded with only limited opposition and set the 
framework for forces in England and Wales for a generation as can be seen in Table 
6:1.  
 
Blurring the thin blue line 
The Conservative Government under John Major published a White Paper on police 
reform in 1993.579 It made several references to the 43 police forces but resisted 
coming to any conclusion. It noted that ‘there are 43 police forces in England and 
                                                 
576HMSO (1960) Interim report: Royal Commission on the Police (Cmnd.1222) at 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/browse/r/r/C235515 ; HMSO (1962) Royal Commission on 
the Police (Cmnd.1728) at http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C235516 ; Police Act 
1964 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/48/contents 
577 Jenkins (1991) Op.cit. p.188 
578 Mark, Sir Robert (1978) In the Office of Constable Collins London pp.70 
579 Home Office (1993) ‘Police Reform White Paper: The Government’s Proposals for the Police 
Service in England and Wales’ Cm 2281 London HMSO at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271
972/2281.pdf  
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Wales. There are 27 county police forces…eight combined police areas, and six 
metropolitan forces.’580 It continued by making clear that ‘this pattern is partly the 
result of historical accident and the merging of organisations which were established 
haphazardly over more than 100 years.’581 It recognised that some of this 
reorganisation has been instigated by government to ensure police forces which are 
‘large enough to provide an effective response to contemporary policing problems and 
have the flexibility to deal with varying demands.’582 On mergers, it concluded that 
notwithstanding a structure that is a ‘… patchwork quilt of forces of widely varying 
sizes and types … there is at present no objective basis for deciding centrally, what 
the precise number of forces should be, nor which individual forces should be 
amalgamated.’583 Whilst it seems extraordinary that the government even mentioned 
mergers just to make clear it was not going to pursue them then, it did lay the 
groundwork for the emergence of a legislative framework for mergers in the future.   
Subsequent legislation - the 1994 Police and Magistrates Courts Act and the 1996 
Police Act 584 - weakened the powers of police authorities further. They cut their size, 
scrapped direct elections to them and transferred control over police force budgets 
from the authorities to the Chief Constables, who ‘effectively became the ‘chief 
executives’ of their forces.’585  
The 1996 Police Act consolidated much of the disparate law in the area into one place 
– a regular feature used to tidy up and develop legislation. Crucially, it made provision 
for the Home Secretary to ‘order the alteration of police areas in the interests of 
efficiency or effectiveness’ (s.32) and outlined the way in which such an order could 
be made and how consultation and objections would be dealt with. (s.33).586  
New Labour and policing  
One of the first substantive policy documents on policing produced by the New Labour 
government showed a clear intent to continue a programme of police reform. The 
White Paper ‘Policing a New Century: a Blueprint for Reform’ was published in 2001. 
Home Secretary David Blunkett wanted nothing less than to ‘substantially improve 
                                                 
580 Ibid. para. 10.2 p.41 
581 Ibid para 10.3 
582 Ibid para 10.3 
583 Ibid paras 10.3 and 10.8 
584 Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/29/contents 
and Police Act 1996 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/16/contents 
585 Loveday (2006) Ibid. p.12 
586 Police Act 1996 s.32 and s.33 
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the standard, reliability, consistency and responsiveness of the [police] service … from 
the beat constable to the chief constable.’587  
Many of the provisions of the 2002 Police Reform Act588 were based on the policies 
outlined in the White Paper. As can be seen in Table 6:2 below, many of these 
provisions related to bringing all the forces up to the ‘standard of the best’.589 The Act 
gave the Home Secretary the power to intervene in the case of force failure ‘to ensure 
that performance improves if this cannot be achieved by any other route.’590 In the first 
 
 
 
instance, HMIC would report to the Home Secretary on each of the forces and if it 
reported that a force is ‘inefficient and ineffective’, the force would be required to take 
remedial action based on a report by the local police authority and the Home Secretary. 
The new Police Standards Unit, located in the Home Office, needs to be viewed in the 
broader context of the government-wide initiatives on performance management, 
measurement and standards and the development of public service agreements across 
all departments eventually.591  
                                                 
587 Home Office (2001) Policing for a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform 2001 Cm 5326 HMSO 
December 2001 at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/250
905/policing_survey.pdf 
588 Police Reform Act 2002 at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/30/notes/division/3 
589 Home Office (2001) Op. cit. p.28-29 
590 Ibid pp. 28-29 
591 Barber (2007) Op.cit and Barber (2015) Op. cit 
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The broad thrust of the reforms outlined in the White Paper was a mixture of either 
internal process improvements or broader substantive reforms intended to modernise 
the police service. Importantly, there was very little in it about the structural dimension 
– the number of forces in England and Wales. Certainly, it was not flagged up as a 
central issue of reform in either the Foreword by Blunkett or in the chapter on the key 
principles of police reform.592 Blunkett, of course, had come to the Home Office from 
his role as the Secretary of State for Education where his constant reforming mantra – 
in this case for schools – was ‘standards not structures.’ 593  
Ormerod and Roberts (2003) see the 2002 Act as prompting  
… considerable concern in Parliament regarding the inroads into the much cited but ambiguous 
doctrine of ‘constabulary independence’ … [which] … brings with it a consequential loss of 
local control without necessarily diminishing local responsibility and accountability for 
policing.594 
They maintain that the ‘Act provides ‘a limited shift towards centralised power 
without completely undermining the tripartite structure.’595 Others saw no sign of a 
reversal of government policy or decentralisation of police control in the foreseeable 
future in the UK. Indeed, the opposite was the case 596 and that ‘an increased drift or 
steer towards central control of policing has happened at a gradual pace over the past 
20 years or so.’597  
Three themes emerged as the policy developed that would underpin the eventual 
debate on mergers and each of them needs to be seen through the prism of the balance 
between the settled position of the tripartite arrangement for policing as outlined in 
Table 6:3 below.598 Firstly, the impact of reform on the ability of the police to police. 
In other words, the dominance of the supposed distinction between the strategic and 
the operational, the policing and the political, the professional and the expedient. 
                                                 
592 Home Office (2001) Op.cit. pp. 27-37 
593 BBC News (1997) Blunkett Unveils White Paper to Transform Education at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/news/07/0707/schools.shtml ; see also The Guardian 
(1999) David Blunkett’s Conference Speech as Secretary of State for Education at  
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Secondly, the impact of the development of local policing, that is, neighbourhood 
policing, on the ability of local police authorities to carry out their role. Thirdly, how 
the development of a performance measurement and review system, based on national 
standards, implies greater centralisation, more incursions into the operational 
dimension of policing and a stronger hold by central government on the domain of 
local policing and local police authorities. Underlying these three themes was the 
general tension in the relationship between the role of chief constables and police 
authorities – and how both were held to account by the public.  
Many felt that the programme of reform as set out in Figure 6:1 below was not only 
over-ambitious but had not been properly though through at in its entirety. For others, 
the Home Office had neither the motivation nor the incentives to deliver on all these 
fronts. One official remarked that he remembered a Home Secretary saying to him that 
‘the trouble with when the Home Office talks about sticks and carrots… our carrots 
are just sticks painted orange.’ 599 Another remarked that ‘one of the things about 
policy-making… it is done in a little silo.’ 600  
ll these factors would feature as the government appeared to stumble towards a policy 
on mergers – but the priorities in the political sense seemed to be the development of 
neighbourhood policing; the mechanisms for the accountability of policing and the 
                                                 
599 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F13) 
600 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F18) 
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ineffectiveness of police authorities; and only then, the delivery of level 2 policing and 
potential for fewer but strategic forces. 
The next policy development was the publication of a Green Paper on policing – 
Policing: Building Safer Communities Together in November 2003.601 It suggested a 
range of potential areas for reform, including neighbourhood-style policing and re-
structuring. It talked at length about themes such as ‘community engagement’, 
accountability, operational effectiveness, and service modernisation. It suggested  a  
range of models for accountability – a model of oversight for the police service alone; 
a multi-agency option that would include police board members drawn from a range 
of sources; a wholly directly elected police board; or a model that would include a 
neighbourhood level, a local policing partnership level, including Crime and 
Reduction Partnerships and others, and a strategic policing board – which might 
include strategic forces.602 
The golden thread: a stumble towards mergers 
The government slowly built up the reasons for suggesting, as in did in section six of 
the 2003 Green Paper that ‘the time is right to consider whether the present 43 force 
structure….is the right one for today’s and tomorrow’s policing needs.’603 It noted that 
in 2001,  it stated that ‘forces should first look at greater cooperation and collaboration, 
where necessary, to help their effectiveness’ and reiterated this call in the new Green 
Paper.604 It was clear that ‘change should not be made for change’s sake’605 but the 
government was 
… keen to explore thinking around the development of ‘strategic forces’ in England and Wales. 
Forces which would have sufficient capability…and capacity to deal effectively with 
neighbourhood and local level crime, anti-social behaviour and disorder on the one hand …and 
serious organised crime on the other.606 
 
This was the hook on which the development of the police mergers policy was based 
but it still felt like an incremental policy development rather than a substantive shift. 
The government still appeared ambivalent about going forward with such a 
restructuring. Clearly, in political terms, the development of neighbourhood policing 
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603 Ibid. p.32 
604 Ibid para.6.6, p.25 
605 Ibid para 6.6 p.25 
606 Ibid para. 6.8 p.25 
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had a much greater priority than the development of strategic forces. In the Home 
Office Strategic Plan of July 2004,607 the Prime Minister highlighted a desire to ‘revive 
the idea of community policing, but for a modern world,’608 but made no mention of 
police force mergers whilst Home Secretary Blunkett explained that 
… security runs like a thread throughout the Home Office’s work; on the one hand, protecting 
ourselves from international terrorism while also ensuring the police and communities have 
the tools to establish order and security in their neighbourhoods.609 
 
Again, as he outlined the next set of priorities, mergers into strategic forces still 
seemed to be an afterthought. The next four government priorities for police reform 
were identified as  
… ensuring the police were responsive to the needs of communities; developing more local 
policing; a continuing focus of improving performance and ensuring as truly representative 
police force.610  
 
Building on the reference in the 2003 Green Paper, the government now committed to 
developing ‘an overall structure for policing in England and Wales which is the right 
one for today’s and tomorrow’s crime environment.’611 To this end, in June 2004, the 
Home Secretary commissioned Her Majesty inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) to 
carry out an initial review on the gaps in Level 2 policing – which includes cross-
border issues such as organised criminality, major incidents and events transcending 
force borders – and report back to him. This work was led by Denis O’Connor, then 
deputy Chief Inspector of Constabulary, but by 2008 he was the HMIC, first in an 
acting capacity but then in the substantive role until 2012.612  
The then Policing Minister Hazel Blears, reported to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee in July 2004 that, in terms of restructuring, the responses to the 
consultation on the White Paper were mixed with 
… some strongly in favour of restructuring, some strongly opposed and many offering a 
cautious welcome to the debate but noting that a lot more work was needed … a clear message 
was that form should follow function.613  
                                                 
607 Home Office (2004a) Confident Communities in a Secure Britain The Home Office Strategic Plan 
2004-08 Cm 6287 HMSO at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251
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608 Ibid p.5 
609 Ibid p.6 
610 Ibid. p.60 
611 Ibid. p.66 
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https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/about-us/ It has since merged with the Fire and 
Rescue Services, hence HMICFRS 
613 Home Office (2004c) Memorandum submitted by the Home Office, Hazel Blears, Minister of 
State in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2005) Police Reform, Fourth Report of 
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She was clear that the government had ‘not yet come to any firm conclusion on the 
question of force structures’ and that even 
…the majority of those who welcomed the debate … acknowledged that should not be rushed 
into and that work was needed to define what capability and capacity a force needed and to 
assess whether existing forces meet the definition.614 
 
It should be noted that the language here is much more conciliatory than the fait 
accompli lexicon that would be used later when the Home Office sought to implement 
O’Connor’s report in full. The measured nature of this language continued with the 
production of the subsequent White Paper, Building Communities, Beating Crime A 
better police service for the 21st century, published in December 2004.615 On the issue 
of strategic forces, it reiterated the question about whether the structure of 43 forces 
was the right one and noted that O’Connor would report ‘by the end of January 2005 
at which point the Government will engage stakeholders in discussing the implications 
of the report.’616  
The White Paper made clear that whilst the government was not persuaded that the 
‘establishment of a national police force is the right direction for the policing in the 
country … the Government believes it would be premature to reach firm conclusions 
on the question of structures or possible amalgamations of forces.’617 It also repeated 
the belief that ‘form should follow function.’618 Some of those concerned about how 
the debate might develop should have had their fears allayed if they read what Policing 
Minister Hazel Blears said in her evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 
October 2004.  She repeated that the government was ‘not interested in huge structural 
change for its own sake.’ She continued saying:  
We do not have a blueprint in my desk drawer showing a whole series of amalgamations of 
forces … I do not regard structural change for its own sake as a high priority.619 
 
                                                 
Session 2004-2005 Volume 2 (March 2005) Ev 99 HC 370-371 para.114  at 
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178 
 
Many felt in the heat of the subsequent debate, as the government moved towards 
mergers, that this emphasis was lost entirely. Not only did ‘form’ almost begin to 
dictate function, but various interviewees were convinced that Clarke did indeed have 
a ‘blueprint in the desk drawer.’620 There was also a problem of ‘excessive reform’. 
Excessive in the sense that the message from ministers was that there should be root 
and branch reform to every aspect of policing – but the clarity of a well-thought 
through vision was lacking. In January 2005, at a conference specifically intended to 
be a vehicle for the government to set out its vision for reform, the messages did not 
identify mergers.621 Blears spoke and outlined the need for ‘outcomes’, ‘building on 
successes and a performance focus’ and a ‘genuine dialogue’. She said that the key 
elements of police reform were an increase in community engagement, a strengthening 
of accountability and an increase in responsiveness, a need to ensure a structure that 
delivers and a modernised and united workforce.622  
The O’Connor report was imminent, and as a participant in government I knew that 
the growing perception was that the Home Office was in favour of structural change, 
albeit, the issue was barely mentioned in such a significant speech on police reform. 
The only mention was tangential at best, obtuse at worst. She said that: 
We want to ensure that there is an overall structure which delivers against volume crime and 
anti-social behaviour, closes the gap on level 2 criminality and combats effectively serious 
organised crime at a national and increasingly international level. These elements are 
interlinked. How do we ensure that the ‘golden thread’ is not lost?623 
 
In policy terms, this paragraph is problematic. The government had made huge strides 
in both volume crime and anti-social behaviour through policy initiatives on 
neighbourhood policing and the Respect agenda. Its policy narrative was clear. 
Similarly, it had a policy narrative in place for combatting serious and organised crime 
through the creation in February 2004 of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA). This agency was to help police forces combat serious and organised crime 
and came into existence as a result of the Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 
                                                 
620 Various Interviews with Author 2016-2107 
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622 Home Office – Blears (2005) Hazel Blears speech to Police Reform Conference, 14/14 January 
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2005.624 It was no accident that Blears used O’Connor’s words on ‘level 2 criminality’ 
as she and the government were relying on O’Connor to provide the policy narrative 
that would ensure that the ‘golden thread’ was not lost. The problem was that this 
rather implied that such a ‘golden thread’ existed in operational and strategic terms, if 
not in policy terms, already – and this was far from clear. The Home Office Permanent 
Secretary in the Policing field, Leigh Lewis, also spoke and his three ‘big questions’ 
on reform were ‘community engagement and accountability’, ‘operational 
effectiveness’ and ‘cultural change’.625  The issue of mergers came up under 
‘operational effectiveness’ and he asked his audience to think in terms of what ‘more 
could be done in terms of co-operation and collaboration’ and whether ‘more is 
required in terms of increased flexibility’. He continued by saying:  
Inevitably that raises the issue of structures. We are not fixated …but we are raising the 
question openly of whether or not the current 43 forces set up will deliver what the public 
wants from policing in this country.626 
So, barely days before the first of O’Connor’s reports, the government appeared to be 
open-minded about force restructuring – yet anyone with an interest in policing knew 
this would be the core of the report. When the Home Affairs Select Committee 
(HASC) published its report on Police Reform in March 2005,627 it reported that it had 
picked up on some of the government’s ambivalence on mergers, particularly in the 
language from Ms. Blears.628  
The Inspector always rings twice 
The first report from HMIC O’Connor, ‘Mind the (Level 2) Gap’ was presented to 
Ministers on 29 January 2005. It identified the provision of protective, Level 2 services 
as the principal driver for structural change and developed a new methodology for 
assessing individual force capability and capacity in this area. This was based on a 
laminate model developed by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). One 
senior police official relays that ‘the idea that it all needed to connect … that whatever 
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you did local, you need to match by doing something with the more serious end…’629 
Policing at every level had to be inter-connected.  
      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Table 6:4 shows the seven broad headings that go to make up Level 2 Protective 
Services. The report also identified that only two forces scored well on level 2 services 
– the Metropolitan Police and Greater Manchester Police. In April 2005, Policing 
Minister Hazel Blears commissioned the HMIC to build on O’Connor’s work on Level 
2 ‘gaps’ and report further on ‘national protective services’ and a ‘more detailed 
review of collaboration.’630 She asked for the report by the end of July 2005 and said 
the Home Secretary wanted it to include HMIC’s assessment of ‘whether the present 
43 force structure is the right one.’631  
Clarke had already told the ACPO annual conference in May 2005 that he did not 
believe that there were “… 43 ways of skinning a similar type of cat.”632 These were 
not the thoughts of a Home Secretary still ruminating on the government’s preferred 
outcome. In September 2005, HMIC publish Closing the Gap.633 It concluded, to little 
surprise from anyone, that most forces did not have the capacity to deliver protective 
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630Home Office (2005a) Letter from Hazel Blears to HMIC Sir Ronnie Flanagan, 5/4/05 at 
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services for level 2 and level 3 crime.634 It made clear that whilst there was a range of 
options available to ‘close the gap’ on the provision of protective services, that the 
strategic forces option was ‘the clearest and most business-like approach’ although ‘it 
could be perceived by some to be the most disruptive and least ‘locally friendly’’. It 
also cautioned that this option ‘would require firm leadership, extensive support and 
national will’. Arguably, by the end of this policy process, it was to have none of these 
things.  
Yet, as if foreseeing some of the future criticisms of the report’s conclusions, it was 
keen to note that there was, in the view of HMIC:  
… nothing incompatible between a move towards a more strategic organisation and a 
concentration on delivering more responsible neighbourhood policing. Strong neighbourhood 
policing is essential to connect with the public and inform the work of protective services. A 
force which is big enough to deliver protection, but still small enough to identify with local 
communities, is an attractive one.635 
It was felt that the other options offered, as in Table 6:5, below were pure policy-
making ‘window-dressing’ – the HMIC and the Home Secretary wanted option five, 
so option five it would be.  
 
The relationship between the broad issues around the level of protective services and 
the continuing provision of local neighbourhood policing services was very important 
to O’Connor. In his report, he was keen to state that the  
…  local policing arrangements need not be disrupted whilst force level services are 
rationalised. A prescriptive reform approach could be initiated relatively quickly if a new 
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executive and strategic authority were appointed at an early stage and a tight timescale was 
set.636 
 
The problem was that, at this stage, the coalition of support for such a step towards 
police mergers was fragmenting. One senior police official claims that ACPO’s 
leadership had reneged and no longer supported mergers. He reported that the ACPO  
… policy entrepreneurs of two years previous had gone  and that it was now  
on the fence about it, as of course that’s a place that’s easy to occupy on this. You can have a 
nice crease in your backside on this issue, forever.637  
 
It was a point well made as this had been exactly where all governments had been 
since Jenkins’ initiative in the 60s.  
In suggesting developing a ‘prescriptive reform approach’,638 it is reasonable to 
deduce that O’Connor knew that anything less would be problematic in terms of 
implementation. He knew too that there was just one chance to portray those dissenting 
from his vision of reform as ‘selfish and obscurantist’, especially as the success of 
neighbourhood policing had already accentuated the local dimension to policing. 639 
The problem was that the Home Office – especially ministers – had thus far been 
speaking in very qualified terms about structures, apart from the Home Secretary 
whose position was clear and unequivocal.  Now its view was about to shift radically 
to one of complete agreement with O’Connor on the need for change. Governments 
of various political colours had fudged the issue of the number of forces since it had 
settled on 43 in 1972 – but now Clarke was determined to take matters further. He 
wanted to introduce between 12-15 strategic forces for England and Wales. In 
response to a question from a journalist about whether or not he was ‘ready for the 
fight’ on mergers, Clarke said that he was ‘of course, absolutely’ and he continued 
saying that: 
…  change is better if … done with consensus and co-operation. If they want to waste money 
on legal action, that is their affair…I am certainly willing to listen, but I have a qualification. 
Many senior police officers say to me that in a process of reform like this….it is important to 
make up your mind and do what you are going to do as fast as you can to reduce uncertainty.640 
 
Given these comments, Clarke’s action could not have been much of a surprise to any 
of the key people involved, but many thought it was a rushed approach nonetheless 
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with little or no scope for the potential alternatives to strategic forces and mergers to 
be explored. There was little discussion either about the apparent desire for mergers 
to be voluntary in the first instance. Enforced mergers would, it was felt, challenge the 
relationships between the three distinct elements of policing. 
Closing the Gap: policy implementation at 90 mph 
As soon as O’Connor’s report was published, Clarke convened a meeting with all the 
Chief Constables and Chairs of Police Authorities of the 43 police forces in England 
and Wales and wrote to them subsequently outlining the details of the policy process 
that would follow the publication of the report. He said that he wholeheartedly shared 
the view that strategic forces were the best long-term business solution. He went 
further and suggested that whilst he did not want to preclude completely the 
exploration of other options [such as those in Table 6:5 above], the burden of proof: 
…will be with the proponents of such alternatives to demonstrate they can deliver the same or 
better outcomes as the strategic forces option in terms of enhanced capacity and capability in 
the provision of protective services, economics of scale and commensurate efficiency savings, 
and clarity of responsibilities and governance. 641 
 
This represented a major shift in stated policy even though it was not clear his 
proposals met the tests he set out at all. The Home Secretary asked each force to 
consider its options in the context of the ‘Closing the Gap’ report and to draw up 
shortlists, conduct further analysis and submit final recommendations including 
implementation plans for inclusion in a broader report by the end of December.642   
Interestingly, Clarke said in the letter that he recognised that ‘the timetable set out was 
a challenging one’ but that he sensed from the meeting held earlier in the week that 
there was ‘broad agreement that we need to move as swiftly as possible to respond to 
the challenges set out in HMIC’s report.’643 As and when the definitive proposals for 
mergers and/or strategic forces emerged, these national criteria would be scrutinised 
intensely. It was felt by many that far from being objective criteria, rigorously arrived 
at, they were written after the event to fit in with the pattern of strategic forces that the 
HMIC and the Home Secretary wanted.  
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The national design criteria were to become a serious matter of debate and discussion 
as the policy unfolded and are outlined in Table 6:6.   
 
 
A senior cabinet minister at the time said quite freely that ‘I never ever believed that 
collaboration could work, and I think I’ve been proved right actually.’644 Collaboration 
was suggested by many as the alternative route to success rather than mergers. A senior 
civil servant in the Home Office from the time noted that: 
I did very strongly believe in police mergers. I thought it was absolutely the right thing to do… 
I’ve always believed the job of the civil servant is to find out what your minister wants and do 
your very best to achieve it. But this one I did with considerable enthusiasm.645 
 
It is difficult to believe that HMIC was not aware of these prevailing views from 
politicians and civil servants. This civil servant was speaking for many of those 
interviewed when he said that ‘…one of my regrets was that this police force merger 
programme was stopped in its tracks. That is genuinely one of my regrets.’646  
Two other matters of interest in terms of the policy-making process were included in 
Clarke’s letter which imposed such a really challenging timetable. Firstly, Clarke was 
clear that he wanted the ‘process to be designed, owned and led by the Service.’ Thus, 
having determined and dictated not only the roadmap, the destination, and the outcome 
of the policy of police mergers, Clarke now wanted the ownership of the process to be 
                                                 
644 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P1) 
645 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F16) 
646 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F16) 
185 
 
shared. Secondly, and as importantly given the stringencies of the timetable, is this 
short paragraph 
… to oversee the restructuring programme, I have asked Leigh Lewis to establish and chair a 
steering group to include representatives of ACPO, the APA, CJS [Criminal Justice System] 
and Government departments. I have asked Leigh to report to me frequently on progress.647 
 
One of the key concerns of many of the critics – and indeed supporters- of the policy 
was the whole issue of finance. For historical reasons, beyond the purview of this 
thesis, the financing of police in England and Wales is inextricably linked with local 
government finance. Policing is financed principally via direct grants from central 
government and from the receipts of a local policing precept imposed on local 
populations through the local government finance system. The system of local 
government finance in England and Wales is extraordinarily complex and the 
consequences of the police mergers policy impacts directly on it. Unfortunately for 
the Home Office, it also draws in two further government departments to the policy 
debate – Her Majesty’s Treasury, as the department in charge of overall finance, and 
the then Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG).648 As the 
Director of Policing Policy, Lorraine Rogerson, made clear in a letter to the forces and 
the police authorities, ‘a working group was established before Christmas to consider 
the way forward’ on funding and the precept.649 Others were clear that this problem 
was not being addressed as seriously as perhaps it should have been and thought that 
it was the most obvious, basic pitfall to the whole policy.650 The problem in part was 
an absence of policy officials who could think beyond their own silo. One official 
related, with more than a degree of exasperation, that   
… the guy who knows all about the precept isn’t thinking [about the other areas] … he knows 
all about the precept, he can give me every alternative for what we might do with precepts. 
He’s not thinking about … any of the other elements.651 
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648 The Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) – it was responsible for local 
government finance and hence the capping regime that limited the rate of increase each year by local 
authorities and police authority finances as well.  
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On the 11 November 2005, Home Secretary Clarke reported on the short-listed options 
for each force area that would be explored further in a written ministerial report to the 
Commons.652 As Table 6:7 below shows, every region had at least two options to take 
forward – except for Wales for which the Home Office determined only a national 
police force for the whole of the country met the criteria outlined by O’Connor. Police 
forces and police authorities were then charged, as we have seen, with determining 
their preferred option for merger that would then be considered by the Home Secretary 
and reported on further. Initially, he wanted comprehensive and detailed plans for 
implementation of the agreed upon mergers by  the end of December 2005 but, in a 
letter to Bob Jones,653 the Chair of the Association of Police Authorities (APA), he 
relented and allowed more time for such plans and other local issues that he agreed 
could ‘be done later in the process on a timetable to be negotiated with areas.’654  
 
 
This letter is crucially important to the development of the policy. It came at the tail-
end of the policy development process. The framework of the new policy – the 
establishment of strategic forces through the merger of existing forces – was in place 
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largely, as I have indicated,  through a mixture of the Home Secretary’s enthusiasm 
and the weight afforded to the O’Connor report. Yet here, perhaps for the first time, is 
any serious concern given to issues that would ultimately undermine the policy. On 
behalf of the APA, Jones raised concerns about ‘the scope for further consultation post 
December 23; finance issues – start-up/transitional costs and precepts; and governance 
and accountability at strategic and sub-strategic level.’655 Clarke sought to answer each 
concern in turn but did so in a manner that implied the Home Office had not really 
thought these matters through at all.656 To even the untrained eye, concerns around 
consultation, finance and accountability would seem to be quite important in the most 
significant structural reform to the police since Jenkins.  
 Clarke relented, as we have seen, on some issues around the detailed plans, but not 
the overall, strategic decisions or the timetable. In response to the APA’s concerns 
about finance and precepts, Clarke raised three possible ways forward and batted off 
the concerns to the newly formed ‘finance working group’ that, at the time of the letter, 
had not met. So, by January 2006, the working group charged with determining the 
way forward in areas such as finance – which meant the police precept, which in turn 
meant dealing with the Treasury and DCLG– had not met, but nominally the first 
parliamentary order was going down in May.657 On accountability, it is clear that the 
policy was also ‘evolving’ to say the least. Clarke thought that restructuring was a 
‘good opportunity to embed more police accountability at BCU/CDRP level’, perhaps 
through policing boards, perhaps through local government, but with clarity over 
managerial accountability.658 Again, the letter referred to transitional arrangement for 
accountability and Clarke referred to the proposals for strengthening the accountability 
of police authorities in the 2004 White Paper Building Communities, Beating Crime.659 
However, the discussion on police authorities in that White Paper was not in the 
context of the emergence of strategic forces.  
 
 
                                                 
655 Ibid.  
656 Ibid 
657 Home Office (2006a) Op.cit. 
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It’s that bloody Gaius Petronius all over again… 
The first significant chance for the Commons to address the issues raised by the police 
restructuring policies was on the occasion of a day long adjournment debate in the 
House of Commons, very late in December – after the list of preferred options had 
been published, but before the Home Office had made its conclusions known. When 
introducing the debate on behalf of the government, Clarke said: 
Starting in June 2004, HMIC conducted an extensive examination of how effectively 
protective services are currently provided…the inspector’s stark conclusion was that the 
current structure of policing is “no longer fit for purpose.”660 
 
The report from the HMIC was the culmination of a series of studies that tried to relate 
how prepared or otherwise the country’s 43 police forces were across a range of 
different levels of policing. Clarke went on to say that 
…they (HMIC) came to the conclusion that strategic forces offer “the best business solution” 
for the future. Faced with that clear, well-argued and independent police advice, I judged it 
essential to act rather than ignore those proposals.661 
 
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis called the plan ‘hasty, ill-considered, costly, 
disruptive and dangerous.’662 He said that the policy was being driven by ‘an agenda 
of regionalisation that the government was pursuing against the will of the people.’663  
He committed the Conservative opposition to a policy of elected police commissioners 
seemingly organised around relatively small forces. He quoted from a Policy 
Exchange research document664 that favoured forces with fewer than 4000 officers 
noting that ‘smaller forces, with a strong commitment to visible policing, are among 
the most successful at cutting crime and providing public reassurance.’665 He made 
grand assertions that the policy would be the first step on the road to ‘making all 
policing remote and less responsive to local people’ and that, given that the policy did 
not appear in the government’s manifesto at the 2005 election, the ‘government seems 
to have come to a decision and then tried to find the evidence to support it.’ He 
concluded by saying that the policy would end up making ‘policing remote when we 
should be making it local, ‘unaccountable when we should be giving people greater 
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control’ and that it ‘threatens massive costs for no extra benefits’.666 He offered no 
alternative and seemed to be stuck somewhere between the status quo and the micro-
localism, with or without elections, offered in the US model and praised in the Policy 
Exchange document. 
The Liberal Democrat spokesperson Mark Oaten was equally critical of a ‘rushed 
process’ and one in which we ‘should not be so blinkered as to assume that merger is 
the best way forward. Various critical Labour voices expressed ‘grave doubts’, 
thought it was ‘rushed, not rational’, that it was being ‘bulldozed and they had ‘serious 
concerns.’667 Welsh Labour MP, Paul Flynn, argued that before any reorganisation, 
the case should be overwhelming. He feared, quoting Gaius Petronius in AD66, that 
… we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising; and a wonderful method it can be for 
creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation. 
668  
Many of the speakers sought more time for the consultation period and the 
consideration of alternatives other than mergers and strategic forces. It is quite 
instructive that this concern – and the other two key issues raised during the 
adjournment debate, finance, and accountability – were also the issues raised by Jones 
on behalf of the APA. Some went further and agreed with one of the senior police 
policy officials who, when asked,  agreed that 
… there was a secondary phase [of policy development] that was missing between 
Mind the Gap and Closing the Gap…they should have explored the manner of the solutions 
much more readily than just saying ‘the solution is roughly this., they should be roughly this 
size….669 
 
By January 2006, the newly-appointed Director of Policing Policy, Lorraine 
Rogerson, reported to all the police forces and the police authorities that ‘the majority 
of police forces and police authorities did submit a response by the required date’. She 
clarified that any such mergers that go forward would be implemented using the Police 
Act 1996 and parliamentary order, that is, secondary legislation – rather than primary 
legislation with all its incumbent difficulties. The process would be different 
depending on whether the merger was voluntary or imposed by the Home Secretary. 
Voluntary mergers could be given effect by the ‘negative resolution procedure’ – that 
is, the order is laid and is not voted against unless it is objected to (or prayed against). 
                                                 
666 Ibid. cols. 1609-1610 
667 BBC News (2005) Clarke attacked on Police Reform   
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/.stm 1912/05.   
668 Hansard (2005) Op.cit. cols 1651-1652 
669 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F12) 
190 
 
Imposed mergers were subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and had to be 
tabled and debated in both houses.670  
At the same time, both Clarke and Blears wrote to all MPs to keep them up to date.671 
Blears said that she would keep MPs informed about the outcome of the process but 
took the opportunity to make clear that ‘restructuring is not an end in itself’ but simply 
one of three elements that will ‘together enable the service to meet the challenges of 
policing in the 21st century’. The other two elements were ‘neighbourhood policing’ 
and ‘workforce modernisation’. To many, it felt like these were three very distinct 
strands of policy that had little in common at all. She also made clear that mergers 
were the only solution on the agenda. She said that: 
HMIC did not feel able to recommend federation or collaboration and although we are aware 
that these are options that have found some support amongst police authorities we have yet to 
be convinced by the arguments put forward in their favour.672 
 
Clarke’s letter reinforced the wider message that ‘restructuring is one of our key 
priorities for further reform of the police service, but neighbourhood policing and 
workforce modernisation are equally important.’673 The letter also discussed how 
reform was structured around five levels: the neighbourhood, the BCU, the force, the 
national and the broader police reform narrative, as can be seen in Figure 6:2.  
Many of the detractors of the policy, in the Labour Party and beyond, were less than 
convinced that this narrative was as thought-out as Clarke or Blears implied,  
especially in terms of the relationship between the newly merged strategic forces and 
neighbourhood policing, which would merge 
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The detailed Home Office plans were now forthcoming. In February 2006, the Home 
Secretary wrote to all Chief Constables and Chairs of Police Authorities and made a  
written statement to the House of Commons, declaring the Government’s position on 
four of the nine regions and the options that were to be taken forward. He announced 
that in Wales all four forces  – Gwent, Dyfed-Powys, North Wales and South Wales 
would be merged to form a national strategic police force; in the West Midlands all 
four forces, Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia and West Midlands, would 
merge into one strategic force; in the North West, Greater Manchester would stand 
alone as a strategic force, Cheshire and Merseyside would merge, as would Cumbria 
and Lancashire; and  in North East all three forces – Cleveland, Durham and 
Northumbria – would merge into one strategic force.674  In March 2006, the Home 
Secretary confirmed that these options would be taken forward under ‘sections 32 and 
33 of the Police Act 1996.’ He explained that the relevant police authorities, local  
authorities, and chief constables had until July to submit objections and that subject to 
this he would propose laying the necessary draft orders for the approval of both Houses 
before the summer recess. Only one merger – that of Lancashire and Cumbria – was 
to be requested on a voluntary basis with the parliamentary orders laid in the House in  
the first week of May and the new strategic authority established by June 2006 and the 
new force on 1 April 2007. The remaining orders – imposed rather than voluntary – 
would be laid by the end of July 2006, with the strategic authorities established in 
September 2006 and the new forces also coming into being from April 2007.675 
As can be seen from Table 6:8, the future map of policing in England and Wales was 
all but established. In March and April, a series of notices and letters were sent out 
from Home Secretary and Home Office officials giving specific notice to each 
individual merger proposed by government, outlining the process, the way forward 
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and the timetable.676 A further ministerial statement on 20 March 2006 confirmed that 
the Government’s view for a further three regions. In the East Midlands,  the finalised 
proposal was for a merger of all five forces – Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, 
Leicestershire, Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire – into one strategic force; in the 
South East the proposals were for the merger of Surrey and Sussex into a strategic 
force and that Hampshire, Kent and Thames Valley would each stand alone as separate 
strategic forces; and in the Eastern region, two strategic forces were proposed – the 
merger of Cambridgeshire, Norfolk and Suffolk and the merger of Bedfordshire, Essex 
and Hertfordshire.677 In addition, the proposals for Yorkshire and Humberside were 
finalised by written ministerial statement the following day. It was decided that there 
should be one strategic force formed from the four existing forces – North Yorkshire, 
West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Humberside.   
The proposals for the South West were delayed until after the May local elections and 
the issue of London would await the Department of Transport’s review of the British 
Transport Police and the Attorney General’s review of the policing of fraud currently 
led by the City of London Police.  
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Dropping the Pilot: Clarke sacked  
Just as things moved on at pace on police mergers and against a relentless timetable, 
the attention of the Home Secretary was diverted entirely by the ‘foreign national 
prisoners’ crisis678 which, as indicated earlier, coincided with a round of significant 
local authority elections in the first week of May – including London Borough 
elections. Even though the issue was principally one of a lack of communication and 
administration between the courts and the prison services, because it involved foreign 
prisoners it was held up as a government immigration failure and because it involved 
criminals, it was seen as a policing failure. The police, under the auspices of ACPO, 
worked closely with the Home Office to find the 1300+ offenders who should have 
been deported.  The Home Office suffered a media firestorm that, the media made 
clear, would only end with the sacrifice of a ministerial career. I recall having intense 
discussions with Clarke and we agreed it was clear that, rightly or wrongly, his head 
or mine would have to be been sacrificed. As the crisis developed, he was convinced 
that I was safe because the media would not settle for anything less than a cabinet level 
scalp – that is, his. He felt that the ‘only question was, in those circumstances, whether 
or not the Prime Minister and his senior advisers would cave in to a noisy challenge 
or whether they would not. Clarke believed – wrongly, as it turned out – that Blair 
would not buckle.679 Charles Clarke was sacked the day after these elections – 
choosing to leave the government despite being offered other cabinet jobs. 680 At the 
time of Clarke’s demise, there was no deal with the Treasury on finance and no deal 
with DCLG on rate capping. It was very unlikely that any merger could proceed 
without such deals – even the voluntary merger that Lancashire and Cumbria wanted 
to pursue. The policy had lost its political champion and its future looked precarious.  
Reid as Home Secretary – mergers unceremoniously dropped 
As John Reid took over as Home Secretary, it was clear that he had to hit the ground 
running. He decided by the first week in June that I would swap my role – Immigration 
and Citizenship – with my colleague, Liam Byrne, who had just been appointed as 
Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety. He felt, as is entirely his right 
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to do so, that the Home Office needed a new face at immigration because of the 
Foreign National Prisoners debacle. He also thought that Byrne had the necessary 
‘managerial’ experience to deal with immigration and that my skills would better serve 
him as Policing Minister, including both the growing security dimension to the role 
and the immediate concern of the mergers policy. 681 
Reid was clearly not enamoured by the merger policy at all. In the initial stages, the 
relationship between the new Home Secretary and the Permanent Secretary, David 
Normington, was frosty, to say the least. Normington had been at the Department of 
Education with Charles Clarke and was clearly sorry to see him go. Given the manner 
of Clarke’s departure, it was also evident that No.10 had given Reid carte blanche to 
fix what was seen as a troublesome department. Unusually, Blair came over to the 
Home Office and gave an impromptu address to the staff and introduced Reid as his 
man. The geography of the new Home Office building lends itself to such ‘mass 
meetings’ as there is a central atrium overlooked by stairwells and open plan offices 
on each of the five floors. One official described Normington at the time as being ‘like 
a man chained to a radiator. He was a hostage. A kidnapped man.’682 Reid set about 
trying to find out exactly what was going on – and his agenda was a very full one. Of 
immediate concern was resolving, or at least getting a grip on, the Foreign National 
Prisoners issue, followed closely by an ongoing crisis with prison numbers, 
immigration, police resources and the development of counter-terrorism capability in 
the light of recent attacks. There was just a sense, said one official, that the ‘Home 
Office was too big, there were too many unexploded time bombs, neither ministers 
nor officials could cope with all of them at once, we had to streamline a bit.’683   
In this context, there was simply, as a senior cabinet member, from the time remarked 
in interview that Reid had ‘probably too much on his plate. Too many battles to 
fight’684 and given that it was a policy that Reid was never committed to anyway, there 
were simply ‘too many reasons to say no.’ 685 When asked by Reid what he thought as 
he went around the table at one of his early meetings on this issue, a senior policing 
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official said that ‘It all depends on whether you’ve got a political strategy. There is 
none at the moment. If you have a political strategy, this is doable. If you don’t, it’s 
not.’686 The same official bemoaned the rush by Home Office officials to tell Reid 
what he wanted to hear – that there was ‘too much risk, I think we have to stop’687 A 
senior official close to Reid, said that whilst the Home Secretary could see that in 
theory this policy  ‘… was a good idea … it will not fly at the present time …politically 
there were immense problems…’ 688  
So, it ended up that ‘John Reid judged that there were more important issues … [and] 
mergers weren’t worth the political capital’689 and the policy was dropped. On the 19 
June, Reid pulled the plug on all of them except the voluntary one claiming that much 
more work was needed on how to take the enforced mergers forward.690 As nothing 
had changed since Clarke’s departure to alter the fact that neither the Treasury or 
DCLG was willing to negotiate on the timing of the voluntary merger, up-front 
financing or the equalisation of the two forces police precepts, the voluntary merger 
failed too. Despite heroic efforts by officials to try and at least get this merger on track, 
it failed.691 Eventually, I had to meet Cumbria and Lancashire on 10 July 2006 to tell 
them that the merger would not to proceed. On 12 July 2006, the Home Office 
confirmed that the mergers were to be abandoned, with the entire proposal taken back 
for consultation.692 I also had to make clear in a speech to a meeting of the Association 
of Police Authorities (APA) that the ‘definitive answer’ to whether or not there would 
be mergers ‘is no’ and that it was ‘now the time, for local government, as well as police 
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authorities, police forces themselves… to collectively tell us, in each and every region, 
how, if not this way – then what way?’693  
On the same day, the Prime Minister was accused by David Cameron, of ‘wasting 
police time’. He asked about the attempts by Lancashire and Cumbria to merge 
voluntarily and if he, the Prime Minister, would now accept that ‘forced mergers are 
certainly out of the question?’ The Prime Minister answered that: 
For exactly the reason that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State [the author] gave this 
morning, we do not believe … that it is sensible to force the merger… .694 
 
Cameron stated that the ‘flagship of forced mergers has sunk without trace.’695 Blair 
insisted that ‘it is also important to proceed with mergers where we find the consent 
to do so’696 rather than simply ditching the policy because so much effort had been 
invested in the policy. The difficulty for Blair, and indeed for myself, was that so much 
political capital had been invested in the policy of police mergers by Clarke, who had 
just been relieved of his role as Home Secretary, that it was impossible to undermine 
him or the policy in the stark terms often reserved for such policy ‘U-turns’. The Prime 
Minister wanted to leave the option for mergers ‘on the table’ as he believed it to be 
the right thing to do, but it was not a priority.697 So, to all intents and purposes, the 
policy was completely dead, and no mergers proceeded at all under the New Labour 
government.  
What went wrong?  
Police mergers and strategic forces were a subject viewed very differently by three 
successive Home Secretaries. For Blunkett, mergers were ‘a second order issue that 
would detract from police dealings with the public.’698 For Clarke, ‘this was part of 
[his] personal agenda. A carry-over from his days as policing minister.’699 For Reid, 
as one of his close advisers related, ‘… the political case for spending energy … didn’t 
seem to be there… it’s going to cause a row in every single patch in England.’700 For 
the uninitiated, this was not a gardening metaphor , ‘every single patch’ meant every 
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parliamentary constituency, always an important concern in decision-making for 
politicians.  
One of the problems of this policy was that it was not the result of one of Kingdon’s 
‘focusing events.’701 No-one could point to a singular event or series of events that led 
to the decision to implement this policy. It was suggested that the lack of co-operation 
between two forces during the Soham Murder Inquiry was part of the impetus. A 
senior police source at the time relates that: 
The strategic force idea came out in … analysis … it was very apparent to us that some forces 
were struggling to cope with the breadth of policing, from local through to national and serious. 
Floating in the mix at the same time, you’ve got the Bichard Inquiry which demonstrated that 
Humberside and Cambridge were just not cutting it.702  
 
Certainly, many felt that the failure of these two relatively small forces was 
problematic. However, as the Bichard Inquiry showed, it was as much about 
information recognition and exchange as it was about force size or capability.  
If anything, the mergers policy was intended to be pre-emptive – to make good the 
gap in level 2 capability to prevent some catastrophic ‘focussing event’ from occurring 
in the future. It was not, as Kingdon would have it,703 a ‘pressing problem of the 
moment’ that the government had decided to address. Even if it was such a problem, 
no-one understood why the government has decided to address it in this way and at 
this time. A policy process loaded with such uncertainties at the beginning meant that  
success was unlikely.  Worse than this, for many it was a distraction from other key 
policies on police reform for which there was established narratives, particularly the  
development of neighbourhood policing, but also workforce modernisation, 
performance management, and the Respect agenda and anti-social behaviour.   
Process - preparing the political ground  
The mergers policy had not been in any election manifesto nor had it been explicitly 
spelt out at any stage.704 The 2001 manifesto mentioned that the government ‘will 
promote co-operation across force boundaries for common services’. The 2005 
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manifesto made no mention of the issue at all.705  Its only legitimising tool was the 
O’Connor report that many felt was a rigorous piece of work, but the motives of HMIC 
to give the Home Secretary what he wanted was suspect. Yet Home Office officials 
were clear that the issue had been a ‘part of Charles Clarke’s personal agenda.’706 In a 
reflective, internal Home Office document, other unnamed interviewees reported that 
‘as the programme unravelled it lost the confidence of the stakeholders’ and that ‘as 
the enormity of the programme became apparent and the activity mushroomed – the 
lack of resource became apparent and the programme descended into a shambles.’707 
Neither significant time nor energy was put into the construction of a narrative around 
police mergers and the efficacy of large strategic forces. To paraphrase Hindmoor, 
‘governments cannot simply abandon one set of policies and adapt another. They must 
construct the policy positions they seek to occupy.’708 Heclo has argued that ‘policy 
invariably builds on policy, either in moving it forward with what has been inherited, 
or amending it, or repudiating it.’ For Béland, ‘the assessment of previously enacted 
measures and their socio-economic consequences impacts on policy decisions.’ Yet 
for all the rigour of the narrowly focussed O’Connor report, none of these elements 
was at all apparent. As indicated above, there was a strong view that O’Connor’s 
conclusions were presented as a fait accompli in terms of policy, not the start of a 
policy process.709 As we have already seen, Cox contended that  
… the advocates of reform need to … create a discourse that changes the collective 
understanding … because doing so ‘shapes the path’ necessary to enact reform.710 
 
The Home Office never fully created such a policy discourse, and, hence, did not 
change the collective understanding. This disrupts the path. Sewell suggests path 
dependence means ‘…that what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.’711 Levi 
argued that path dependence must mean that once an actor has  
                                                 
705 Labour Party (2001) Ibid. Chapter 4, p.32 
706 Home Office (Undated) Op.cit  
707 Ibid 
708 Hindmoor (2004) Op.cit p.13  
709 See ‘The Inspector always rings twice’ above  
710 Cox (2001) Op.cit pp.463-498 
711 Sewell, William H (1966) ‘Three temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology’ in McDonald, 
Terence J The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences University of Michagan Press Ann Arbor, 
Michagan pp.245-280 – quoted Pierson (2000) Op.cit p.252 
200 
 
…started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, 
the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice. 712 
 
One of the failings of the police mergers policy process was that the Home Office 
became locked into a self-imposed path dependence that took no account of prior 
policy nor had any understanding of the impact the policy might have or the enormity 
of the tasks that it required. Mahoney recognised two forms of path dependence – 
increasing returns and the reactive sequence.713 In an increasing returns process with 
each move down the path, the probability of further steps along the same path increases 
and the costs of exit from the path increase. The reactive sequence is ‘a causal chain 
in which each step is a reaction to antecedent events.’714 
The policy on police mergers locked the Home Office into a path that took no account 
of the other key elements of police reform, took no account of the views of the key 
actors in the area and took no account of how to achieve success. Further, if there was 
a significant event in policing it was, as we have seen, the development of 
neighbourhood policing – not police mergers.  Neighbourhood policing could be 
described as a ‘critical juncture’ in policing. Consterdine and Hampshire suggest that 
critical junctures ‘may be triggered by major events that are exogenous…or by an 
accumulative process of endogenous changes, or some combination of the two.’715 
They add that ‘for policy analysis, critical junctures are moments when there is an 
opportunity for political actors to overcome the usual bias towards inertia caused by 
lock-in and feedback effects.’ The government policy of encouraging, and funding, 
initiatives around neighbourhood policing was such a moment – and fitted in within 
what the government was trying to do, for example, on workforce modernisation 
(getting more police out of stations and on to the streets, the introduction of police 
support officers) and performance management (by measuring the local dimensions of 
policing implied by the neighbourhood model and rewarding it as good practice.) 
The groundwork for the mergers policy had not been done – within the department, 
throughout the policing world or across government. It was important to not only to 
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make adequate preparation, but also to develop a narrative for the policy of police 
mergers and establish how it fitted in with the then plethora of other initiatives under 
the broad term ‘police reform’. There was, as we have seen,  no ‘focussing event’ as 
Kingdon would suggest or indeed any developed rationale behind the development of 
the policy, and. once determined, little or no work was done to construct the narrative 
for the policy, as Hindmoor would suggest. 716 
Process - protecting the political ground 
Timing is important too. As Béland notes ‘the moment at which a policy entrepreneur 
attempts to promote a policy alternative is crucial in determining its level of political 
influence.’ At the time of this policy, the Home Office managed to overestimate the 
support for the mergers policy from ACPO, and hopelessly underestimated the 
campaigning skills of the APA – whose members were quite literally fighting for their 
existence.  
As we have seen,  ACPO proved a less than reliable ally. Initially it was one of the 
proposers of the merger policy and its then leadership was completely behind the move 
towards strategic forces. One senior official thought that the Home Office was very 
‘naïve about thinking that when ACPO said ‘this is what they wanted’, that somehow 
meant it was right and it would happen’ with the implicit if not explicit support of 
ACPO.717  For him, ‘there was a bit of a sense that we [the Home Office] were a bit 
too cosy with ACPO…’718 Yet ACPO was an unreliable stakeholder. The Home 
Office allowed itself to be captured by ACPO as an agency of interest. Yet whenever 
things got tricky, the Home Office would discover that 
… a. you know what, funny enough quite a lot of Chief Constables weren’t that keen on it [the 
policy] really, and b., when it came to defending [policy] as a proposition and why the game’s 
worth a candle, it became the Home Office against the world really quite quickly.719 
 
As if to prove this point, a key police official said that, as a senior member of ACPO, 
he was convinced that with police mergers ‘… [Clarke] was sold a pup. The majority 
[of Chief Constables] were ‘we want to stay as we are’… I knew … that the merger 
[policy] was never going to fly politically. Never in a month of Sundays. 720 Months 
earlier, all four of ACPO’s senior leadership were open policy advocates for mergers, 
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but by the time the policy was being developed, all had moved on. This included,  
ironically, O’Connor himself.  
As we have already seen, the genesis of the policy was a mixture of ACPO’s early 
work and the reports of the HMIC that built on that work.  O’Connor played a role on 
both sides of this issue – first as a leading member of ACPO and then as an HMIC. 
Despite this, a senior ACPO member called the whole scheme into question. The 
reality was that at one stage ACPO did support the policy and was therefore in full 
agreement with the then Home Secretary. However, by the time the policy started to 
come to fruition, the new ACPO leadership had gone off the idea.  
A policy official lamented that when it came to campaigning against the mergers  
… this is the one thing on which police authorities turned out to be rather more effective than 
anybody expected… they corralled themselves remarkably well to get across to the public out 
there that this was… a threat to things they hold dear.’721  
 
The mergers issue gave police authorities the local exposure and presence that the 
Home Office was bemoaning that they lacked. Mergers would not deal with the 
accountability issue, but would protect, rather than threaten,  police authorities. As we 
have seen above, the policy of police mergers gave the APA a ready policy frame 
within which to defend its own role as the voice of local dissent against the Home 
Office and in defence of its local police.  
One key official drew two sharp conclusions from the mergers issue. The first was that 
‘if there is someone who has the power to stop something and they are not bought into 
it, then that needs to be taken very, very seriously.’722 Secondly, simply because there 
‘a lot of people in favour of something doesn’t mean it is doable if someone can stop 
it, or wants to stop it.’723 Kingdon’s policy entrepreneurs need to ‘constantly stress the 
need to reform existing policies when promoting alternatives at odds with the existing 
order.’724 The groundwork in terms of allies and enemies had not been done, in part 
because the planning and policy development had not been done, but also because 
officials and politicians let their generally unfavourable view of one of the protagonists 
– the APA – colour their view about its ability to campaign. Further, the Home Office 
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had ‘no solution to the one thing that will excite local people, and obviously local 
politicians – the precept. We had no solution to that….’ 725  
Policy development - hiding in plain sight 
One senior official spoke at length about things that were ‘hidden in plain sight’. 726 
He suggests that ‘…the presenting issue was never… actually hidden…it’s not 
recognised for what it is’.727 In the example of the policy on police mergers, his point 
is that everyone, including me,728 recognised that there was a key issue around 
accountability and the role of police authorities. The view in the Home Office was that 
the police authorities were hopeless and routinely ‘invisible’ to the public as evidenced 
by polling. In fact, this official argues that, at this time, the name of the APA was mud 
in the Home Office and that 
… no-one gives them any credence at all, we [the Home Office] pay lip service to tri-partite 
policing because the APA is a nonsense, they have no political kudos or legitimacy at all. Yet 
they are the locals. They’re the dog that didn’t bark then, that comes back and bites us.729 
 
But the APA had not just become local – its entire raison d’être was as the voice of 
local policing. By any measure, the government was having real success with the 
continuing roll-out of neighbourhood policing and ‘people must know that the largest, 
most substantial local voice that is glorified in local policing … [was] …  the police 
authorities, the APA.’730 But rather than seeking to address the issue of the apparent 
lack of accountability through ineffective police authorities, the government opted for 
a policy – strategic forces achieved through force mergers – that effectively 
‘weaponised’ the local dimension of policing which would be used  to great effect by 
police authorities. Thus, the key problem that was ‘hiding in plain sight’, local 
accountability, was used by the opponents of police mergers to great effect as they 
defeated the government’s proposals.  
Another issue around the policy was what one interviewee described as ‘optimism 
bias’. He does not mean in the general sense of a cognitive disposition to underestimate 
personal risk but rather in the sense of an attitude to one’s work as a civil servant. For 
although civil servants are generally often  
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… characterised as always wanting to say no, the thing that comes through… is a tendency to 
ignore voices and to tell minsters that things can be done that can’t be done...there’s almost a 
policy of optimism bias…”731  
 
As a participant in government through several changes of Home Secretary, I could 
see that the tendency to want to please the Home Secretary was greater if he or she 
commanded respect. There was a sense that saying ‘yes’ meant not to let the ‘good 
guys’ down. There was a lack of clarity as to what the policy was intended to achieve 
in the context of broader policing reform and whether it should be a priority at all. 
There may have been elements of groupthink. According to t’Hart  
… in high-level decision groups, closed leadership styles combined with group or 
organisational norms of compliance may produce groupthink tendencies… the group’s 
members are prone to excessive anticipatory compliance. 732  
 
As the civil servant above implies, this notion of ‘anticipatory compliance’ was more 
on the part of the officials, than it was on Clarke’s part. One official argued that in 
broad terms the argument for the policy on police mergers ‘hadn’t been well made and 
people were confused about it… and probably there’s a huge collective shrugging of 
shoulders …what’s it all about. It doesn’t mean anything to me’. 733 In contrast, the 
same official noted that the 
… neighbourhood policing message had got across … plenty of stories about local cops being 
eyes and ears of detectives and the counter-terror units [but] … I don’t think anybody joined 
that up with the desirability … to merge forces.734 
 
Policy entrepreneurs and advocates who were supporting new policy alternatives had 
to ‘not only depict them in a manner that appeals to the public, but also attempt to 
undermine public support for existing programmes.’735 For the mergers policy, this 
presented two problems – it had very few policy advocates – and the ‘existing 
programme’ was essentially the status quo – the forces before any mergers, the forces 
that were developing local neighbourhood policing successfully. The message was not 
getting through, because the narrative linking up these different levels of policing was 
not cutting though  
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Policy development – the missing middle     
Some felt that O’Connor’s report was afforded too much respect. The only significant 
discussion within the Home Office in response the report was how and when it was to 
be implemented, not whether it should be. The Home Office view was at one with the 
report but there should have been scope for more policy discussion and development.  
There was a ‘ridiculous deference … paid to Closing the Gap [the eventual report].’736  
It was presented as a fait accompli but there was a feeling that the Home Office was 
not prepared for the task at hand – that there was ‘no capacity in the Home Office’737. 
Even O’Connor was reported as agreeing that there was a ‘phase of policy 
development missing that drew everything together before going ‘bang’ on 
implementation.’738 Another senior policy official from the time said in interview that 
he thought there was  
… a big phase missing … the phase which would have told the Secretary of State … whether 
this was going to fly at all, or what he would have to do to make it fly…could it have been 
saved having not done that phase…the answer is ‘yes’ but it would have been 
messy…ugly…cost a lot more both in pounds and reputations…739 
 
The official went on to say that it would have been difficult not least because it was 
never clear to him that ‘there was a great interest in doing it [mergers] outside the 
Home Office, in government generally.’740 If there had been further stages of policy 
development then:  
Charles [Clarke] could have got the Treasury on-board as a long-term projection of what we’d 
spend on police infrastructure and its limitations, then … there would have been a better 
chance. 
 
He added that you could have found ways to make the policy less threatening by 
‘putting a lot more time into it’ 741 and concluded by saying that 
… I think if you’d done the finance, been prepared to do a little bit of the [internal] politics, 
stretched the time, make it unthreatening… 5 years plus … you could probably have achieved 
quite a lot…742 
 
Even if the policy was right, the report was presented as the police and the Inspectorate 
saying that ‘Dennis has done this excellent report. Everybody in policing thinks this 
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is bleeding obvious. Why haven’t you done it already? We’ll be there with you every 
step of the way’743 without any discussion as to how it would be achieved. Working 
parties to sort out the detail of implementation, including discussions with other 
government departments, were only being established in January 2006 with the project 
planned to go live effectively in April with the voluntary merger of Lancashire and 
Cumbria.  
One Home Office policy official at the time related that the fundamental reason it did 
not happen was 
… because it was presented as an entirely technocratic, logical solution that most people didn’t 
care about. It never cut through politically … I just don’t think the reasons ever, ever cut 
through for anyone except aficionados…744 
In effect, many were ‘blinded by the elegance’ of the solution without understanding 
whether it solved any of the issues at hand or the Home Office was prepared to 
implement it or not.  Minkin has spoken of  ‘a wilful blindness in which the failure to 
change in the face of early warnings was striking.’ He related that 
… the self-confidence about their diagnosis and skills… and constantly guided media 
presentation of their success…adversely affected the ability … to observe problems of their 
own behaviour and to listen to warnings about it.745 
 
Such a wilful blindness would have been supported by the fact that the functional actor 
– ACPO; the technocratic – the civil service; and the political – the Home Secretary,  
all supported the policy at the start of the process. Yet, as we have seen, with the 
change in leadership at ACPO, its support  came an abrupt end and there was no longer  
any unity in its ranks on mergers.  
One very senior policy official said that one rather technocratic but useful way to 
measure readiness and ability to implement is to ask the simple questions, that is, 
…what was the business case… what are the benefits you are seeking? What are the options 
for different ways of achieving them? What are the risks? And then charge it a sensible path 
… and find a willing pilot…746 
 
It may have been that such a ‘pilot scheme’ would have allowed the opportunity to 
explore the ‘missing phase’ of policy development and a comprehensive discussion of 
the other options. This could have been the phase that was used to put forward two or 
three costed options. This would have ‘brought the Treasury in the thing and would 
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have set some bounds on it.’747 But someone needed to start looking at the finance 
issue to ‘find a solution to the Treasury blockage.’748 A senior police officer reported 
in interview that when someone from a police authority asked:  
Have the Home Office thought about how to deal with the equalisation of the council tax? … 
no, they haven’t, and they didn’t understand the problem and they probably hadn’t advised the 
Home Secretary to get the issue resolved in cabinet … committee either…749 
 
This troubled the official and for him it ‘started the train of worrying.’750  He had some 
experience in dealing with negotiations with the Treasury and he knew that getting the 
departments ‘signed up to the detail is the kind of tactical work that the department 
has to do for the Secretary of State’ and that, at this stage, they haven’t even thought 
about it.’751 Another relayed the fact that on the matter of money ‘we [the Home 
Office] never even started to think about it…’752  
So, it was clear that the preparatory work within the department had not been carried 
out and that the preparatory work with other government departments had not been 
done either. If it had been, then a policy so strongly supported by the then Home 
Secretary would not have been something ‘which was ditched in a nanosecond,’ as 
one key policy official remarked. He continued that ‘the fact it was so easily ditched 
just suggests to me we just had not done nearly enough work.’753 He meant across the 
whole of government, but especially within the Home Office. Another official at the 
time remarked that: 
… the fact that John could just drop it, ‘Life’s too complex around here so that can 
go’ [means] we’ve got that [mergers policy] in the wrong place. It shouldn’t have been 
that easily disposable.754 
Policy development – joined-up government 
For one former minister then, the failure was not one of the policy itself, but of 
opposition to the policy from within government. Clarke’s rationale was correct. The 
former minister argued in interview that  
… Clarke’s approach to trying to drive it through was heroic in the face of some pretty 
concerted Treasury opposition, and I think ultimately it broke down because people could see 
the potential downside risk to police precepts spiking at a politically sensitive time, for which 
the Treasury was not going to cooperate in providing any kind of transitional arrangement…755 
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Large reforming policies invariably need support across government from other 
departments – and very often, in my experience, such a collective and collegiate 
approach is less than forthcoming. The same view has been expressed by senior policy 
officials at the time. One such official said that the Home Office was  
… completely screwed by the Treasury on all this… and that was one of the reasons why we 
[Home Office] lost some support. Quite a lot of police thought… somewhere along the way 
they’d squeeze a billion or two extra to make it happen. Then Treasury said ‘You must be 
joking. It’ll be done out of existing resources. Just not possible.756 
 
Thus, a policy that the Home Office was convinced would save the Treasury 
significant amounts of public money in the longer term was viewed with intense 
suspicion – not least because Clarke had not relayed this view when he signed off  the 
Home Office’s settlement with the Treasury. There was a ‘missing middle’ in its 
dealings with the Treasury too. Alongside this there sat an  ‘utterly unmanageable 
timetable’ which would have challenged the best skills of the civil service even if these 
other departments had been engaged throughout the process. It was described as ‘that 
kind of classic civil service thing where, if you write it down, it means it’s 
happened.’757 The same official believed that there was absolutely ‘no sense about 
how you do any proper project planning and management… so that anything about 
scoping or what kind of skills you really needed was hopelessly amateurish.’758 On 
one level, a strict timetable can be of value and focus activities, but not in this case. A 
policing policy official related that  
“Ministers were holding this huge steaming problem, and mergers were going to be the thing 
that was going to solve it… so there was a … kind of an early sense from officials that we just 
didn’t yet know how to solve the problems that way…  how on earth did we not see this 
coming? 759 
 
The official had worked in the Treasury and could not understand it, as he said, ‘when 
I remember saying “But how is it going to be funded?” and the team saying, “Well, 
we don’t really know.”  and thinking “‘What?”’760 
Another key official is now more damning of his colleagues. He felt that dealing with 
other departments was not a new phenomenon and officials should have been prepared 
for it. He was clear that it 
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…was quite simple really. Here was a policy that was the Home Secretary’s… one of his key 
initiatives and that we had to deliver it. You did whatever you needed to do to persuade or 
cajole the Treasury and ODPM [sic, although the department had become DCLG by this stage] 
to get onside.761 
 
He believes that such negotiation with other departments was not a new thing but has 
been a feature of much of his policy work over an extensive career. He added in an 
interview that, consequently  
… it wasn’t anything exceptional in the mergers context to find that Treasury and ODPM 
might find this rather difficult. And your job as a civil servant is simply to get around that, to 
get in negotiation and persuade and force it through.’762  
At some stage, the civil servant must go to the minister and say, ‘I am sorry, but I am 
hitting a blank wall here’763 and this should be signalled at an early stage. The problem 
for mergers was that Clarke has been the first to sign off on the departmental budget 
round thinking that he could return to these issues later, but the Treasury did not want 
to help. By the time of the Foreign National Prisoners crisis, nor did anyone else. 764   
Politics - potential strong ministerial sponsor 
A strong ministerial sponsor does not guarantee the success of a policy. For Clarke, it 
was a matter beyond party politics  - the party politics that Reid regarded as his first 
consideration. Clarke certainly did not regard it as the  ‘second order issue’ as Blunkett 
described it. For Clarke, it went to the heart of his view of policing. As one Home 
Office official would have it ‘he was not political but motivated by what he thought 
was right.’ and that ‘ he liked order – the 43 forces structure was illogical to him.’765 
However, it failed in policy terms because the ground had not been properly prepared 
both within government and beyond. It was not a failure of implementation, but a 
failure of planning and policy development, but it was a failure, nonetheless. One 
official noted that this would have been the ‘biggest change in policing in 30 years – 
no-one had realised the scale or considered the detail.’766  
Some officials argue that by leading on all the political dimensions of the 
implementation of the policy, Clarke let the civil servants off the hook. One said that 
‘Charles … would sort the politics, and the department got a bit lazy… they believed 
                                                 
761 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F6) 
762 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F6) 
763 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F6) 
764 Personal recollection of Author 
765 Home Office (Undated) Op.cit  
766 Ibid  
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Charles’ propaganda about how he could deliver’767 and, therefore, once the 
agreement of Clarke was secured, they believed the problems were solved, but in this 
case, they were not. Worse than this ‘it [mergers] was too limited to Charles. There 
was no real alliance for it. The police are very unforgiving. Nobody from police circles 
is going to put themselves out for a politician.’768 The policy was going to die even 
with its strong sponsor.  
One thoughtful policing policy official at the time suggested that normally one of three 
things happened when a policy suffers the loss of a strong and high-profile ministerial 
sponsor. Sometimes, if the minister has survived but moved on, they take the policy 
with them. This was not an option in this case as Clarke did not survive. Sometimes 
policy officials, with or without the support of the minister, try to get the policy 
embedded elsewhere. This was unlikely to happen in this case as the political 
opposition was so marked by the time of the denouement. The third option is ‘changing 
the weather’ but persuading a more powerful department to take on the policy in a 
different context.  
Once the policy lost its main sponsor in Clarke, as in life, failure became an orphan – 
bereft of any support across government. No. 10 was already reaching the view that 
perhaps that this ‘was more trouble than it was worth’769 and, as we have seen, 
indulged Reid when he shut the policy down. Interestingly, Reid went on to be just 
this type of strong sponsoring minister for the development of the Office of Security 
and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) across government and made sure that all the lessons 
about the failure of the policy of mergers were not repeated. 
Politics – PM and the role of No.10  
No. 10 likes to plan and control the Prime Minister’s discussion of specific 
departmental policy at Question Time and does not like being bounced into 
discussions by the Leader of the Opposition. As related in Chapter Five, an interviewee 
reported how a Prime Minister relates to his or her ministers. The No.10 source said 
that inter alia 
… there are things that the minister wants to do that the PM can support, or not, if it proves 
difficult – and this [mergers] was in the latter category…770 
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769 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P9) 
770 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P9) 
211 
 
So, even in the best of circumstances, the support from No.10 and the Prime Minister 
is always going to be qualified. The interviewee goes on to say that when things go 
astray then ‘if you can persuade people this is right, that’s fine. But … if we end up in 
the situation where we are going to have to drive through several brick walls to get 
there, there’s a limit.’771 
A special adviser in No.10 at the time, Kieran Brett, said that Blair 
… showed some interest in whether … public sector reform could be imported into the police 
reform agenda … for a while he was persuaded that mergers might provide the vehicle for 
further improvement, but the level of opposition changed his mind.772 
 
Sources close to the Prime Minister at the time went further. For them, Blair was 
‘reasonably agnostic’ on police mergers, but he 
…had a tremendous amount of confidence in Charles, so the fact he was proposing it made 
[him] want to look at it…and give it some leeway to see if it could run. But…[he] wasn’t 
committed to as…other reforms that we were doing in education or health care or whatever.773 
 
So, No.10 was prepared to give Clarke licence rather than push the policy itself. 
Officials in No.10 were clear that, for Blair, the core agenda ‘was to change the laws 
so we gave the police … greater power to deal with the problems in people’s ordinary 
lives’ and in this context the policy was ‘not a top priority.’ 774 The interviewee went 
further and suggested that the Prime Minister was always sceptical on reorganisation 
and that although he understood 
… that there was a rational case for what Charles was proposing… it was always going to be 
a calibration between the substantial political pain that this could engender, and the diversion 
of energy and the tension, to benefit…the proportion of pain to gain…775 
In other words, it was not that the Prime Minister was unconvinced about the policy, 
but that he ‘wasn’t convinced it was worth pulling the house down for.’776 Certainly, 
as I recall, the Home Office got no assistance at all from No.10 when it came to trying 
to deal with DCLG or the Treasury towards the end of the process.  
So, the policy did not fail to be implemented because of antipathy from No.10. The 
Prime Minister was not against the policy but rather agnostic. This was fine if the 
policy was on track, but not helpful as things started to go astray. It is also clear both 
from my own recollections at the time and the more  recent interviews with colleagues 
that the message to Reid as the incoming Home Secretary was not ‘you have to carry 
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on with this at all cost’. Equally, it was not, ‘get us out of this’, Reid had the leeway 
to assess the situation and make his own choices.  One of the first questions he would 
have asked is how well-prepared the Home Office was to deliver this policy – 
internally, intra-governmentally and, particularly important for him, politically. By the 
time Reid inherited the policy it was bereft of any support at – and there was no 
compelling reason in terms of political process or electoral pressures to defend it or 
press on with it.  
Conclusion   
This was a sorry end for such a major platform of government policy on police reform. 
Police force mergers were a solution that was pursued before the details and issues 
around the ‘problem’ were fully articulated and proposals and details agreed. There 
was a failure of policy preparation and development. The restructuring of police forces 
from 43 forces to perhaps 12 to 15 would have had a profound effect on policing in 
England and Wales but the plans were defeated by a mixture of professional and 
political lobbying by key groups such as the APA and the opposition of a range of 
Government and Opposition MPs. They were helped in this endeavour because the 
solution of large, regionally based strategic forces was being proposed at a time when 
the key policy success of the government had been neighbourhood policing. The latter 
was based on micro-localist solutions to community policing issues. These two facets 
of policing were seen as competing rather complementary policy solutions.  A senior 
civil servant at the time thought that the lack of success was more about timing and 
resources than anything else and was clear that: 
It was organisationally the right thing to do. It should have been able to save money in the long 
run, we just didn’t get the phasing of the money right, we had to put money up front to get it 
back…we could have done it.777 
 
The Home Office certainly failed to get it right – there was a complete failure of policy 
development, not least because successful police reform was happening in other 
aspects of policing. It faced a Treasury that did not want to engage in a policy that 
would save money in the longer term. It got locked into a dysfunctional and closed 
path dependence that could only end in failure.778 Lowndes is right to contend that  ‘… 
an institution is destabilised when change occurs in the institutional environment’  and 
this is particularly the case when the institutions with which it is connected are 
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destabilised.779  The nexus of detailed policy reform was already creating a degree of 
destabilisation in the policing world, principally with the introduction of 
neighbourhood policing.   
I thought at the time, and continue to think, that the policy was an appropriate response 
to O’Connor’s report 780 but the manner of the response to the report was wrong and 
led to failure. Two senior figures at that time, agree. One said in interview that one of 
their ‘regrets was that the police force merger was stopped in its tracks.’781 A leading 
Chief Constable from the time said ‘… it was a lost opportunity … the service did act 
parochially. Chief Constables did, police authorities did…and we probably lost an 
opportunity…’782 There has been some progress on collaborations and sharing 
backroom services, but thirteen years on from O’Connor’s report and Clarke’s 
enthusiasm,  the number of police forces in England and Wales in 2018 remains at 43 
exactly the same as it was in 2005 and, indeed, in 1972.   
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Chapter Seven 
Case Study  
Pre-charge detention – pick a number 28, 42, 90 days 
Funny old world: success and failure ?  
The final public policy case study looks at the Labour Government’s attempts to 
introduce further counter-terrorism legislation. The provisions for pre-charge 
detention of terrorist suspects were the most controversial elements of both the 
Terrorism Bill 2006783 and the Counter-Terrorism Bill 2008.784 To set the scene for 
this case study, it is useful to consider the progress of the bills through both houses.  
In the topsy-turvy world of government policy, this is a narrative that includes the first 
Commons defeat of  the Labour government in 2005 on an extension of the provision 
to 90 days. Nonetheless, this led to a substantial change in legislation and an increase 
of the existing provision from 14 to 28 days. It also includes a Commons success for 
a government proposal to extend the 28 days limit to 42 days in 2008 that led to the 
government withdrawing its proposals entirely. 
In November 2005, the Labour government experienced its first defeat in the House 
of Commons by a majority of 31 - 322 votes to 291 - with 49 of his own backbenchers 
voting against 90 days and many others abstaining or simply absenting themselves.785 
A backbench compromise of 28 days’ detention was passed by 323 votes to 290 votes 
– a majority of 33. The government, facing certain defeat, did not pursue 90 days in 
the Lords and the Bill with 28 days secured Royal Assent in 2005.   
Three years later, Brown’s government returned to the issue and in June 2008 won the 
crucial vote on 42 days by 9 votes by 315 to 306.  Whilst 36 Labour MPs voted against 
the proposal, 9 MPs from the Democratic Unionist Party voted with the government 
thus assuring victory. This led to instant accusations about a deal being done between 
the government and the DUP, but my judgement as a participant is that this was 
                                                 
783 I have referred to such legislation as Bills when being discussed prior to royal assent, and as Acts 
thereafter. This bill became the Terrorism Act 2006 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents Pre-charge detention provisions are at sections 
23-27 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/part/2/crossheading/detention-of-terrorist-
suspects 
784 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 22/4/2008 Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmpublic/counter/080422/am/80422s01.htm  
785 Complete numbers are always difficult to assess with these ‘rebellions’ as those who do not vote 
could have any number of reasons for their absence from the division lobbies. For further general 
discussion on rebellions, see Cowley, Philip (2005) The Rebels: How Blair Mislaid His Majority 
Politico’s London  
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unlikely.786 The Bill went up to the House of Lords where the 42 days provision was 
unceremoniously dumped, and the Lords passed an amendment that read:  
No extension of pre-charge detention: For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Act allows 
the Secretary of State to extend the maximum period of pre-charge detention beyond 28 days.  
his amendment was passed by 309 votes to 118, a majority of 191 and it was clear that 
there would be no scope for a compromise between 28 and 42 days.787 The government 
subsequently withdrew the provisions on 42 days pre-charge detention and the rest of 
the Bill proceeded through both Houses. The provision for 28 days pre-charge 
detention remained on the statute books,788 but the then Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, 
responded to the defeat by publishing a three-clause bill entitled ‘Counter-Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Bill.789 When conceding defeat and introducing the new bill, 
Smith said that: 
Some may take the security of Britain lightly, I do not. The Counter-Terrorism (Temporary 
Provision) Bill now stands ready to be introduced if and when the need arises. It would enable 
the Director of Public Prosecutions to apply to the court to detain and question a terrorist 
suspect for up to a maximum of 42 days.790 
As any attempt at consensus had passed, she continued by saying that of course ‘we 
cannot defeat terrorism through legislation alone, but where legislation can help to 
protect the innocent from those who would afflict atrocity upon us, I am steadfast in 
my determination to do the right thing for the British people.’791 Opposition parties 
and Labour backbenchers spoke of ‘gears clunking into reverse’, ‘crushing defeat’, 
and ‘haemorrhage of support from her benches in another place.’ This was because 
the bill she introduced would essentially provide the same emergency provision that 
an amendment to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004792 would have done.  This had 
                                                 
786 I have had as many interviewees tell me with absolute certainty that there was such a deal, as I 
have had say with equally certainty that there was not. My analysis of the evidence suggests the latter.  
787 Hansard (2008d) Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, 13/10/08. HL cols.491-545 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/81013-0002.htm#0810135000003 
788 The maximum limit reverted to 14 days when the Draft Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of 
Section 25) Order 2010 was debated and passed on 14 July 2010. The effect of the 2010 Order expired 
on 25 January 2011 and accordingly the current order lapsed on January 25. 
789 Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldhansrd/text/81013-0002.htm#0810135000003 
790 Hansard (2008e) Home Secretary – Counter Terrorism Bill cols. 624-636 at  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081013/debtext/81013-
0017.htm#08101334000001 and  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081013/debtext/81013-0018.htm 
791 Ibid col.625 
792 Civil Contingencies Act 2004 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/36/contents See also 
Home Office (2007) Options for pre-charge detention in terrorist cases 25 July 2007 
216 
 
been one of the options on which the government had consulted previously. The 
Shadow Home Secretary, Dominic Grieve, 793 asked:  
Can she please explain why this measure is of any usefulness when, as she knows, at the start 
of the process, we said to her that we would be only too happy to co-operate with the 
Government on an amendment of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to provide for almost 
identical powers to be exercised in the case of an emergency?794  
Considerable political capital and parliamentary time had been expended on an 
outcome that could have potentially been secured by consensus – a strange 
denouement for legislation on such an important issue.  
This purpose of this case study is to identify and explain how this unsatisfactory 
denouement happened. It considers how and why the 2005 Commons ‘defeat’ led to 
success and the 2008 ‘success’ led to ultimate failure. It considers how the policy and 
decision-making processes failed, and how ministers misread the way the Commons 
responded to government decisions. It will also look out how the roles played by 
individual ministers in the policy-making and decision-making processes under can 
determine outcomes. In particular, it assesses the relationship between the two events 
– the 90 days ‘defeat’ and the 42 days ‘success’.  A senior civil servant, reflecting on 
the run-up to the 432 days debate, observed in interview that it was  
…a period of heightened tension… our mind-set is still…we need all the powers we can get… 
[yet]  in truth there wasn’t much evidence for going beyond twenty-eight days, was there?795 
Central to the theme of the chapter is the simple question, why did the government 
rush to revisit the legislative option on pre-charge detention so soon after the failure 
of 90 days? There was little or no evidence for revisiting the pre-charge detention 
provision, the police and security services were not asking for it, why then did the 
government persist? Legislation was invariably part of any response to the threat of 
terrorism, but why this legislation and why at this time? Indeed, where was the 
evidence in 2008 that previous legislation, particularly that with regard to the 
provisions for pre-charge detention, had either been effectively used to date or needed 
any further extension at all?  
International Backdrop    
On the international stage, the Bosnian conflict is seen by many UK terrorism experts 
as a key event in encouraging greater involvement in violent Islamist796 terror in the 
                                                 
793 Greive, MP for Beaconsfield from 1997- to date 
794 Hansard (2008e) Op.cit. col.626 
795 Interview with author 2016-2017 (F1)  
796 ’ Islamist’ as a phrase has been increasingly accepted as a shorthand description for the political 
creed of Salafism and other versions of religiously inspired but avowedly political terrorism.   
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UK. The roots of al-Qaida, it is suggested, go back to Peshawar in Pakistan as early as 
1988. The earliest significant events carried out by or inspired by al-Qaida were the 
bombing of the New York World Trade Centre in 1993 and the suicide bombings of 
the USA embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania in 1998. There 
was also a direct attack on the USS Cole whilst it was in port at Aden in Yemen in 
2000 in which seventeen US naval personnel were killed.797 The struggle of the 
various clans and tribes in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union’s military incursions 
and occupation in 1979-80 is also identified as a major factor behind the rise of 
Islamism in the region.798 There were a range of other events throughout this period 
that had an impact on the growth of the Islamist threat as can be seen in Table 7:1 
below. 
Much of the foreign policy of the first parliamentary session of the Labour 
Government from 1997-2001 was influenced by the close and strong relationship 
between Blair and Clinton. Clinton was the US President from 1992-2000 and had a 
significant impact on both Blair and Brown, when they were in opposition as well as 
when Blair was Prime Minister. It is reasonable to suggest that much of both the 
Labour government’s foreign policy and the development of counter-terrorism policy 
was influenced by, or at least influenced by, the UK/USA relationship particularly 
 
                                                 
797 English, Richard (2016) Does Terrorism Work? Oxford University Press Oxford pp.42-92. See 
also Burke, J Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam Penguin London 
798 For further discussion see Naftali, Timothy (2005) Blind Spot Basic Books NY USA; Coll, Steve 
(2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden. Penguin 
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after the 9/11 attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon.799  
As Table 7:1 shows, however, there was a history of Islamist terrorist-inspired events 
– including casualties – before the attacks of 9/11 and before the Iraq War of 2003. 
Too often assumptions are now made that somehow all Islamist terrorism stems from 
the ‘twin evils’ of the Afghanistan War that followed 9/11 and the Iraq war.  
A new emerging threat…. 
Prior to the 7/7 attacks in London, the deadliest terrorist attack in Europe since the 
1988 Lockerbie bombing was the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The explosions 
killed 192 people and over 2000 were injured.800 The attack happened in the middle 
of a general election campaign and, after an intense controversy over whether or not 
it was an ETA801 attack, it rapidly became clear that it was Al-Qaida-inspired.  
The most significant manifestations of the emerging and immediate threat from 
Islamist terror in the UK were two separate plots in 2003/2004 – codenamed Crevice 
and Rhyme by the Metropolitan Police. Both plots were disrupted, and the perpetrators 
arrested, but away from the glare of publicity. Certainly, once arrests were made, the 
details of the nature of each plot were not permitted to be released into the public 
sphere and would only emerge at the subsequent trials much later.   
Operation Crevice – the ‘fertiliser bomb plot’ - resulted in eight men being arrested 
and charged with a range of terrorist offences and the seizure of over 600kg of 
ammonium nitrate fertiliser. This was used as an example of the increasing threats 
faced by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO), Andy Hayman. In a 
memorandum to the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, on proposals to change the 
law on terrorism, Hayman stated that 
… the advent of terrorist attacks designed to cause mass casualties, with no warning, 
sometimes involving the use of suicide ...means that we can no longer wait until the point of 
attack before intervening.802 
The Crevice plotters discussed several focal points for a future attack including a 
football stadium, trains, pubs, and nightclubs. The fact that the gang was considering 
                                                 
799 The 9/11 Commission (2011) The 9/11 Commission Report; The Attack from Planning to 
Aftermath Norton New York; Burke, Jason (2011) The 9/11 Wars Allen Lane London; Burleigh, 
Michael (2009) Blood and Rage Harper Perennial London  
800 BBC News Madrid train attacks at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457031/html/nn4page1.stm 
801 Basque terrorist group -Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Homeland and Liberty 
802 Hayman, Andy (2005) Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13) – Three Month Pre-Charge Detention 
Metropolitan Police 6/10/05 
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an attack on the public transport network – especially in the light of the ‘success’ of 
the Al-Qaida attack in Madrid – would not have been lost on the authorities. They also 
discussed attacking the Bluewater shopping centre in Kent, the National Grid, and the 
Ministry of Sound nightclub in Central London.803  
Operation Rhyme ‘set new standards in terms of its scale and complexity and forced 
police to confront new technological challenges and adapt their investigative methods 
to meet the challenges posed by the new brand of international terrorism.’804 It 
revolved around the activities of Dhiren Barot and his extensive reconnaissance of 
targets in the USA for terrorist attack – including the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank buildings in Washington DC, the New York Stock Exchange and 
Citigroup buildings in New York and the Prudential building in Newark.805 He and his 
group were also planning attacks in the UK using limousines packed with gas cylinders 
and explosives806 and a radioactive, so-called dirty bomb, with the intention of causing 
“fear, terror and chaos.”807 The complexity of the case was compounded by its 
international dimensions rooted in the UK, the USA, and the Pakistan. Senior officers 
at Scotland Yard described it as an ‘extraordinary investigation’, that largest and most 
complex ever carried out at the time. 
The legislative response up to 2005 
Up to, and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11,808 there had been only limited 
legislative interventions around counter-terrorism to deal with the perceived terrorist 
threat. Table 7:2 below highlights the pre-7/7 legislative activity. Importantly, The 
Human Rights Act was one of the first significant bills passed by the new 
government.809 Amongst other things, the Terrorism Act 2000810 confirmed that 
suspects accused of being terrorists could be held without charge for up to 48 hours 
and that this could be extended to 7 days as the maximum period of detention without 
charge, but judicial approval was required for the extension.     
                                                 
803 BBC News (2007) Fertiliser bomb plot: the story 30/4/07 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6153884.stm 
804 The Guardian (2006) Barot operation posed complex challenge, 7/11/06 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/nov/07/usa.terrorism 
805 The Guardian (2006a) Man admits plotting UK and US terror strikes at 
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807 The Guardian (2006a), (2006) Ibid 
808 For further details on 9/11, see footnote above.  
809 Human Rights Act 1998 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents  
810 Terrorism Act 2000 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents 
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Following the 9/11 attack on the twin towers of the World Centre on New York, the 
UK passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001811 which included 
provision in Part 4 for the indefinite detention of terrorist subjects who were non-UK 
citizens. The Criminal Justice Act 2003812 amended the 2000 Act and doubled the 
period for pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects from 7 to 14 days. 
In December 2004, Charles Clarke replaced David Blunkett as Home Secretary and 
by co-incidence, the next day, the Law Lords ruled that detaining non-UK citizens pre-
emptively, without trial, was unlawful. The appeal was made on behalf of nine men 
who were detained under the Part 4 provisions of the 2001 Act. These provisions were 
due to expire in March 2005 – hence the speed with which the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2005 813 was introduced. The core focus of the 2005 Act was the establishment of 
‘control orders’ in response to the judgement that struck down the 2000 Act’s Part 4 
provision. The new Act was secured three days before the provisions expired.  
So, prior to the attack in London on 7/7, there had been some limited legislative 
interventions, but they were becoming increasingly more serious in import and 
direction. One senior government minister from the time stated that he 
                                                 
811 Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents Part 4 
812 Criminal Justice Act 2003 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/44/contents Criminal Justice 
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... understood … the state has too much power and it should not be increased… we were … 
trying to reconcile those two irreconcilable principles: the security of the country and 
individual liberty.814  
 
As Security Minister at this time,  I knew that the government was increasingly clear 
that it needed to develop a narrative in case further legislation was needed and the 
balance between these two principles would be again tested.  
7/7 – the road to 90 days 
Much of the work that succeeded in preventing terrorist plots such as Crevice and 
Rhyme went on unnoticed by the public due to sub judice rules. The attack on 7 July 
2005 in London was different - it succeeded. The death of 52 people with hundreds 
injured, many severely, brought home clearly the nature, depth, and danger of the 
threat.815 The reaction to it was all the more pronounced when it emerged that the 
perpetrators were young men born and bred in the UK.816 
The 7/7 attack also brought the phenomenon of suicide bombers to the UK. 817  One 
of the most vulnerable elements of any crime, any terrorist outrage – including 
planting bombs – is the proposed escape route. If escape is no longer a factor, there 
are profound ramifications for the respective roles of the intelligence services, the 
police, and the law. One former security official noted that ‘… the big lesson … was 
that if you have suicide bombers then the emphasis has got to be on preventative 
intelligence.’818  
Prime Minister Blair, at Gleneagles to chair the annual G20 meeting, announced that 
‘whatever they do, it is our determination that they will never succeed. We are united 
in our resolve to defeat this terrorism.’ 819 He reiterated some of the themes he had 
been using since 9/11:  
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Qaeda and Pakistan’ International Affairs Vol.91 No.1 pp.17-35 
817 The Stationary Office - HC 1087 (2006)  Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in 
London on 7th July 11/5/06 at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228837/1087.pdf 
818 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F3)  
819 YouTube (2005) Terrorist Attack on London Tony Blair at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Cntv8JtuJA 
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Our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination 
to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the 
world...820 
Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, made a short statement to the Commons at the 
earliest opportunity – 12.54pm on the same day.821 He reported the situation on the 
transport network in London and the work of the emergency services. He also reported 
that he had chaired a number of meetings of the COBRA822 emergency committee to 
‘ensure that the whole government commitment is properly co-ordinated, and any 
necessary support is provided’ and that the Prime Minister was returning from 
Gleneagles to chair a COBRA meeting later that day.823  
Blair flew to London, chaired a COBRA meeting, then made a further statement from 
No.10. As he was unaware at the time of the suicide nature of the attack, he made clear 
that there would be the ‘most intensive action to make sure we bring those responsible 
to justice.’ 824 Blair resisted visiting any of the sites of the atrocities and flew back to 
Gleneagles to resume the G20 round of meetings. He wanted the public to see the G20 
meeting take place as planned – a normality resumed – rather than ‘give the terrorists 
the pictures they wanted’ – a PM visiting the sites of such murder and mayhem. 825  
Importantly, the initial reaction to Clarke’s statement by the opposition spokespersons 
helped project a unified response to a national crisis by the House of Commons. The 
shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, declared that: 
This morning’s explosions were acts of almost unspeakable depravity … planned with the 
deliberate intention of taking innocent life, and the whole House condemns them utterly… the 
Government will have our full and wholehearted support in dealing with this assault on our 
society.826 
Clarke responding by saying that  
… it was encouraging that right across every fragment of opinion in the House, we say that 
our democratic methods are the way to prevail and that we are determined to do whatever we 
must in order to ensure that those who seek to destroy that democracy are unable to carry out 
what they would wish to do.827 
 
                                                 
820 Rawnsley, Andrew (2010) Op.cit p.333 
821 Hansard (2005) Home Secretary Statement on ‘Incidents in London’ cols. 465-469 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050707/debtext/50707-11.htm#50707-
11_head0 
822 COBRA is an acronym for Cabinet Office Briefing Room A – the original room where such 
emergency meetings took place.  It is now shorthand for the national crisis centre in the Cabinet 
Office 
823 Hansard (2005) Op.cit  c.465 
824 Rawnsley (2010) Op.cit p.334 
825 Ibid (2010) p.334.  
826 Hansard (2005) c.466 
827 Ibid. c.470 
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Two weeks later, on 21/7/2005, there was a further attack involving bombs on 
London’s trains, but they failed to explode and a more traditional ‘flee and pursue’ 
scenario ensued. It was also marked by the accidental shooting dead of an innocent 
young Brazilian man, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell tube station by special 
forces officers charged with tracking leads on the terrorists.828 Even though the attack 
failed, it was again clearly an Al Qaida-inspired suicide attack by radicalised young 
men – albeit this time from East African origin rather than Pakistan. Although it ended 
in the capture of the terrorists, it reinforced the nature of the threat and the need for a 
government response in substance rather than in symbolism and words. I remember 
thinking at the time that the patience and tolerance of London as a city would have 
been sorely tested had they succeeded too.  
Blair’s Twelve Point Plan – ‘the rules of the game are changing’ 
The first substantial policy-focussed response became clear at a press conference from 
Tony Blair on 5 August 2005.829 He announced a twelve-point plan, as shown at Table 
7:3 below. The plan framed the government response in terms of politics, legislation, 
and policy. It was a mixture of measures already in train, measures already discussed 
but in abeyance and new measures – both practical and aspirational. Two of the points 
related to citizenship. He ordered a review of the threshold prescribed by the new 
requirements for ‘citizenship ceremonies, the swearing of allegiance to the UK and a 
rudimentary grasp of the English language.’830 He also announced that the government 
would consult on extending the powers available to the state to strip citizenship from 
people involved in terrorism and making the procedures more effective and simpler. 
Two further proposals pointed towards both the extension of the control orders system 
– first implemented as a result of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 – and an 
expansion of the capacity of the courts to deal with such an extension.831  
                                                 
828 The Guardian (2016) Who was Jean Charles de Menezes? Haroon Siddique,Wed 30 Mar 2016 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/30/jean-charles-de-menezes-your-questions-
answered; The Independent (2008) Seven mistakes that cost De Menezes his life Mark Hughes, Crime 
correspondent, Saturday 13 December 2008 at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/seven-
mistakes-that-cost-de-menezes-his-life-1064466.html 
829 No.10 had received plaudits for not overreacting in policy terms prior to the press conference 
announcing the 12-point plan. Personal recollection of Author   
830 No.10 (2005) Full text of PM’s press conference 5/8/05 at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/number10.gov.uk/page8041  
831 Ibid.  
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He also announced an enhancement and increase in security at the country’s borders 
by bringing forward a range of measures that were already in train such as biometric 
visas and the greater use of no-fly lists and other international databases to exclude 
people from entry to the UK. Four of the proposals were plans to reform or refine 
existing measures – new grounds for deportation and extradition; automatic refusal for 
asylum for anyone who had ever participated in terrorism; the introduction of a 
maximum time limit for all future extradition cases; and the proscription, under 
existing laws, of Hizb-ut-Tahir and the successor organisations of Al Mujahiroun and 
a proposal to widen the laws on proscription.832  
Further, he announced plans to consult on a new power to order the ‘closure of a place 
of worship which is used as a centre fomenting extremism.’ He indicated that there 
would be ‘new anti-terrorism legislation in the autumn’ which ‘would include an 
offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism.’833 Blair mentioned also that the 
government was already ‘examining a new court procedure which would allow a pre-
trial process. Importantly he asserted that the government would also  
…examine whether the necessary procedure can be brought about to give us a way of meeting 
the police and security service request that detention, pre-charge of terrorist suspects, be 
significantly extended.834  
                                                 
832 Ibid.  
833 Ibid.  
834 The Guardian (2005a) The Prime Minister’s 12-point plan at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism2 
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Blair was alive to the need to try to reconcile the irreconcilable – the balance between 
security and liberty. On the one hand he said, ‘Let no one be in any doubt that the rules 
of the game are changing’, on the other, he was clear that whilst the public had 
responded to the attacks with tolerance, this tolerance was in danger of being stretched. 
He was ‘… acutely aware that alongside those feelings that there is also a 
determination that this very tolerance and determination should not be abused by a 
small fanatical minority and anger that it has.’835 He knew that the government had a 
duty of care in terms of security, but also  ‘responded with a determined effort to 
extend ‘outreach links’ to the Muslim community’. He ‘knew [he] would upset the 
civil liberty Guardian/Observer lobby, but this left him unphased.’836 He understood 
the need to reconcile liberty with security but believed that ‘if only the public knew 
what I knew about all the people out there who want to hurt and kill … they would 
understand what I’m trying to do.’ 837 As a narrative on its own, this ‘trust me’ 
approach would not have been sufficient after Iraq, but the emerging story was clear 
– any extension of the 14 days limit on pre-charge detention was ‘a way of meeting 
the police and security service request’838  
The new legislation was to be fast-tracked and introduced into the Commons as early 
as possible. The broad package of measures received only muted coverage at first – 
largely because it was announced at the start of the summer recess. This gave both the 
government and its detractors the opportunity to consider all aspects of the package 
before the House resumed in the autumn.  The proposal to extend the time limit on 
pre-charge detention soon became one of the key focal points for discussion on the 
impending legislation, as did the origin of the proposal and the role of the police. 
Overall, the 12-point plan formed a powerful core for the emerging government 
narrative. 
 
 
                                                 
835 The Guardian (2005b) ‘The rules of the game are changing’ 5/8/05 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/05/july7.uksecurity5 
836 Seldon (2008) Op.cit pp.397-398 
837 Ibid. p.397 
838 No.10 (2005) Ibid.  
226 
 
Where did 90 days come from? 839 
Seldon contends that the police would later dispute that they asked for such a long 
period.840 Blair reported in 2010 that ‘the police were clear the power [the 90-day 
extension] would help’. Although their apparent views are often bandied about during 
these sorts of debates, both MI5 and MI6 did not make clear their respective positions 
at all. They would also resist doing so later on the similar provisions in the 2008 bill. 
The growing narrative was that this sort of legislation would form a core element of 
the government’s response to the threat from terrorism and that the police thought it 
essential to help them counter this threat.   
In its reply to the Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Select Committee Session, the 
government stated that the extension of the maximum period of pre-charge detention 
was based on: 
The strong advice… was that because terrorist investigations are now more complex the then 
current maximum period of detention – 14 days – was no longer … adequate.841 
Reflecting later, Clarke noted that he had already committed to further counter-
terrorism legislation during the proceedings of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in 
order to ‘implement some of the proposals about new laws and so on which, at that 
stage, we had envisaged happening much later.’842 In July 2005, he thanked the 
opposition spokespersons for agreeing to go straight to legislation in the autumn rather 
than waiting for any pre-legislative scrutiny, provided ‘they could have sight of the 
draft legislation and that the normal parliamentary procedures and timetables were 
followed in both houses.’843  
The first mention of the extension of pre-charge detention to a 90 days maximum had 
been in an Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) response in 2005 to a 
                                                 
839 Hansard (2005) Home Secretary Statement 20/7/05 HC cols. 1254-1273 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050720/debindx/50720-x.htm 
840 Seldon (2008) Op.cit.  p.398 
841 The Stationary Office – HC 910 (2006) The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the 
Home Affairs Committee Session 2005-06 HC910 September 2006 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/terrorism-detention-powers 
842 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2006) Terrorism Detention Powers Fourth Report 
of Session 2005-2006 HC910-911 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/910/910ii.pdf Ev 56 Q281 
843 Hansard (2005) Home Secretary Statement 20/7/05 HC cols. 1254-1273 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050720/debindx/50720-x.htm 
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government request for views on the broader issue of a review of counter-terrorism 
legislation. This review process was hastened by, not caused by, the 7/7 attacks. As 
part of this process, Hayman, recalled later that ‘we felt from experience and 
investigations that 14 days was not sufficient and we were looking for an extension.’844 
He went on to say that ‘ACPO were being pushed for a judgement on that – and it was 
no more than a professional judgement – which is 90 days.’ He was clear that any such 
extension would ‘always be in line with any human rights legislation, and that would 
be subject to a judicial review.’845 The Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, 
Head of the Metropolitan Police Service Anti-Terrorist Branch and National Co-
Ordinator of Terrorist Investigations, told the Home Affairs Select Committee that 
officers working on terrorist investigations all the time came to that conclusion  
… not through working groups, not through documents, but through discussion over a period 
of time … not the subject of a formal working party within the Police Service…(but) … the 
product of a lot of discussion and reflection by practitioners over a period of some two or three 
years.846 
 Thus, ACPO suggested changes to the law in the context of a wider review of 
legislation that was already in train but brought forward by the July events. Blair 
endorsed this approach in his August 2005 statement and made clear that legislation 
would be forthcoming in the autumn. In his letter and memorandum to the Home  
 
                                                 
844 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2006) Terrorism Detention Powers Fourth Report 
of Session 2005-2006 HC910-911 at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/910/910ii.pdf Ev 35 Q186 
845 Ibid Q186 
846 Ibid Q188 
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Secretary in October 2005, Hayman spelt out in more detail why the police thought 
there should be an extension of the limits on pre-charge detention to three months from 
two weeks.847 
Table 7:4 above outlines the key developments that he offered, based on recent 
counter-terrorism experience, as the reasons why there should be such an extension to 
the limit. He argued very strongly that it was the cumulative impact of each of the 
claimed was  ‘compelling’.  
Adverse reactions 
The campaigning organisation Justice came out against the proposals very early on. 
In a letter to the Home Secretary on 27 July 2005 it stated, amongst other things, that 
‘the current period [14 days] is the maximum period that would be compatible with 
fundamental rights (short of seeking a further derogation from the Human Rights 
Convention) and we would strenuously oppose any attempts to extend them’.848 
Although presented in such a definite matter, this legal opinion was simply that – an 
opinion. The government was clear that its proposals were human rights compliant 
and did not require derogation from the convention. The organisation would remain 
opposed to any extension throughout the process, as would its fellow organisation 
Liberty. Whilst Liberty conceded that ‘the state must be permitted the ability to detain 
for a reasonable period without laying charges.’ and seemed to accept 14 days as the 
maximum, it was clear that there was, in its opinion, no need for an extension.849 Its 
witnesses to the Home Affairs Select Committee in October 2005 seem to imply that 
the main concerns of the police around factors such as the international dimensions, 
greater use of IT and broader complexities were a matter of resources, despite the 
police saying otherwise. 850 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also had doubts. In its Third Report Session 
2005-2006, it concluded ‘in our view the proportionality case for any increase from 
the current 14-day limit has not so far been made out on the evidence.’851 Indeed, the 
                                                 
847 Hayman (2005) Op.cit  
848 Justice (2005) Letter to Charles Clarke on  Terrorism Bill 2005 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060929213405/http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/cc270705.pdf 
849 Hansard (2005c) Home Affairs Select Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 11/10/05 
athttps://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/515/5101106.htm Q103-105 
850 Hansard (2005c) Ibid. Q109-110 
851 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Third Report of Session 200506, Counter-Terrorism Policy 
and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters, HC 561-1, para 92. 
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two committees – the Home Affairs Select Committee and the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights – worked a convincing double act as two key focal points of dissent on 
many aspects of the proposed legislation – including pre-charge detention. Not 
surprisingly, parliamentary dissent would grow as time passed between the horror of 
the events in July 2005 and the eventual publication of the legislative proposals in the 
form of the Terrorism Bill 2005/6.852 This was remarked upon by the Home Affairs 
Committee in its fourth report: 
We recognise the value of seeking to achieve cross-party consensus on the issues. The 
immediate response to the July bombings was a strong cross-party approach to new counter-
terrorism powers. By the time the Terrorism Bill was debated in the House, this consensual 
approach had broken down.853 
The government was clear that it would ‘continue to believe it is important to have 
cross party consensus’ and will ‘strive to achieve this in relation to future counter 
terrorism legislation.’ The Committee and the government could not agree on why this 
consensual approach had broken down – for the government it was the intransigence 
of the opposition and their view of 90 days and for the committee it was the 
government’s ‘lack of care with which the case for 90 days was promoted.’ 854 
Clarity of government response and policy 
Notwithstanding the view of the Committee, the government was developing a 
detailed and cogent narrative of its view on further legislation. There was public 
support for the changes to legislation, but it was not wholly unqualified. Blair could 
not understand how ‘a whole section of the right went into completely nonsensical 
civil liberties mode’ He was at pains to ensure that people understood that he did not 
mean ‘the whole civil liberties critique was nonsense – I didn’t concur with it, but I 
respected it.’ He meant 
…right-wing law and order types who suddenly discovered that preserving the liberty of 
suspects was what they had really been about all along…it was the beginning of the unholy 
coalition after Iraq proved such a force, a sort of Daily Mail/Guardian alliance.855 
                                                 
852 Terrorism Act 2006 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents 
853 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2006) Terrorism Detention Powers Fourth Report 
of Session 2005-2006 HC910-911 para 27-29 at  
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhaff/910/910ii.pdf 
854 The Stationary Office – HC 910 (2006) The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the 
Home Affairs Committee Session 2005-06 HC910 September 2006 paras.1-3 at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/terrorism-detention-powers  
855 Blair (2010) Op.cit pp.274-275 
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The government was clear that, in the wake of 7/7, it had public opinion on its side, 
even if it faced a rather strange parliamentary coalition of opponents – dissident 
Labour MPs, the Liberal Democrats and the Tories led by the shadow Home Secretary, 
David Davis. The government also seemed to be winning the more detailed arguments. 
In the YouGov Sky News poll in the week the legislation was before Parliament, 71% 
agreed that ‘the threat from terrorism has fundamentally changed because of terrorists’ 
use of technology and their willingness to commit suicide’, 76% thought the police 
‘genuinely believe that the 90-day limit is necessary to fight terrorism’ and 61% 
thought that critics ‘of the Terrorism Bill are more worried about the civil liberties of 
terrorists than the rights of the public to be protected from terrorism.’ 856 The need for 
legislation was central to the government’s core narrative which was based on Blair’s 
12-point plan. Both were rooted in broad public support, even if the media response 
was far more mixed. The narrative was also very clear about how the legislative 
proposals fitted into the government’s overall response. The government’s overall 
narrative was cogent and clear.  
Government ‘glorious defeat’ and a different sort of rebellion… 
The government had accepted the ‘compelling case’ that the police had made for the 
90 days provision, despite critics accusing the government of ‘politicising’ the police, 
that is, confusing security concerns with political concerns.857 The consensual 
approach had evaporated, and the stage was set for a parliamentary showdown. The 
government made some changes to elements of the provision to try and secure further 
support, in the normal manner of the legislative process.  
On the 9 November 2005, in the week of the debates on the Bill in the Commons, the 
Leader of the Opposition, Michael Howard, accepted that the Bill had been amended 
to ‘provide for High Court supervision of detention, annual renewal and revisions to 
the code governing the questioning of suspects’ and asked Blair if he agreed that these 
changes improved the Bill.858 Blair responded by saying that  ‘we have made changes 
                                                 
856 The Sky News YouGov poll is quoted in the following report : Anti-Terrorism Laws 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/date/2005/11/page/3 
857 The Guardian (2005) Police support Blair on terror detentions 7/11/07 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/nov/07/terrorism.uksecurity  
See also : The Guardian (2005c) A failure of political judgment, The Guardian, 11/11/05 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/nov/11/terrorism.lab 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-
summary.pdfour 
858 Hansard (2005d) Prime Ministers Questions 9/11/05 at  
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to try and reach a compromise’ but ‘this is an occasion when it is important to do what 
is responsible, right and necessary to protect this country’s security.’859 By the time 
the defeat came, Blair knew that the vote was lost, but argued that ‘sometimes it is 
better to lose and do the right thing than to win and do the wrong thing.’ 860 
A compromise of 28 days’ detention, reviewed on an annual basis, was proposed by 
Labour backbencher, David Winnick,861 which was passed by 323 votes to 290 votes 
– a majority of 33. The Bill eventually secured Royal Assent with the 28-day provision 
in place. As indicated earlier, the government did not pursue the 90-day provision in 
the House of Lords and appeared, at least, to accept the ‘settled’ will of parliament - a 
28-day limit on pre-charge detention.  
Blair was clear that he had done the right thing. Public opinion was more mixed. A 
poll by ICM for the Guardian after the vote reported that 28% of people thought 28 
days was a sufficient length of time, 18% objected even to this Table as too long. Of 
the remaining 49% who gave an opinion, 29% thought the government should have 
compromised and 20% thought the government was right to stick to its view on 90 
days.862 Only 31% of people thought Blair had emerged unscathed from the defeat in 
the Commons. Some 22% thought Blair’s authority had been greatly damaged and 
41% thought it had been somewhat damaged.863 A majority (55%) thought he would 
have to learn to compromise more if he wanted to get his measures through while 47% 
thought he should stick to his guns and re-assert his authority.  
The Prime Minister remained unmoved.  He said, ‘when it came to the vote I decided 
not to compromise on the essentials, but to lose without having yielded.’ He continued: 
Of course, when we lost there were all sorts of articles about the prime minister’s vanishing 
authority, etc; but I could sense that the very recklessness of it, on something I believed was 
so right, got me traction amongst the public.864   
 
Having arrived at such a compromise, the House would defend it vociferously. The 
compromise at twenty-eight days was regarded as a ‘job well done’ by a House of 
Commons that felt it had recognised the need for some movement but recognised too 
                                                 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051109/debtext/51109-03.htm#51109-
03_sbhd0 c.297-298 
859 Ibid c.299  
860 Ibid c.302 
861 Winnick had been MP for Croydon South 1966-70 and Walsall North from 1979-2017 
862 UK Polling Report Archives (2005b) Did Commons defeat damage Blair? at  
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/date/2005/11/page/2  
863 Ibid  
864 Blair (2010) Op.cit. p.585 
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that the government was trying to go too far.865 As one of the key participants related 
in interview, the origin of the compromise was quite prosaic. The key mover of the 
amendment, Winnick, said that  
… given that we are already have 14 days, and in view of the acute terrorist threat and the 
police request, I thought it would not be unreasonable … to double that to 28 days.866 
He was clear too that, in his opinion, the role of MPs was not to simply follow public 
opinion, but to lead it. He was clear that in the past even when in a minority position, 
it was the job and responsibility of the Commons to lead and that ‘on this issue we 
should again give the lead.’867  
A member of the government at the time was clear in interview that an extension was 
the right thing to do but was less clear about the settlement at 28 days. S/he said 
…I don’t think I ever thought 28 days was the final position. There were just so many legal, 
administrative, and judicial complexities involved that it was absolutely necessary to hold 
people for longer. I just do not believe that we have gotten the right answer in this respect. 868 
Reflecting on the result of the vote, a former senior police officer said that ‘not enough 
work was done to sort of win hearts and minds at the outset and simply using chief 
constables as amplification routes to get to MPs was clumsy…’ 869 He also remarked 
that there were lots of undercurrents running through it, some rational, some 
emotional, some political.’870 Nonetheless, the government relented and accepted the 
28-day provision.  
From my experience as a government whip from 2001-2005,  the defeat of the Labour 
Government for the first time, and the Commons determining policy through 
compromise rather than at the behest of the government, created a very different event 
from previous ‘rebellions’ by the usual malcontents and political mavericks. 
Normally, a number of government backbenchers would object to a particular course 
of action or policy and, after numerous meetings with ministers and, if necessary, with 
the Prime Minister or other cabinet ministers, would either maintain their position 
against the government, or relent and ‘fall in line’. 871 It was different this time because 
there was an alternative to the government position – and a well-thought out and 
cogent alternative position. This time it was a Labour backbencher, Winnick, who 
                                                 
865 Personal recollection of Author 
866 Hansard (2005e) Debate on 28-Day/90-Day proposals – Winnick speech cc. 357-361 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo051109/debtext/51109-21.htm 
867 Ibid c.361 
868 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P2) 
869 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F2) 
870 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F2) 
871 Personal recollection of Author 
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decided to proffer an alternative. He cleverly did so within the context of the broader 
narrative put forward by the government. He said 
… one thing should be made absolutely clear: there is no division among us about acceptance 
of the terrorist threat…we know that there are mass murderers who want to bring death and 
destruction to our country…I do not challenge the authority of the Prime Minister in anyway. 
I want him to stay in office…the police have a perfect right to request more time…872 
It would have been highly likely that the government would not have secured any 
increase in the maximum period of pre-charge detention had it not been for this 
compromise. If the battle lines had been drawn between the 90-day provision and the 
status quo position of 14 days, then it would not be difficult to envisage a scenario 
where the government was defeated on 90 days and any other proposal except for the 
14-day existing provision. The government had implicitly agreed that pursuing 90 
days was a strategy unlikely to achieve any success. When asked if he thought Blair 
was happy to go down to defeat on 90 days, a very senior former cabinet minister 
answered ‘yes’ and that Blair 
…thought it was more important to stand with the position that we had, and he thought, at the 
bottom line, people would make their judgement based on what our stance had been.873  
 
Asked if Blair was happy in the knowledge that ‘ twenty-eight days was there as a fall-
back rather than nothing’, he agreed.874 As it was extremely unlikely that the Lords 
would have supported anything beyond 28 days, the 90 days provision was not pursued 
any further by the government and the 28 days provision was duly endorsed in the 
Lords. Ironically, Winnick had probably saved the day for Labour and Blair – and, 
importantly, embedded 28 days into the broader narrative of government and nation 
on counterterrorism. 
Post 7/7 – the path from 90 to 42 days 
Despite many thwarted attacks, plot disruptions and continuing intelligence activity, 
there was only limited legislative intervention following the passage of the 2005 Bill. 
The Crevice and Rhyme plots875 were finally coming to the courts, with much 
previously unheard detail being placed into the public domain for the first time.876  
                                                 
872 Hansard (2005e) Op.cit. cc.357-361 
873 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P1) 
874 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P1) 
875 For further details on Operation Crevice or Rhyme see the following :-BBC (2007a) Timeline – 
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Table 7:5 below shows only a selected summary of the events that took place during 
the crucial 2005-2008 period. The most important contextual matter is that for all this 
level of intense activity by both the state and those that would seek to commit terrorist 
atrocities in the UK, no-one was talking in any seriousness about further legislation – 
certainly not in terms of the specific policy of extending the limit on pre-charge 
detention.  
 
For some, the details that emerged in the trials of those involved in either the Crevice 
or Rhyme plots, illustrated how the police and security services could be successful 
within the existing legal framework. The details that many in government thought 
would assist in the justification and rationale behind further legal intervention, were 
being used by to explain how ‘normal’ legislation was working. Every success of the 
existing legislation indicated that there was no need for further forays into such 
legislation. 
The ensuing publicity around the details of the court cases potentially weakened 
further any case for a further extension to the legislation. The cases were reported as 
victories for the existing legislation.877  Nonetheless, Brown, as Chancellor,  still felt 
it was important enough to keep the options of further legislation open. In a speech on 
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national security in February 2006 he made this clear. Symbolically, he prefaced his 
remarks with a reference to the government’s record: 
Very few cases currently run to 14 days and we would expect an even smaller proportion to 
run beyond that. We are rightly proud of civil liberties. No-one should be held arbitrarily 
without safeguards and the longer the detention the more concerns there may be about arbitrary 
treatment.878 
Brown felt that it was important for him as Chancellor of the Exchequer to join the 
public conversation about terrorism – so soon after the November 2005 vote on 90 
days. He also felt it necessary to emphasise his pride in civil liberties and to recognise 
that there were arbitrary dimensions to the power of the state and the more arbitrary 
such dimensions, the more safeguards there should be. He felt that the ‘tradition of 
impartial judicial oversight’ would protect the civil liberties of a person detained 
before charge and that this was how to reconcile the balance between the needs of 
security and an affirmation of civil liberties.879 In what was one of the government’s 
first explicit references to a revisit to the issue of pre-charge detention, Brown 
continued by saying 
… it may be… that … Parliament may be prepared to consider going beyond 28 days … And 
it may be … to ensure … accountability we might consider not just that a senior judge approve 
continued detention every seven days and that there be an appeal to high court …’880 
He was clearly thinking about the potential, at least, for a further foray into this 
complex and contested terrain. This was not, however, the start of a detailed 
elaboration of the government’s narrative on counter-terrorism. This speech shows 
that even as Chancellor, Brown was already thinking about the future of counter-
terrorism policy and legislation.  
No demand for extension and the roots of a lost narrative   
Operation Overt,881 the plot to murder hundreds of people by to bringing down a 
number of airliners over the Atlantic by using liquid bombs, was foiled in the summer 
of 2006. It was disrupted much earlier than anticipated partly as the result of some 
very precipitative and unhelpful action by the Pakistani and US authorities.882 A 
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senior, former member of the government thought that even after the horror of the 
airline plot many in the police and security forces did not call for a change in the law 
because they were ‘once bitten, twice shy’ after their role in the 90 days debate. 883 
This source was adamant that the services should be ‘put on the spot because of what 
happened last time’ and that no proposal should proceed without ‘clear operational 
demand from the police’884 He clearly felt that the services – particularly the police 
but also, by implication if not explicitly, the intelligence agencies, had held too much 
sway during the prelude to the 90 days debate – and that the government should not 
proceed further with legislation in this area unless the services demanded change in a 
very public fashion. The most important point about the aftermath of Overt was that 
here was a well-developed plot that sought to use explosives to blow a number of 
trans-Atlantic airlines out of the sky resulting in innumerable deaths – and there was 
still no pressure from any quarter for an extension to the pre-charge provision.885  
The starting point for any new government narrative on counterterrorism would have 
to begin with either ‘We accept that, for the moment at least, there is no need or desire 
to go beyond the 28 days provision’ or ‘Having reviewed the situation, we are 
persuaded that there is a need to look again at the 28 days provision’. By making the 
pre-charge detention provisions so central to the legislative dimension of his 12-point 
plan in 2005, Blair had afforded it a status that was probably way beyond its efficacy 
as a legislative tool, but it would be the core of any future narrative. 
Others were mindful too of the political impact on the Labour Party. Unlike the 
position in 2005 and the 90-day debate, the government’s narrative was either absent 
or hopelessly underdeveloped. This left some members of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) both angry and disappointed.886 A backbencher who was particularly 
influential around the issue of human rights, asked plaintively, ‘Why do it when 
everybody knew how unpleasant the ninety-day debate had been throughout the 
PLP…. It’d been really divisive in the country…. Why the hell stir it all up again?’887 
If the government failed to explain in any substantive detail why a change in the law 
was necessary, then its detractors could, and did, create a counter-narrative that helped 
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frame the key debates on counterterrorism and the government would struggle to 
frame any narrative at all.  
Frustratingly, at the time, I felt that all the elements required for such a coherent 
narrative existed and were rooted in two key factors.888 The problem was that key 
opportunities were being missed. Firstly, there was a steady drumbeat of criticism of 
much of the work of government by both the Home Affairs Select Committee and the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights. Secondly, the new Home Secretary, Reid, wanted 
to review the government’s counter terrorism capabilities. 
Both committees were particularly concerned with any new legislative initiatives in 
the area and produced a range of reports throughout this period.889 The government 
could and should have used its statutory obligations to respond to these reports as the 
platform on which to develop its own narrative on counterterrorism and linked these 
responses to the development of the Reid review.  
The government might well have been determined in 2007 to revisit some aspects of 
the legislative agenda, but it would not be allowed to do so in a vacuum. Both 
committees constantly referred to 28 days detention as the ‘settled will’ of 
Parliament890 which ensured that there would be a competing narrative to the 
government’s views. Both committees, and the opposition parties, were clear in their 
own belief that there was no need to revisit the legislation. Often the government can 
craft and frame the narrative for a new piece of legislation, but without such a 
developed narrative, any attempt to look again at the time limit on pre-charge detention 
would be framed as simply a rerun of the 90-day debate that the government had lost 
some years before.  
The only way the government would have been able to confront this view was if it 
went right back to basics and explained why the 28-day provision had been found 
wanting at any stage since its introduction and how any change to the limit would fit 
in with all other aspects of the government’s overall strategy. In short, how would any  
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change in the law fit in with its counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, 891 especially 
the non-legislative elements? Without such a challenge to the incessant drumbeat of 
reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Home Affairs Select 
Committee, the government let its opponents develop a counter-narrative that would 
challenge belated attempts by the government to get its act together. The 
counterterrorism context was an arena of significant activity throughout this period as 
can be seen from Table 7:6 above.  
In 2006, Reid, the new Home Secretary made it clear that he wanted to instigate a 
comprehensive review of the government’s counter-terrorism effort and he did so. He 
also wanted to establish a national security council and made it clear to that he 
favoured a ‘European-style’ split of responsibility between a security-focussed Home 
Office and a Ministry of Justice that would be responsible for offender management 
and prisons.892 This marked new territory in a UK context. He began his review of all 
aspects of the government’s counter-terrorism policies, resources and structures and 
all government departments remotely involved in counter-terrorism were invited to 
attend a high-level series of meetings over the course of late 2006 and into 2007. It 
was to be one of the most detailed and through reviews of such an important aspect of 
government activities.  
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The fact that the Home Office should be the centre of the government’s counter-
terrorism effort is entirely uncontroversial today, but the prospect was both deeply 
controversial and fiercely contested across government at the time. One participant 
suggested that 
…the Cabinet Office didn’t want it to be based in the Home Office because they thought their 
job was coordinating things, but they weren’t up to the task…the Foreign Office thought it 
was a great idea, but of course they were the lead department for MI6 …. and didn’t want 
anything to threaten their position.893  
 
Interestingly, for the first few meetings, many of the departments sent either junior 
civil servants or ministers along and clearly had no intention of taking the process 
seriously at all. Once it became clear, however, that the review had the full support of 
the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, all participants worked with 
the review to get the best they could from the outcome. By then, as the Security 
Minister,  I was a member of the review and attended all the meetings. 894  
The review reported in May 2007 and, as expected, the Home Office took full 
responsibility for the government’s counter-terrorism strategy for the first time. A  new 
Ministry of Justice was created by a merger between the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs and the offender management, probation, and prison elements of the Home 
Office. Also, a new Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism was formed (OSCT) 
reflecting the new Home Office responsibilities. The Foreign Office remained in 
control of GCHQ and MI6, the Cabinet Office still serviced COBRA when it met, but 
there was to be a weekly security meeting in the Home Office, chaired by the Home 
Secretary or the Minister for Security, where all interested parties would meet and go 
through all serios developments. The meetings began with reports from MI5, MI6, 
GCHQ and the senior counterterrorist Police – and would prove to be, for me, some 
of the most important and useful meetings I ever attended as a minister.895  
When he introduced these changes, referring to the OSCT, Reid spoke of ‘a new 
strategic centre’ that would ‘add capacity that is currently non-existent or stretched 
too thinly for the scale and duration of the challenge we face.’896 In this seminal speech 
introducing the outcome of the review and, crucially, only weeks before Brown took 
over, legislation was not mentioned at all.  
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The Reid speech was in April 2007, Brown’s ‘On Liberty’ speech in July. So, the 
government’s most senior minister in the policy area, after a lengthy detailed and 
comprehensive review of the government’s counter-terrorism capacity, did not choose 
to highlight further legislation around the issue of pre-charge detention as a necessary 
way forward to enhance the country’s capacity to resist terrorism.897 Yet barely three 
months later such a change to legislation would become a government priority. The 
outcome of the review was the time to settle the government line on any new 
legislation and to develop and frame the government’s narrative including legislation.  
The issue of legislation had been discussed. The police had been asked if they wanted 
change, as without police support securing such a change to the law would be difficult. 
They were told that such a change of law would only be forthcoming if the they gave 
the Home Office a letter that stated clearly that ‘we want it and we need it.’ They 
demurred, and no such letter was ‘forthcoming.’ 898  
Under New Management – the state is always the servant of the people 
Brown took over the premiership in June 2007 and on the 29 and 30 June there was 
an unsuccessful bomb plot - Operation Seagram. This started in the Haymarket in 
central London and ended in flames at Glasgow Airport. 899 He made a statement on 
security to Parliament some weeks later and related that the events were 
…the 15th attempted terrorist plot on British soil since 2001…the police and security services 
are currently having to contend with around 30 known plots and monitor more than 200 
groupings or networks and about 2,000 individuals.900 
 
Brown announced that he was going to ‘explore whether a consensus could be built 
on the most measured way to deal with (the) …remaining risk.’ 901 There was little 
discussion with the Home Office and it is unclear how the options were arrived at but 
he made clear that the government would consult on four options – a state of 
emergency option rooted in the Civil Contingencies Act; an extension of the pre-
charge detention limit; an extension but with a vote in Parliament before 
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implementation and the development of a European-style investigative magistrate 
system902 The options were considerably influenced by the output of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights  and the Home Affairs Select Committee and the 
influence of Liberty.903 The relative success of both Liberty and the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights, especially in framing the limitations of the legislative discourse 
was, in my opinion at the time, only possible in the absence of a comprehensive 
government discourse and narrative.904 It was a view shared in the Home Office. 905 
Brown was clear that he did not ‘want a return to the previous proposal rejected by the 
House’ but he also hoped that the House could ‘agree that there must be a maximum 
limit – and that that should be set by Parliament.’906 But he did not put in the ‘slow 
boring of hard boards,’907 the hard graft of politics and policy-making necessary to 
show that this was a new proposal. He also referred to the notion that ‘more important 
even than the consensus here in the House is the consensus that we seek in 
communities across the country’ and spoke of how   
… as a nation we both defeat terrorism and isolate violent extremism …I hope that in doing 
so, an all-party consensus that will extend into every community in this country is 
possible…908 
 
The problem for Brown was that he was seeking to develop a consensus after the fact 
– after he had already determined that new legislation was at least part of the answer 
to the threat. This was why he emphasised ‘consensus’ so much and why he sought to 
work with groups like Liberty – but without a clear government narrative, the 
consensus would be problematic from the very beginning. It was tainted.  
The Leader of the Opposition asked what evidence ‘does he have that was not 
available in December, because it was then that the then Home Secretary, Attorney-
General and Lord Chancellor agreed that fresh evidence was needed before any further 
change.909  The Liberal Democrat leader, Campbell asked ‘what has changed in the 
past 18 months that merits asking MPs to change their minds about detention without 
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charge?’910 It was a reasonable question and one that was difficult to answer in the 
context of the Reid review and the absence of the political narrative. 
Winnick told the Prime Minister that ‘parliament agreed to 28 days…because of the 
acute terrorist threat to our country’ and that because of this   
…we should be very hesitant indeed and reluctant to go further … consensus was found on 28 
days, so we should be hesitant about taking the controversial steps that divided the House 
nearly two year ago.911 
 
As ‘Mr. 28 days’, Winnick would clearly be a totemic presence in any new debate on 
further legislation. He played an important role in the 90-day debate and was pivotal 
in the push to compromise around 28-days. Recognising this, Brown responded to him 
in the most conciliatory of terms and emphasised consensus once more. Yet again 
though, the government had still to develop the narrative that would be necessary to 
build any such consensus and could not answer the point on ‘new evidence’. There 
was a growing view that the push for new legislation was coming from the Prime 
Minister  rather than from the Home Office – and that it might have its origins in the 
old antagonism between Brown and Blair rather than a coherent policy direction. 
Rawnsley attributes some of the apparent confusion to Brown himself and his inability 
to know quite how he wanted to take his premiership forward. He said that 
… part of the explanation for the internal contradictions and cramping caution of Brown was 
that he could not decide what he wanted to preserve about the Blair decade and what he wanted 
to repudiate…912 
 
The obfuscation around the rationale for introducing new legislation was part of the 
reason for the stunted development of a narrative to explain the government’s position. 
Brown’s ‘cramping caution’ and ‘internal contradictions’ clashed with his strong 
signal about how he wanted to relate to ‘liberal Britain’. Rawnsley went on to say that 
… a test case was security and civil liberties. Brown began his premiership with a strong signal 
that he intended to rebuild bridges with liberal Britain by softening the authoritarianism of his 
predecessor.913 
 
Brown had made clear in both his speech to RUSI914 in February 2006 and in his 
statement on National Security in July 2007 that there might indeed be a case to revisit 
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the limits on pre-charge detention.915 He was trying to work with the ‘civil liberties’ 
lobby to reflect his ‘change’ from Blair whilst simultaneously sending signals on 
legislation that showed ‘continuation’ with Blair. The signals were mixed to say the 
very least. Rawnsley relates that Brown reached out to talk to opposition parties and 
to groups like Liberty and that one of his  motives was ‘to show that he could win a 
battle which had defeated Blair.’916 This does not fully explain the 2006 RUSI speech 
or the view in the Brown camp that he was seriously trying to protect the nation from 
the very real threat and try to do so with as broad support as possible.917 
Brown made a speech entitled ‘On Liberty’ on the 25 October 2007 within which he 
outlined his broader view on civil liberties and constitutional change. Clearly, this 
represented a further move in his ‘reaching out’ to liberal Britain. Symbolically, this 
was important for a number of reasons. The title of the speech evoked the memory of 
John Stuart Mill yet the government had already published its consultation paper on 
new legislation.918 In the speech, Brown was ‘concerned that too often in recent years 
the public dialogue in our country has undervalued the importance of liberty’ but also 
declared that ‘in the future 28 days may not be enough and we are also considering 
other proposals including post-charge questioning.’919 He ended the speech by saying 
that ‘the state is always the servant of the people. We must remember that liberty 
belongs to the people and not governments.’ Again, such framing would have been 
useful as a prelude to ‘the desirability of a debate over pre-charge detention,’920 but its 
message was lost at it took place at a time when the government had determined it 
wanted further legislation.  
A flawed process, a flawed proposal: victories evaporate, defeats linger 
The one thing that the Prime Minister wanted to resist was the notion that any new 
proposal would be seen and understood in the context of the previous debate on 90  
days. An insider said in interview that 
… the reaction to [the] proposal was just the same people re-running the old proposal and they 
weren’t prepared to look at it in a fresh light…and that was one of the problems.921 
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Brown had made the mistake, in my opinion, of assuming that the civil liberties lobby, 
especially Liberty, were people who understood government and who the Prime 
Minister could do business with. He was clearly torn between his political instinct that 
was telling him to do and say more on the issue of civil liberties and his instinct to 
protect the public and ensure their safety by legislating.  
The problems stemmed from Brown’s overly swift response to the Haymarket attack. 
It would prove difficult to establish and sustain the government narrative on the need 
for legislative change given the cumulative impact of three things. First, the absence 
of a government narrative to match the ‘drumbeat’ of the negative and critical 
committee reports from the Joint Committee on Human Rights  and the Home Affairs 
Select Committee; secondly, the absence of any proposals for new legislation from the 
very recent ‘reality’ of Reid’s detailed counter-terrorism review findings; thirdly, the 
absence of any real consultation before Brown’s ‘instant’ decision to go forward with 
legislation. His mixed messages to the supporters of civil liberties were so apparently 
contradictory that they pointed towards, if anything, no further legislation. These 
factors would haunt the entire process until the government relented and dropped the 
proposal for 42 days completely - albeit under the fig leaf of the temporary emergency 
legislation that would sit in its collective ‘back pocket’.922 
In the summer of 2008, the recently retired Director-General of MI5 took her seat in 
the House of Lords as the Bill was about to go into the Lords. She declared in her 
maiden speech that 
… successful counterterrorism work depends on many things, but in particular on good 
intelligence and good police work, not necessarily on changes in the law. That said, all the 
legislation has had some important and enabling provisions.923  
 
The government would have been happy with this intervention, had it ended there, but 
the speech had a sting in its tail. She continued by saying  
… there is no such thing as complete security and the importance of our hard-won civil 
liberties. Therefore, on a matter of principle, I cannot support the proposal in the Bill for pre-
charge detention of 42 days.924 
So, just as the government was scrambling to find a narrative for the forthcoming 
legislative proposals, one of the most senior people, who had until recently been at the 
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core of the counter-terrorism effort in the country, had decided she could not support 
the centrepiece of the new legislation.  
All of these factors, but especially the spectre of the 90 days debate, haunted the 
development and eventual scrutiny of the Bill and its proposals. The government 
assumed that there would be a consensus on which to go forward but there was none. 
Worse than this, as a senior government member now describes it ‘the absence of a 
narrative …allows a counter-narrative to prevail…so it becomes just a rerun of ninety 
days with no real substantial basis for it.’925 This same source asserted that, in part, it 
was a counter-narrative that said it was ‘Gordon’s turn. Tony had his hard man ninety 
days, twenty-eight days, now Gordon just wants to have the same…’ 926 
It was felt by many, particularly by those Labour backbenchers who felt little loyalty 
to the new Prime Minister, that the government was not taking the Commons seriously 
if it thought it could reintroduce these matters, without detailed reasons as to why it 
was doing so.927 A senior backbencher from the time reported in interview with me he 
asked the Home Secretary ‘What the fuck are you doing on pre-charge detention?’ and 
went on to say that 
… its mad, completely mad. There is no and, to my knowledge never has been, a strong 
demand from the police for this. They don’t want to be dragged back into this. Why is he 
(Brown) doing this? 928  
 
Although the 90 days defeat was not on the order paper when it came to the 
parliamentary debates on 42 days, it was there in the air, nonetheless. Time after time, 
a range of participants - government and opposition, frontbenchers and backbenchers, 
veterans and neophytes, said that if the government had understood the political capital 
exhausted in achieving the 28-day compromise, then it would have never come back 
with further changes – certainly not without a full and comprehensive explanation and 
narrative of why change was so important in the fight against terrorism.929  
As we have seen, to fully understand fully the importance of the 28 days settlement in 
2005, one needs to understand what it cost parliament to reach that compromise. The 
government maintained that it sought to legislate on 90 days in a spirit of agreement. 
Some of those involved in government were clearly willing to go further than others 
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in forging a compromise – and were not ‘fixated on the number 90’.930 It became clear, 
however, that the Prime Minister, Blair, wanted to stick with 90 days and ‘thought it 
was more important to stand with the position that we had’.931 It was reported to me 
that ‘Tony wants this to be a binary issue’ meaning ‘a polarised issue on which there 
can be no possible compromise.’932 Defeating the government but responding to public 
concerns over terrorism by alighting on the 28 days compromise mattered to the 
tradition of Parliament. The compromise of 28 days in 2005 was a reaction to the 
heavy handedness of the government’s 90 days proposal, but it was also a recognition 
that something had to be done to allay the fears of the public and to address the threat.  
One of the provisions of the compromise on 28-days was that the order had to be 
agreed by Parliament on an annual basis. I was the Minister who had to put the renewal 
order before parliament in the three years after it had passed. While always 
anticipating trouble and a re-run of the old debate on the manner of pre-charge 
detention, it was never forthcoming, and renewal was secured with relative ease. I 
reflected that this was because of the way in which the compromise had been secured. 
In other words, Parliament did not defeat the government lightly back in 2005 and felt 
that it collectively ‘owned’ the 28-day compromise as its ‘settled will’933  
Revisiting the issue in 2008 on what appeared to be a flimsy basis devoid of even a 
substantive government narrative would have irked Parliament. A senior former 
minister who had been comfortable with 90 days knew this. He said that despite being 
comfortable with 90 days ‘… once it had gone I couldn’t find the evidence that actually 
losing it was giving us considerable difficulty.’934 He added that ‘there was nothing 
that justified the 42 days in the end’ and felt that the government would have been in 
a much stronger position overall had Brown said that ’28 days…seems fine for now, 
we’ll keep it under a watchful [eye].’935 This would have recognised the importance 
of the compromise that 28 days represented and put the Commons on notice that it 
might need to be reviewed in the future – thus at least attempting to incorporate the 
Commons dimension into any future outcome. Instead, Brown was destined to become 
the ‘prisoner’ of the 90 days defeat and its legacy.  
                                                 
930 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P1) 
931 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P1) 
932 Seldon (2008) Op.cit p.398. Blair (2010) Op.cit. pp.583-584 
933 Personal recollection of Author 
934 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P4) 
935 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P4) 
247 
 
Signs of desperation  
The government insisted throughout the period of scrutiny in 2008 that this package 
of measures was essential for the security of the nation and it had been carefully 
thought through following consultation. However, at the report stage, with potential 
defeat looming, the entire package changed completely, as can be seen in Table 7:7 
below. There was to be a ‘trigger’ to the period being extended arising out of ‘grave 
exceptional terrorist threat’, it was to be available for only 30-days and parliament had 
and to approve the decision within seven days. This opened the entire process – 
nominally an operational matter for the police – to instant political scrutiny. The 
Director of Public Prosecutions had to approve any extension beyond 28–days which 
some contended might threaten his position as the independent prosecuting authority. 
A statement had to be laid before the Commons within two days , again confusing the 
operational and the political.  
 
 
The government had to seek independent legal advice before the order to extend the 
period and publish this advice with the statement. Further, the government had to 
notify the chairs of the Home Affairs, Intelligence and Security and Joint Committee 
on Human Rights before taking the order forward. Hayman reflected later that the 
proposal was flawed as ‘it had too many built-in hurdles. They were aimed at pacifying 
opponents but would have made it unworkable.’936 He felt this was political 
                                                 
936 Hayman (2009) Op.cit.  pp.134-135 
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interference in operational matters – and ‘might have marked the end of the operational 
independence of the police.’937  
Superficially, this looked like a government ready and willing to work with its 
opponents and detractors to secure the legislation. Others thought it was more readily 
the actions of a government determined to secure victory in the Commons – at almost 
any cost. Rawnsley argued that, after recent defeats on the 10p rate of tax and the 
recent loss of the Crewe and Nantwich938 seat in a by-election, ‘Brown was frantic to 
avoid yet another authority-shredding defeat.’939  
As has been seen, the  government won the crucial vote by 9 votes. So, the new Prime 
Minister secured the victory in the Commons but at what cost? One senior 
backbencher when asked if in interview ‘Gordon would have been better off not 
dealing with [42 days] at all’, answered ‘Oh yes, absolutely’.940 Another thought that 
‘nothing of value came out of the process’, and agreed it was ‘a complete waste of 
time, effort and an indulgence.’ 941  
What went wrong?  
A range of very different factors had an impact on the decision-making process that 
culminated in the failure of the 42 days proposal in the Bill. Detractors would no doubt 
have it that the attempts to revisit the issue were about appealing to the more 
authoritarian instincts of many of the ‘backwater’ communities that Jennings and 
Stoker have identified, but there is no significant evidence to sustain this view. 942 
Rather, the revisit owes as much to Blair’s rhetoric about ‘tough on crime and tough 
in the causes of crime’943 than it does to any crude triangulation purely for electoral 
purposes as implied by a simplistic view of the Downsian model of voter 
maximisation.944 
A former senior cabinet minister thought that ‘it was the right thing to do but I think 
we went about it the wrong way’ and reflected later that it was ‘bound up in the failure 
                                                 
937 Ibid p.134 
938The by-election was caused by the death of Gwyneth Dunwoody MP. Labour lost on a swing of 
nearly 18% to the Tories.  
939 Rawnsley (2010) Op.cit. p.549 
940 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P3) 
941 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P3) 
942 Jennings and Stoker (2106) pp.372-382 
943 Blair first used the quote on ‘toughness’ in an article in the New Statesman on the 23/3/1993 at 
http://www.newstatesman.com/2015/12/archive-tony-blair-tough-crime-tough-causes-crime   
944 Hindmoor (2004) Op.cit. See also Hindmoor (2005) Op.cit pp.402-417 
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of Brown’s Prime Ministership.’945 In reality, the government lacked the courage to 
‘wait and see’ if 28 days would suffice. Given the pressure to act, it confused 
‘legislating with action’ rather than explaining in detail the vast range of other 
activities that were being carried out successfully to enhance the country’s counter 
terrorism capacity.  The government had developed its counter-terrorism capacity and 
had all the key policy ingredients to construct a compelling narrative on the issue. 
These revolved around the recommendations of Reid review and their implementation. 
This could and should have been the core of any narrative in this area that could have 
been used to persuade, as Hindmoor would have it, the public that the government had 
a clearly defined policy on counter-terrorism. All three elements of the theoretical 
framework have been of use in this analysis. As well as Hindmoor’s adaptation of 
Downs, the path dependence and critical juncture dimensions of institutionalism and 
the informal and decentred analysis of interpretivism have been applied to the analysis 
of the case study in this chapter. 
Unusually, the centre – No.10 – overlooked and ignored developments in a key policy 
network, that is, the department, the Home Office. Rhodes argues that  
networks are self-organizing and the centre’s capacity to regulate them remains undeveloped; 
it has only ‘loose leverage’… it shows the limits to managerial reforms which stress either 
intra-organizational control and management by objectives or competition, masking the need 
for trust and cooperation with the language of the market. 946 
 
No.10, under new management, ignored the significant advances that the Home Office 
had made in counter-terrorism. Any subsequent narrative on the need for new 
legislation in the area would been flawed because of this omission. Normally the 
difficulty in government is that while ‘there are limits on the centre’s ability to steer, 
it still attempts to do so.’947 In this case, Brown, as the new Prime Minister, to no 
account of the department’s policy legacy. Rather, he treated July 2007 as some sort 
of policy year-zero and went on to develop counter terrorism policy on the premise 
that the world was the same in 2008 as it was in 2005; that the Haymarket attack was 
as much a ‘focusing event’ as 7/7 and that the ‘periphery’ – the Home Office - should 
have done what the ‘core’ told it to do.948 The key to steering is to recognise ‘the 
importance of wearing the other person’s shoes to understand their objectives and 
                                                 
945 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P2) 
946 Rhodes (1996) Op.cit  pp.652-667 
947 Bevir and Rhodes (2003) Op.cit  pp.73-74 
948 Kingdon (1995) Op.cit 
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build and keep suitable relations of trust.’949 Brown’s No.10 never managed this 
degree of empathy for the policy networks that represented the core of government 
activity.  
Uniquely, the Home Office had the policy answers to hand, and No.10 ignored them. 
This omission was compounded further because the new regime pushed itself into a 
legislation-driven dependence path with no pressure from any other source.950  No-
one in the Home Office was insisting on legislation on pre-charge detention, no-one 
in the police or security services was pushing for such legislation and, indeed, all the 
signs from Parliament were that such a move would be strongly resisted. Bevir and 
Rhodes have noted that ‘… even when an institution maintains similar routines while 
personnel changes, it does so mainly because the successive personnel pass on similar 
beliefs and preferences.’951 Whilst there can be little doubt that Brown did inherit 
similar beliefs and preferences from Blair, there was no reason why Brown should 
have thought that he had to legislate because Blair had done so.  
Process – preparing the political ground  
Brown took from Blair’s earlier response that legislation should be central to the 
government’s approach. He had said as much in his RUSI speech as Chancellor in 
early 2006. There is no doubt that the 7/7 attack was, by any definition, an event of 
some magnitude – it was a ‘focusing event’ as described by Kingdon.952 It was an 
agenda setting incident that needed a swift reaction.  
The government’s immediate response to 7/7 had worked and worked well – from the 
narrative that was developed to the ‘glorious defeat’ on 90 days and the ‘settled will’ 
of parliament on 28 days. By the time that Brown announced the potential road to 
further legislation in 2007, he did so in a vacuum. Without extensive explanation, the 
pursuit of legislation looked dated, almost a second attempt to rerun the 90 days debate 
without any immediate cause. In short, it looked like a belated response to the 
‘focusing event’ that had happened over two years before.  No-one was saying that 
Haymarket was such an event. It looked like ‘fighting the last war.’ One senior 
minister said since that they were: 
                                                 
949 Bevir and Rhodes (2003) Op.cit. p.73 
950 Mahoney (2000) Op.cit pp,509-510. 
951 Bevir and Rhodes (2003) Op.cit. p.41 
952 Béland (2005) Op.cit. pp.9-12 ; see also Kingdon (1995) Op.cit.    
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… proud of both the policy structure and the results of (our)…counter-terrorism work – and 
that’s one of the reasons why I think 42 days was a distraction. 953 
The world had not remained the same as it was in 2005. There was a failure of insight 
and perception, including not recognising the non-legislative advances in capability 
and capacity since 2005. There was a failure to perceive the importance and 
significance of the ‘settled will’ of  Parliament on 28 days – and this had not changed 
since it occurred in 2005. Above all, there was a failure to understand that there were 
options beyond a dependence path to legislation.    
Process – protecting the ground 
There is little evidence for the charge that Brown opted for the legislative route, at 
least in part, because Blair had done so previously. Some argue, as one former cabinet 
minister did, that at least part of his motivation was to show that he ‘could do things 
better than Tony did, which is a hopeless reason for doing anything’954 If the 
motivation had been this prosaic, others would have intervened. It is likely Brown 
wanted this route because he thought it the most beneficial. He did however get too 
involved. Some relate that he was ‘sitting in Downing Street by himself redrafting 
legislation’955 or was meeting interest groups and individuals ‘completely separate 
from what the [the Home Office] were doing.’ As a participant,  I remember this being 
deeply unhelpful and at times it led to real confusion in terms of relating to outside 
groups such as Liberty, relationships with our own backbenchers, and relations with 
officials within the Home Office. Another senior minister at the time relates that:   
the problems was … that he tried to do everybody else’s job and it’s a disaster, he was trying 
to do Jacqui’s job and couldn’t…no human being could possibly cover all … activity.956 
 
At one stage in the proceedings, there were at least four whips’ operations at play on 
the run-up to the vote – the official Whips’ Office under Geoff Hoon,957 a separate one 
organised by No.10 and the special advisers, a third unofficial operation run by 
elements in the Whips’ Office who did not have faith in the Chief Whip, and a fourth 
informal one that largely involved the Prime Minister and his phone.958 
 
                                                 
953 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P3) 
954 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P2)  
955 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F1) 
956 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P2) 
957 Hoon was MP for Ashfield from 1992-2010. He was Chief Whip during the 42 days vote. 
958 Personal recollection of Author.  
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Policy Development: hiding in plain sight 
The proposed legislation paid no regard to the key developments that had happened 
since 7/7, some at the government’s behest : 
 the Reid review; 
 the Crevice and Rhyme trials; 
 the threat from the ‘airline plot’ Overt ; or indeed  
 Brown’s own attempts to shift the narrative through speeches such as ‘on 
Liberty’; 
 Reports on counter terrorism from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and 
the Home Affairs Select Committee. 
How could these developments be ‘hiding in plain sight’? The drumbeat of the reports 
from various committees, the Home Affairs Select Committee and the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, that were so resolutely against further legislation on 
pre-charge detention were also ‘hiding in plain sight.’ They were not challenged by 
the development of a government narrative on counter-terrorism. The move to a pre-
emptive consultation process almost locked the government into a path dependence 
trajectory from which it could not escape. As we have seen, despite indicating that he 
wanted to proceed on a consensual basis, in 2007 the Prime Minister and the new 
Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, announced a consultation on four options for 
legislation.959  
One backbencher commented on the potential for new legislation by saying that, ‘I 
think a number of us were really quite surprised … we could not see what could happen 
to change the settled will.’960 A former senior cabinet minister reflected that ‘there’s 
no point in going back into it [the limit on pre-charge detention] unless you’ve got law 
enforcement……unless the police were clamouring for it.’961 And they were not.  
There was also a strong view from those who did not support the legislation that it was 
wrong to consult if the decision to legislate was already taken. There was a 
consultation process, but ‘the trouble is a lot of the responses to the consultation came 
out saying, ‘Don’t do it!’’ 962 In short, there were no ‘footprints’ for such a change in 
policy.  
                                                 
959 Hansard (2007) PM Statement on security Op.cit. HC col. 842-848; Home Office (2007) Op.cit.  
960 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P5) 
961 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P9) 
962 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P5) 
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Policy Development: the ‘missing middle’  
A developed government narrative could have made a virtue out of many of the things 
that had changed. Some things were completely new –  a reformed Home Office, the 
outcome of a detailed review of every aspect of the government counter terrorism 
capacity, a new Home Secretary and a new Prime Minister. Although largely an 
internal review, no attempt was made to put the new call for legislation in the context 
of this new capacity. The problem was that at no point in the findings of the review 
was the need for a further extension to the period of post-charge detention identified. 
It was certainly discussed, but throughout his time at the Home Office, Reid  never 
pursued this line. Even after the Overt plot was foiled, legislation was not pursued. 
Overt was not the ‘focusing event’ that 7/7 had been, nor was the Haymarket incident. 
Indeed, almost every development since 7/7 signalled the success of the current 
legislation and the growing capacity for detection. Examples include plots being 
disrupted; the police and the security services working closer and closer together; court 
cases showing the effectiveness of existing laws. The ‘missing middle’ was any real 
evidence or desire that another major distraction over 42 days was needed at all.  
In normal circumstances, any proposal for legislation goes through a detailed internal 
government scrutiny process that includes both extensive consultation across 
government departments and an exhaustive process under the aegis of the Legislative 
Programme Cabinet Sub-Committee (LP). As part of this process, one essential 
document concerns how the government will handle the bill in the House of Lords. As 
minister, I knew that in taking the bill through this process that there was little debate 
over how to deal with the issues that would be raised in the Lords. I also remember 
that, unusually for this Committee, there was an intense debate about the legal 
coherence of the 42 days provisions and whether it was really the right way to go for 
the government. It is not the purpose of the proceedings of the LP Committee to reopen 
debates on the policy substance of a bill. It has been difficult to determine whether this 
reticence to either challenge the paucity of the handling document or to hold up the 
bill until the document was improved, as the committee could have done, was because 
of the clear signal from No.10 that the bill should proceed at all costs.963 At the time, 
I felt that some of the ministers on the LP Committee who had been lawyers in a 
previous life took issue with some of the key points of law in the Bill because they 
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knew it would have to ultimately be allowed to proceed, but they wanted to register 
discontent nonetheless.964 With hindsight, this could have been the opportunity to 
prevent the Bill from proceeding – the Committee could have blocked it, but chose not 
to do so.  
Policy Development – joined-up government  
It may well have been the case that the absence of an effective transition from one 
Prime Minister to the other was also part of the difficulties that the government faced. 
For at least a while, I was the ministerial ‘corporate memory’ at the Home Office – 
having been there for two years when Brown took over as Prime Minister and the only 
‘surviving’  minister when Smith came in. There was little or no discussion before the 
consultation paper on the options was published and so the government was locked 
into a path without any real buy-in or ownership. There was even less discussion on 
the nature of the option finally alighted on – 42 days. 
By opting, in the end, for an elaborate extension to 28 days based on a stated 
‘emergency,’ the government opened itself up to criticism based on the confusion 
between making law and implementing law. Quite reasonably, many of the detractors 
of the Bill argued that, as drafted, it confused the role of the Commons as a legislative 
body with the role of the courts to discharge the law. If the police could not proceed 
with an extension to the period of pre-charge detention until Parliament has 
determined that there was a situation urgent enough to warrant such an extension, then 
how could the defendants have any guarantee of due process in the courts?  
By basing the legislative change on ‘emergency-style’ provisions, the government 
ended up in a difficult position with some of the concessions that it made to get the 
Bill through. It was to avoid these problems that all previous extensions had just been 
simple extensions – with more and more judicial oversight for the longer periods. 
Politics - potential of a strong ministerial sponsor 
The relationship between Number 10 and strong ministerial sponsorship for a policy 
is complex and has mixed success. We have seen how successful policy can be 
produced – and sustained – when it has a strong ministerial sponsor and the active 
backing of Number 10, such as the points-based system for immigration. We have 
seen how a policy with a strong ministerial sponsor can still fail when the sponsor 
                                                 
964 Personal recollection of Author  
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departs for whatever reason – as was the case with the police mergers’ policy. In this 
case, the Prime Minister could be considered the strong ministerial sponsor – 
something which can and did lead to some confusion. The other problem with strong 
Prime Ministerial involvement in a Bill is that it could undermine its lead minister.  
Although this was never the case with Jacqui Smith,  this was largely due to her strong 
character and the fact that she had only just been appointed at the time Brown started 
as PM.   
The government decided that it would listen to critics to such an extent that what it 
proposed at report stage had little or nothing to do with the provisions in the Bill. This 
meant essentially that the entire Commons Committee proceedings had been a waste 
of time in the context of 42 days. Nevertheless, however much Smith or the Prime 
Minister indulged the dissenting voices, the existence of Parliament’s ‘settled will’ 
meant that the concessions and compromises discussed were just an elaborate game. 
The Bill was not supported and would not get anywhere in the Lords – despite the 
strength of the ministerial sponsorship. 
Politics – PM and the role of No.10  
No.10 had a front row seat in this case. It is debateable whether the second proposal 
started at No.10 or the Home Office. In the end, as one senior former minister reflected 
‘It took up too much time… the process of trying to ram it through took up too much 
time, political capital and energy for the benefit that they brought.’965 ‘Political capital’ 
is a difficult concept to both measure and take account of but by the end of this process, 
no-one could argue that the government’s political capital had been enhanced in 
anyway.  
A senior source in the No.10 of the time remarked that  
…the people that had been in the Lords against … 90 days just regrouped. There was no 
rational argument… it was just the old sides being re-established … I thought we could have 
been able to break through that…966 
 
The government had the chance but resisted constructing a new narrative on counter- 
terrorism policy. Without this, the new proposal was always going to be cast as a rerun 
of the 90 days debate. Once the proposals were framed in this way the government 
was always going to lose the issue. No.10 both misunderstood the informal rules and 
                                                 
965 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P3) 
966 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (P12) 
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procedures of the Houses of Parliament – the ‘settled will’ of the Commons on 28 days 
and the importance of the Lords. The same No.10 source highlights this by saying that 
‘ …none of us believe the Lords as important as the Lords believe they are.’ 967 This 
view and the notion that Parliament was seen as ‘a source of stress and irritation for 
ministers’968 show clearly how they had lost their grounding as Members of 
Parliament. With such an insensitive view of the Lords and the Commons, ministers 
and No.10 were unlikely to recognise, let alone fully comprehend,  the nuances of the 
informal rules and procedures of the palace – or the importance, as we have seen, of 
the ‘settled will’ over 28 days and the objections to 42 days.  
Notwithstanding the outcome of ditching the policy of 42 days, the former minister 
quoted at the start of this section in interview said that he was pleased ‘with the way 
that we developed both the government capacity and the …police and others in their 
ability to counter terrorism.’969 There had been so much development of counter- 
terrorism capacity that it is difficult to describe it here in full. It was hugely successful 
despite the failure to establish new legislation. The failure of this particular element 
of the legislative route did not prevent successes elsewhere in the policy domain. One 
senior official was clear that ‘the really important work was being done in parallel.’970 
Conclusion  
Decisions made in 2005 dictated policy responses in 2008. The new Prime Minister 
failed to take account of the development of policy since 2005 and the 90 days defeat. 
The government chose to allow the defeat to permeate every aspect of its decisions in 
2008 - as though it thought that after 7/7 it was locked into a path dependent process 
that demanded revisiting the legislation as though nothing had changed since 2005.971 
The government never seriously questioned in 2008 why the extension of pre-charge 
extension might have been an appropriate response in 2005 but was not in 2008.  
As indicated earlier, it was   
’a complete mystery… because a high amount of effort was put into this legislation … when 
actually the really important work was being done in parallel…’ 972 
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The world did not remain the same. It was as though No.10 sought to see ‘the world 
as it wanted it to be’ rather than for what it was. There were four opportunities for 
avoiding this position. All of them are straightforward and all required merely a 
different emphasis on events and developments that had already occurred.  
Firstly, all my experience, as both an academic and as a participant, indicates that the 
government could have constructed a fresh narrative around the emerging themes of 
the outcomes of the Reid Review on the government’s capacity to tackle terrorism. 
The key elements would have been the positive benefits of the creation of an Office 
of Security and Counter Terrorism; the decision to base all of the government’s efforts 
on counter-terrorism at the Home Office; the opportunity provided by the 
establishment of a Ministry of Justice to take over policy and operational control of 
prisons and offender management; the value of the regional co-location of MI5 and 
counter-terrorism specialist police; and the joining-up provided by a weekly security 
meeting for all elements of the government’s efforts in this area – including the armed 
forces and a range of government departments as well as MI5, MI6, the Police, GCHQ 
and JTAC973, chaired by the Home Secretary or myself as the Minister of Security. 
This could have been the basis of such a new narrative. It could have been constructed 
in the way that  Hindmoor has suggested, complete with persuasion, spin and choice 
– and the underlying use of rhetoric.974 
Reid would have certainly included revisiting the issue of legislation in the conclusion 
of his review, had he felt this was necessary. As we have seen, the prevailing view 
was that if the police and security services wanted such a move, they should say so. 
Confirming that, for the present time at least, there was neither a need nor a desire for 
advancing beyond the then ‘28 days’ status quo would not have looked out of place in 
this new narrative. In reality, the outcomes of this excellent review were implemented 
without fuss in an extremely functional fashion, and without the development of a 
positive narrative. 
The second opportunity for the government to reassess the need for legislation fell to 
me. After Reid resigned as Home Secretary in July 2007, I was the only surviving 
minister with Home Office experience. The other members of the ministerial team  
                                                 
973 Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) is the government’s listening post. JTAC is 
the government’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre – it sets the threat level.   
974 See Hindmoor (2004) Op.cit and Hindmoor (2005) Op.cit pp.402-417 
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that came in with Jacqui Smith were all  new to the Home Office. I could have pushed 
the view – from the spirit, at least, of the Reid review – and argued that no further 
legislation should be the position that the Home Office should take at the earliest 
opportunity. The fact that there was a terrorist attack on the very first day Smith was 
in office, only reinforced the notion that the Home Office should have a view sooner 
rather than later. From my perspective, having sat through all of the review meetings 
and worked closely with the police and the security service throughout the year, further 
legislation was an option, not a necessity. I told Smith she should at least think about 
pushing for no further legislation and defining a new outlook on counter terrorism and 
legislation – rooted in the Reid review.  I did so in the knowledge that soundings from 
No.10 suggested that Brown was keen to move in this area. My view did not stem 
from an opposition to extending the provision, but more from my judgement that it 
just was not needed at this time, even after the Haymarket attack. I believed too that 
Smith could establish herself sharply as the new Home Secretary if she developed such 
a view. Events moved too fast and there was really little time for her to even consider 
this as an option and we both ended up locked into the Bill and the legislative process. 
Interestingly, had the Home Office narrative been developed as indicated above, then 
it would have been all the easier for Smith to nail these colours to the mast. I should 
have pushed further.  
The third way in which the process of the Bill may have been stopped was if I, or the 
collective effort of the Legislative Programme Committee, determined that the 
legislation simply was not ready to pursue through parliament. Reasons for blocking 
the bill could have been because of the way in which the legislation was drawn up 
(which was flawed as it was based on, but not rooted in, existing emergency 
legislation) or because there was not a detailed handling document for the passage of 
the Bill in the Lords. In any normal circumstance, any remotely contentious Bill, 
which did not have the tactical chapter and verse of each and every stage of its passage 
in the Lords spelt out along with how any disagreement would be dealt with, was not 
allowed to proceed. The Bill was not ready. The handling strategy was not ready. 
Everyone around that table knew that – but also knew that the new Prime Minister 
wanted it – which is why it prevailed. Again, had the Home Office narrative been 
developed to reflect the outcomes of the Reid Review, this would have been a much 
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easier course of actions – if indeed Smith and Brown still chose to continue with the 
legislation. 
Rawnsley noted, as we have seen that ‘Brown began his premiership with a strong 
signal that he intended to rebuild bridges with liberal Britain by softening the 
authoritarianism of his predecessor.’ 975 He made his ‘on Liberty’ speech soon after 
becoming premier but mixed the message. 976 He sounded more disposed towards the 
civil liberties agenda than Blair had done, but still insisted that the options for further 
legislation should stay open. Announcing that there was neither a need nor a desire to 
look at extending the provision on pre-charge detention would have fitted in neatly 
with the broad message of his speeches at the time. It would certainly have fitted in 
with the Home Office activities linked to the Reid Review. Ironically, one of Brown’s 
strongest adversaries from Scottish Labour politics – Reid – could have saved him the 
embarrassment of ultimate failure on 42 days.  
Unlike the other two case studies considered in this thesis, one of the biggest problems 
that the Brown government faced was that all the pros and cons of the proposed 
legislation had already been so clearly and definitively rehearsed barely three years 
beforehand, during the debates on the 90 days provision. In particular, it took no 
account of the strength of the ‘settled will’ of the Commons on 28 days. The 
government misunderstood the importance of this earlier rebellion and the consensus 
that emerged on 28 days. Given the manner in which the government approached both 
legislation and parliament during the 42 days debate, it was clear that it had learnt 
nothing from the earlier debates on 90 days and that it was a failure of both insight and 
perception. There was almost a blend of Minkins’ ‘wilful blindness’, a collective and 
distorted version of ‘groupthink’ and silent complicity from those not at the No.10 
table but intimately linked to the policy. Of all the failure in this study, this is perhaps 
the most bizarre, in theoretical and political terms.  
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976 BBC News (2007f) Op.cit.  
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Chapter Eight  
Conclusion                                                                                                                                                      
The core of this study has been the consideration of three public policy case studies in 
which I was actively involved in my capacity as a Minister of State in the Home Office 
between 2005 and 2008. I was Minister of State for Immigration, Citizenship and 
Nationality during the first case study – the formulation and development of a points-
based system for non-EU migrants; Minister of State for Policing, Crime and 
Community Safety during the key phase of the second case study, the proposed 
mergers of the 43 forces in England and Wales into 12-15 strategic forces; and 
Minister of State for Policing, Security and Counter-Terrorism during the third case 
study, the extension of pre-charge detention provisions for terrorist suspects. 
This thesis makes a significant contribution to academic knowledge in political 
science by utilising this extensive experience as a minister to further our understanding 
of the role of ministers and the detailed decision and policy making processes of 
government. It has also highlighted some of the ways in which elements of political 
science theory can be useful. The thesis has used this experience together with a 
theoretical and methodological framework that offers a unique insight into the inner 
workings of government.  
Theoretical Framework  
I have used aspects of the three broad theoretical approaches that were discussed in 
chapter two – rational choice theory, new institutionalism and interpretivism – to 
explain and analyse the three case studies from my ‘insider’s view’. In doing so, I have 
shown the value of an academic analysis by a former participant, including how such 
a perspective brings unique insight and contributes significantly to academic 
knowledge.  
Each of these case studies has contained elements of policy that were unpopular in 
some quarters. The government’s move towards a ‘managed migration’ policy – of 
which the points-based system for non-EU migrants was a key element – has been 
described as a 
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… seeming mismatch between public demands to limit immigration on the one hand and the 
expansive policies on the other – as there was no public demand for expansion, indeed quite 
the opposite. 977 
This deliberate pursuit of a policy on immigration that was apparently so different 
from what the public wanted was hardly the policy of a party intent of maximising its 
vote at the cost of any principle.  
The government’s policy on the merger of police forces was unpopular amongst both 
police forces and the public.  The government’s self-interest should have dictated that 
the policy is not pursued at all, rather than be pursued in the face of such opposition. 
The government showed strong leadership in the wake of the 7/7 attacks in London 
and responded clearly to the public demands to do something to better protect it. But 
if the first foray into legislation to extend the provision for pre-charge detention had 
legitimacy, notwithstanding the mixed support for 90 days, the government proposal 
of revisiting the issue three years later commanded far less support and legitimacy, as 
we have seen, and cost the government a good deal of political capital.  
Rational choice theory and the assumptions behind it were not sufficient to explain 
why a government should pursue such unpopular policies. Green and Shapiro’s adage 
about the empirical limitations of such an approach seems to be valid.978 The focus on 
the individual actor – methodological individualism – simply is not enough to help 
understand the complexities of today’s political life. The role and the insight of the 
insider are absent. Hindmoor’s adaptation of Downs spatial/voter maximisation 
approach was, however, found to be useful here in explaining some of the issues in 
each case study, particularly the theoretical construction of the political centre.979 
New institutionalism was much more useful but not as a single theoretical framework. 
One aspect of new institutionalism that was useful was the notion that institutions 
change in ‘stop/go terms, identifying long periods of path dependence punctuated by 
critical junctures.’980 The notion that choices are increasingly limited, the longer an 
institution is set on a particular path, has been a useful one in the context of all three 
case studies.981  As Pierson relates, in the context of change or indeed, decision-making 
                                                 
977 Consterdine, Erica (2015) p.1434 
978 Green & Shapiro (1994) Op.cit pp.5-7 pp.202-204 
979 Hindmoor (2004) Op.cit  
980 Lowndes et al (2013) pp.202 
981 Mahoney (2000) Op.cit pp.507-548 
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inside institutions, the ‘earlier parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts’ 
– timing matters.982   
The concerns for the formal dimensions of organisational constraints  such as ‘rules 
and structures’ remain important to this thesis, but the concerns of new institutionalism 
for ‘discourse theory, narrative methodology and shades of political rhetoric’983 have 
been of more use and this shift is reflected in the analysis of the case studies.  The 
informal inside institutions matters, as do the new norms and values. As Bourdieu 
would argue ‘what is essential goes without saying because it comes without 
saying.’984  More prosaically those who say, ‘we have always done it this way around 
here’, are not always aware that they are delineating a clear set of norms and values. 
The way in which new institutionalism concentrates on how institutions remain stable 
and how they react to change has been useful, as has the notion that processes, 
procedures and structures inside organisations reflect power, politics and contestation 
– formal and informal. The link of this aspect of new institutionalism to the 
interpretivist/ethnographic approach was also of some use in this regard. 
Institutionalism can dwell too much on institutions to the detriment of individual 
actors, just as rational choice theory can do the reverse. Both, as has been suggested, 
suffer from an absence of  a detailed insider’s view. Central to the concepts of both 
path dependence and critical juncture is the notion of ‘feedback.’ I have tried to show 
that the insider knows and understands the source, value and legitimacy of such 
feedback better than most as a participant. Yet, as Foucault relates:  
If we make institutions the starting point for our analysis of power relations, we run the risk of 
seeking in the former the origin and explanation of the latter, in other words of explaining 
power in terms of power.985  
As has been seen in this analysis, political institutions in the UK polity are generally 
ineffective at feedback and reflexivity, but these concepts have been of some use in 
the analysis of the case studies. This was certainly so in the case on pre-charge 
detention. There seemed to be a very real sense in which the Brown government felt 
                                                 
982 Ibid. p.263  
983 Lowndes (2013) Op.cit pp.41-42 
984 Bourdieu (1977) Op.cit p.167 
985 Foucault, Michel (1985) ‘Deux essais sur le sujet de pouvoir’ in Dreyfus, Hubert and Rabinow, 
Paul (eds.) Michel Foucault: un parcours philosophique Gallimard, Paris p.315  
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locked into a path dependency regardless of changes to the world and the political 
environment that ended with a failed attempt at further legislation. 
The decentred approach of interpretivism and its emphasis on the informal elements 
of institutions has also proved to be very useful. Understanding both the formal and 
informal nature of government departments and the ‘hidden dimensions’ of political 
life are central to understanding the role of ministers and the processes they are 
involved in.986 Rhodes contends that interpretivism  
… takes a variously constructed world, the unintended consequences of human action and 
contingency of public affairs as its basic building blocks’ and ‘urges us to look for more and 
better ways of …. studying politics.’987  
I would agree that interpretivism does this successfully, but it only takes our 
understanding so far, and is lacking because it lacks the insight of the involved – the 
participants. This thesis fills this gap with both my own recollections and the views of 
the range of active participants that I have interviewed.  
A New Insight  
All three approaches have had something to offer in seeking to understand what 
prevailed in each of these case studies. The rich data from the interviews with key 
participants has also shed light on these events and the choices made. This, 
complemented with my insight as a participant, has influenced the theoretical, 
methodological and empirical dimensions of this thesis. The literature on policy failure 
complemented the theoretical framework. McConnell’s typology of three forms of 
policy failure – process, policy development and politics – was a useful device and 
was used to help develop and analyse the three case studies.988 My research and this 
insight were used to establish seven key factors – the seven Ps - which were common 
to each and were helpful in assessing the relative success or failure of the policy 
interventions in all three case studies. These were: 
 Process - Preparation of the political ground 
 Process - Protection of the political ground  
                                                 
986  See the concept of backstage in  Hunter, A (1995) ‘Local Knowledge and Local Power: Notes on 
the ethnography of local community elites’, in Hertz, R and Imber, J (eds.) Studying Elites Using 
Qualitative Methods, Sage, London pp.151-170 p.153-4 
987 Rhodes (2012) Op.cit  
988 McConnell (2015) Op.cit.  
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 Policy development: hiding in plain sight 
 Policy development: the missing middle 
 Policy development: joined-up government 
 Politics - Potential of a strong ministerial sponsor and Politics - 
Prime Minister and No.10 
After a core narrative was developed for each case study, I assessed each against 
these seven factors and highlighted the key elements of the relevant theory. This 
allowed me to draw conclusions specific to each case study, but also to establish 
some broader themes across the three case studies, as shown in Figure 8:1. 
I have also shown how there are key overarching factors – electoral and temporal 
processes and political pressures that need to be taken into account.  
Key Problems  
Notwithstanding the fact that there were elements of success within each of the 
three areas considered within the case studies, the ultimate conclusion must be that 
they each failed to achieve their policy ambitions. By the end of the Labour 
government in 2010, there was not a clear and positive narrative around asylum 
and immigration rooted in a points-based system; there were not 12-15 strategic 
police forces replacing 43 forces of various sizes and capabilities; and there was 
not a provision to detain terrorists suspects for up to 42 days before charging them.  
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As we have seen, there were specific problems and outcomes relating to each case 
study, and it is these, as set out in Table 8:1, that are now reviewed, before looking 
at some of the themes common to each case study.  
The key problem in the immigration case study was one of political will. The shift 
to a more liberal managed migration system was short-lived – Reid and No.10 
were determined to move away from this critical shift in policy as a result of the 
public and media-driven discontent around the Foreign National Prisoners issue. 
There was an  absence of a substantive and integrated narrative on a complex 
policy that was focussed on  the government’s message on asylum, immigration 
and the EU/A8 issue. In the end, this absence left the government little choice but 
to opt for either the coercive or liberal model, rather than pursue a more complex 
hybrid model. Ultimately, then, the failure of this policy was a failure of political 
will. It was what McConnell would term a ‘outright failure.’989 The policy failed, 
even though it was successful in some minimal respects. Minimal because 
although the points-based system for non-EU migrants has worked successfully, it 
did not, and could not, achieve ‘the goals that proponents set out to achieve’ 
because of the absence of both a comprehensive and integrated policy and an 
equally comprehensive and detailed narrative. Its failure outweighs this limited 
success and the overall policy, immigration, remains a political liability and 
‘opposition is great and/or support is virtually non-existent.’990 Essentially the 
policy failed on all three counts – process, policy and politics.  
More work on why this happened is needed. As the research moves beyond the 
internal machinations of the government to the broader policy discourse, the use 
of frameworks such as rhetorical policy analysis and discourse analysis would be 
valuable.991 Analysing the rhetorical context, the rhetorical argument and the 
rhetorical effects of the speeches around the issue of immigration and the managed 
migration system would increase our insight into what happened.992 As Atkins and 
Finlayson would have it  
                                                 
989 McConnell (2015) Op.cit. p237 
990 Ibid p.237 
991 On rhetorical political analysis see Atkins and Finlayson (2013) pp.161-177; Finlayson (2007) 
pp545-563; Martin (2013) Op.cit pp.25-42. 
992 See Martin (2013) Op.cit pp.25-42 
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…rhetorical analysis … exposes the symbolic, ritualised aspect of contemporary political 
and ideological practices, the understanding of which requires the integration of rhetorical 
and performance theories.993 
Using rhetorical analysis in this way, together with using rhetoric to construct the 
narrative, as is necessary in Hindmoor’s cycle, would give further insight into how 
the government failed. It would also help explain how it failed to counter the signs 
of resistance from Jennings’ and Stoker’s ‘backwater’ communities. This failure 
led to the dropping of the liberal managed migration policy and employing a 
coercive migration model and a strongly coercive rhetoric. Such analysis should 
increase our capacity to understand the continuing bifurcation of the UK which 
has ultimately led to Brexit.  
The key problem with the police mergers initiative was that, in the end, as one of 
the participants related, there were ‘too many reasons to say no’.994 In other words, 
too few people had a stake in the success of the policy and too many wanted to see 
it fail because it challenged other policies that they valued more. There was an 
absence of sufficient policy advocates and entrepreneurs. It was ultimately a 
failure of policy preparation, a failure of securing the necessary support for the 
option chosen, largely because it was imposed from above. The imposition from 
above, however, meant that the Home Office was locked into a path dependence 
that had no scope for ‘increasing returns’ or ‘reactive sequences.’ The Home 
Secretary had created a self-imposed, closed path that allowed for no feedback or 
option for change and took no account of surrounding influences of 
circumstances.995 It was a  ‘conflicted failure’, that is, it failure to achieve goals is 
‘fairly evenly matched with [the] attainment of goals, with strong criticism and 
strong defence in roughly equal measure.’996 The process and politics failed, but 
there was some limited success in terms of police forces collaborating much more 
readily.  
Although much has changed in the police environment, the argument for the 
merger of police forces remains a compelling one. A forensic look at why the 
                                                 
993Atkins, Judi and Finlayson, Alan (2014) ‘“As Shakespeare So Memorably Said” ….: Quotation, 
Rhetoric and the Performance of Politics.’  Political Studies doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12156 pp.1-
18 p.1. 
994 Interview with Author 2016-2017 (F10) 
995 See for further detail  Capoccia and Keleman (2007) Op.cit pp.341-369 ; Mahoney (2000) Op.cit 
pp.507-548; Pierson (2000) Op.cit pp.251-267 
996 McConnell (2015) Op.cit. p.237  
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Home Office resisted the ‘missing middle’ would be useful. This would not just 
be about the recalcitrance of Clarke to look at any other option, but also the failure 
of allies such as ACPO to deliver their support. Most officials involved in the 
policy making process were clear that collaboration, lead forces and other options, 
discussed above, should have been exhausted before the imposition of mergers. A 
more detailed application of models such as that offered by Mahoney and Pierson’s 
work would help us to understand this particular form of path dependence – the 
self-imposed one.  
The key problem with the pre-charge detention proposal was that nobody said no 
to the Prime Minister. There was an absence of an understanding about how 
different the world was in 2008 compared with 2005 – in particular, the many 
positive advances in the area of counter-terrorism. There was an absence of 
explanation about how important the earlier vote on 28 days was to the Commons 
and to Labour’s own MPs. Essentially, there was an absence of an assessment of 
the policy legacy that the new Prime Minister inherited in this area.  
The ‘headline’ story in 2005 would have been 90 days and the defeat in Parliament, 
but any assessment of the non-legislative policy implementation since then would 
have contextualised the 90 days defeat and noted that 28 days had been a success. 
The  absence of such an assessment clearly influenced the nature of the review of 
policy options and choices. Given that ‘the moment at which a policy entrepreneur 
attempts to promote a policy alternative is crucial in determining its level of 
political influence,’997 matters become complicated when it seems the chief 
political influence is also the policy entrepreneur. The absence of a rigorous review 
of options meant that a new legislative foray would prove to be a re-run of 
essentially the same debate and would end in ignominious failure.  
Ultimately, it was a failure of insight and perception, not just by No.10 and the 
Prime Minister, but also collectively by government. There had been opportunities 
to ensure that events would have turned out differently, as we have seen, but they 
were not taken. In terms of McConnell’s forms of failure, it was a ‘tolerable 
failure’, but only because of the 90-day debate that had gone before. Although it 
cost significant political capital, failure was tolerable because it did not 
                                                 
997 Béland (2005) Op.cit pp. 10-11 
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‘fundamentally impeded the attainment of goals that proponents set out to 
achieve.’998 These gaols were achieved by the implementation of the Reid Review 
which proceeded unimpeded by the unnecessary foray into legislation.  
The legacy of the Labour government in the context of counter-terrorism policy 
should be considered a good one. Certainly, by the end of the government’s term 
in 2010, the country’s capability and capacity to deal with terrorist threats was far 
better than it was in 1997 or in the immediate wake of 2001. Yet, the key legacy 
is usually reported as the government that wanted 90 days detention – and then 
sought to impose 42 days detention. As a direct result of the government own 
failures, much of this good solid work was ignored. In terms of research, it would 
be useful to look further at how governments often mistake legislation for action. 
As this case study has shown, the most significant developments since the vote on 
28 days in 2005, were both non-legislative and successful. This is an important 
lesson.  
Some Common Themes  
In addition to the seven factors identified above which were significant in each of 
the case studies, five common themes are worthy of highlighting : 
 Construction  
 Persuasion 
 Feedback  
 Path Dependence  
 Timing 
 
Construction  
A common feature evident in all three case studies was the absence of a strong 
narrative by government  – the story it had to tell on each issue.999 This is linked 
to the ‘preparing the ground’ and ‘protecting the ground’ variables in the schematic 
analytical framework at Figure 8:1, above, which was discussed in detail in chapter 
two. The managed migration narrative was detailed and complex and failed 
because its coercive dimensions were too often favoured over the more liberal 
dimensions, as has been seen in chapter five. The police mergers’ narrative failed 
                                                 
998 McConnell (2015) Op.cit. p.237 
999  Bevir and Rhodes (2012) Op.cit pp.201-208 pp.205-206 
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because it was not rooted in what had been a very strong story of police reform up 
to that time – especially neighbourhood policing.  The pre-charge detention 
narrative failed because it ignored a whole range of policy advances in the area of 
counter-terrorism and concentrated simply on the legislation. This was probably 
the most troubling omission as, following the Reid Review, the government had a 
very strong story to tell in counter-terrorism policy. 
More research needs to be carried out on the backdrop of successful policies.  
Kingdon’s policy framework and processes approach could usefully be employed 
here.1000 How have governments prepared the ground for policies that have been 
successfully implemented? How much is there really the notion of evidence-based 
policy rather than policy-based evidence?  
My experience as in insider participant and now as a researcher would lead me to 
an analysis of two areas of successful policymaking which I was involved with. 
The first would be research into the successful negotiation with the Treasury to 
secure a £3 billion credit line for Transport for London which allowed it to make 
the necessary improvements to London’s transport infrastructure to make an 
Olympic bid viable. The second would be research into the cross-government 
support necessary to establish the success of that Olympic bid, when I was again 
involved as a Transport Minister and had to present to the Internal Olympic 
Committee assessing London’s bid. Research into why both these examples were 
successful would aid our understanding and learning.   
Persuasion  
In each area, there was little attempt to persuade the public about the enormity of 
the changes that the government was seeking to make. This links to the three 
‘policy development’ variables in the framework at Figure 8:1, above. Given the 
profound nature of the changes proposed in each area, greater thought should have 
been given to conveying the message. Of course, this was hindered by the 
inefficacy of the narrative process. In immigration, the media was allowed to 
dictate terms and the government shifted into defensive and reactive mode; in 
police mergers, the government had managed to give the key opponents to the 
                                                 
1000  Kingdon (1995) Op.cit   
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policy – the APA – a key weapon in its the defence of local policing; in counter-
terrorism, the government seemed to think it could depend on the strength of 
argument around security issues and the ‘honeymoon period’ of the new Prime 
Minister.   
This theme is also linked to the variables at Figure 8:1 above, concerning both a 
strong ministerial sponsor and the role of No.10. The failure of immigration policy 
turned on losing a strong ministerial sponsor, Clarke, and a shift in commitment 
from No.10, in particular Blair, and the new Home Secretary, Reid. It remains 
unclear how much of the police mergers’ policy would have been pushed through 
if Clarke remained at the Home Office, but its cause was certainly weakened by 
his departure. Blair’s control of the first pre-charge detention debate was an 
example of how a strong ministerial sponsor can push a policy through, as was 
Reid’s command of counter-terrorism policy as Home Secretary. However, 
Brown’s subsequent intervention was ultimately dysfunctional and failed to 
persuade. Victory in the Commons was not sufficient for this policy to succeed.  
Rhetorical policy analysis could again be useful here. As we have seen, the 
discourse of policy is often as important as the context and development of policy. 
There is an increasing blurring of the lines between the use of language and the 
use of policy, an increasing lack of distinction between the substance of policy and 
the rhetoric used to persuade the public of its virtues. There needs to be a 
rehabilitation of the notion of ‘spin’ so it is perceived as a legitimate element of 
the policy process, as Hindmoor would have it, and an understanding that Riddell’s 
‘spin gap’ is the fault of the politicians, not the public.1001 
Feedback 
In each of the case studies, the misunderstanding of feedback was frequent and 
significant. In the points-based system, there was a complete overuse of the 
coercive dimension in response to both media and public disquiet in the issue of 
both asylum and immigration. Given the complexity of the narrative, every time 
                                                 
1001 Riddell (2005) Op.cit. See also Daddow (2011) Op.cit  pp. 41-43 
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the coercive dimension was used on any aspect of the broad area – asylum, 
immigration and EU migration – it diminished the liberal message and heightened 
its apparent problematic nature.  
In the area of police mergers, there were problems both internally and from 
external stakeholders. The Home Office failed to understand the negative or 
indeed, recognise the meaning of, absent feedback from other government 
departments. Further, it misunderstood the growing animosity to the policy, led by 
the APA, across all stakeholders. There was little or no attempt to overcome these 
problems or even to consider how they might have been overcome  – indeed, the 
chosen policy process exacerbated them.  
On pre-charge detention, the government did not recognise the depth of ownership 
that the Commons felt towards the 28 days consensus in the first debate. The centre 
– No.10 – completely misunderstood how all the non-legislative advances in the 
government’s counterterrorism capability and capacity pre-empted the need for 
revisiting the issue of legislation at all. More detailed preparation would have 
ensured both these elements were picked up more clearly in the feedback.  
The feedback loop remains one of the weakest elements of the UK polity. How we 
assess the success and failures of public policy remains very important and more 
work needs to be undertaken. A detailed look at what the crisis management 
literature would be a useful way forward – although much of the substantive 
political science work is in foreign affairs.  
Path dependence 
Strong governments clearly know what they want to do and how to do it – and get 
on with it, but decisions already made influence decisions yet to come. Sometimes, 
however, governments get locked into policy processes that are path dependent 
and there is an increasing absence of choices as the path evolves.1002 This is similar 
to Minkins’s ‘wilful blindness’1003, and is not dissimilar to some aspects of the 
notion of groupthink.1004  
                                                 
1002 Pierson (2000) Op.cit pp.263-264 
1003 Minkin (2014) Op.cit  p.709-710  
1004 Stern, Eric and Sundelius, Bengt ‘The Essence of Groupthink’ Mershon International Studies 
Review Vol.38, No.1 pp.101-107 and  ‘t Hart (1990) Op.cit  
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It is the notion that policy makers get ‘locked in’ to policy directions that they 
cannot escape, even if they wanted to – sometimes because of events beyond their 
control, sometimes because of their own choices and sometimes in reaction to 
other individuals or events. All of this occurred within the context of the seven 
‘Ps’ discussed above that I have used in analysing the case studies. When first 
elected the government was locked into a coercive view on asylum and then 
struggled between the two polar opposites of coercive and liberal views on 
immigration as well as asylum  – in response to both the media and the public. It 
could have locked in a positive narrative and policy framework on asylum and 
immigration, but the government did not have enough confidence in developing 
the complex, integrating both the coercive and liberal elements, necessary  to 
follow that path. Blair was focussed on the end of his term, Brown on the start of 
his and the subsequently on the 2008 crisis.  
Mergers were the only response to O’Connor’s report because that is what the 
Home Office, led by Clarke, was locked into. There was no scope for the 
development of alternative responses to O’Connor. The Home Office developed 
an ‘excessive anticipatory compliance’ in this area as Clarke was so attached to it 
and became locked into a self-imposed, closed path dependence that was 
dysfunctional and ultimately failed.1005 Similarly, Brown was locked into a 
legislative response path oblivious to the development of counter-terrorism 
policies and enhanced capacity in every area except legislation. The last policy 
intervention required was legislation – not least because of the development of all 
other aspects of the policy.  
Timing 
In each of the case studies, there is a key moment in the political cycle that has 
been misconstrued. In the immigration case study, the sacking of Clarke marked a 
turning-point in the development of the government’s narrative. Faced with the 
choice to respond to events with an instant reversion to coercive policies or to stick 
with the development of an integrated liberal policy, Blair chose the former. 
Arguably he had more concerns for the last year of his government than he did for 
                                                 
1005 ‘t Hart (1990) Op.cit pp.177-178 
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the durability of the government, which had four years to run, and its immigration 
policy. 
In the police mergers case study, the focus of the development of the policy was 
the then Home Secretary, Clarke and clearly the demise of Clarke spelt the end of 
the policy. It did not have to, but by then both Reid, the new incumbent, and the 
PM, had had enough of the opposition they faced with the policy. The policy did 
not have to fail because it lost its key sponsor, but it the timing of Clarke’s demise 
was central to its ultimate demise.  
In terms of the 42 days pre-charge detention case study, the timing of the end of 
the Blair era and the start of the Brown government was central to both its 
development and the ultimate failure of the legislation. Indeed, it could be argued 
that the only reason that the legislative path was even considered was because of 
the change in Prime Minister. 
In each case, the importance of the timing of key developments – not least changes 
in senior personnel – in the political processes and broader electoral and temporal 
pressures cannot be underestimated.  
These common themes highlight the complexities of the decision-making role of 
ministers and the processes that they use to determine policy. Together with the 
overall findings of each case study, they also accentuate the importance of the 
insider perspective that I bring to these narratives. The academic synthesis of my 
own personal experiences as a minster, the elements of each of the theories 
discussed and the interviews with some of the key participants have provided 
complex insights that are both unique and add to the sum of our academic 
knowledge through a contribution to theoretical and empirical advance of political 
science. All three of these areas could have been successes for the government, but 
for various reasons, they all turned into policy failures.   
Concluding remarks  
The role of the minister is central to the efficacy of government. The decisions 
ministers make on a daily basis are crucial to the success or failure of policies. 
Policies do not drop out of the sky – they are constructed. They are constructed, 
usually, through exhaustive processes of policy making and decision making. 
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Once decided upon, policies need to be ‘promoted and sold’ to the public as 
suggested, in Hindmoor’s cycle of policy and position, creativity, spin and choice.  
Considering the case studies against Hindmoor’s cycle shows some successes in 
each policy area – but no real, long-term policy success.  The points-based system 
for immigration has controlled the level of non-EU migration is a significant way, 
but the Labour Party is no nearer developing a comprehensive view or positive 
policy on immigration and asylum now than it was, however fleetingly, in 2005. 
The police mergers’ debate prompted limited moves to collaboration and shared 
services by the 43 police forces, but there has been no appetite for the merger of 
police forces in England and Wales and there have not been any since 2008, 
although the Scottish forces merged in to one national force in 2012. The original 
debate on 90 days gave the government an extension of 28 days that was used 
during the Overt crisis and prompted a wider debate on counterterrorism 
legislation, but the 42 days debate marked the end of public debate on pre-charge 
detention and the Coalition Government dropped the provision back to 14 days in 
2011. There is unlikely to be any attempt to review this in the future.1006 However, 
the legacy of the Labour Government in terms of counter-terrorism has provided 
a framework and capacity that are much more durable and robust than what existed 
in 1997. This was a real and lasting success - the legislative proposals were 
ephemeral.  
One of the underlying themes of this thesis has been the relationship between 
political science and politics and whether or not they can have the dialogical 
relationship that Béland identifies between policy paradigms and alternatives;1007 
that Rhodes sees between observer and the observed;1008 and that Diamond argues 
can and should happen.1009  This thesis has shown that all three can be satisfied 
and that politics can indeed inform political science and political science can 
inform politics.  
                                                 
1006 House of Commons Library (2012) Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorism Cases, Alexander 
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1009 Diamond (2011) Op.cit p.150 
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It has highlighted both the strengths and frailties of crucial policy and decision-
making processes in these three key areas and the role of ministers within them. 
The result has been a study that brings both analysis and insight from a unique 
perspective to political science. Further work is required in taking forward the 
synthesis of Hindmoor’s adaptation of the Downsian model; the path dependence 
model and the interpretivist approach to explain the construction of not only of 
policy-making processes but also of the political narratives. This thesis has 
reinforced the importance of narratives – especially in times of crisis, such as 7/7, 
and the relevance of potential critical junctures, such those within the point-based 
system and a managed migration system.  
More forensic work needs to be carried out in the areas underpinning narratives, 
such as the construction and persuasion elements of the process, as Hindmoor 
outlines, and the central use of devices such as rhetoric. But the development of a 
stronger understanding of these internal processes and the role of narratives would 
be better served if there could be more use of the views of political insiders – both 
elected and appointed.  
This thesis has shown the value of exploiting the role and experience of the 
participant. There needs to be more attempts to capture the difference that 
individuals can make to an understanding political processes. I remain convinced 
that no one school of thought has a monopoly on how best to learn from these case 
studies – and have become a determined bricoleur. A pragmatic researcher who, 
to paraphrase Rhodes, ‘will employ a ragbag of tools’ to recover, discover and 
explain meaning – from the ontological perspective of the participant as well as 
the researcher.1010 The interpretivist approach has been the most useful, not least 
because it holds that ‘beliefs and practices are constitutive of each other… that 
meanings and beliefs are holistic … and human cation is historically 
contingent.’1011 Only by a detailed understanding of the key elements – such as the 
processes, the narrative, the rhetoric and the insider’s perspective – can political 
science offer insight and advice to the political world.   
                                                 
1010 Rhodes (2014) Op.cit p.326 
1011 Rhodes, Rod A.W. (ed.) (2018) Narrative Policy Analysis: Cases in Decentred Policy  
Palgrave-Macmillan Houndsmills Basingstoke pp.3-5 
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If the Labour government had had more finely tuned and developed narratives, 
rooted in coherent policies, then its message in each of these areas would have 
been more effective. Had this happened, the political landscape facing the country 
today might have been very different, at least in terms of  Jennings and Stoker’s 
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘backwater’ communities, the 2016 referendum and, of course, 
the impending dystopia that is Brexit.  
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Appendix One  
Table One :  Immigration and related government policy and legislation activity 1997-
20101012 
 
Policy/Legislation   Year 
Fairer, faster and firmer: A modern approach to 
immigration and asylum 
White Paper 1998 
Human Rights Act Act of Parliament 1998 
Immigration and Asylum Act Act of Parliament 1999 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act Act of Parliament 2000 
Full and equal citizens: a strategy to integrate refugees Policy strategy 2000 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act Act of Parliament 2001 
Secure borders, safe havens: Integration with diversity 
in modern Britain 
White Paper 2002 
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act  Act of Parliament 2002 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, 
etc.) Act 
Act of Parliament 2004 
Controlling our borders: Making migration work for 
Britain 
Five Year 
Departmental Plan 
2005 
Improving Opportunity, strengthening society: the 
government’s strategy to increase race equality and 
community cohesion 
Policy strategy 2005 
Prevention of Terrorism Act Act of Parliament 2005 
Integration matters: the national integration strategy 
for refugees 
Policy strategy 2005 
Selective Admission: Making Migration Work in 
Britain  
A points-based system: making migration work for 
Britain 
Consultation 
document 
White paper 
2005 
 
2006 
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act Act of Parliament 2006 
Identity Cards Act Act of Parliament 2006 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act Act of Parliament 2006 
Fair, effective, transparent and trusted: rebuilding 
confidence in our immigration system 
Policy Strategy 2006 
Enforcing the rules: a strategy to ensure and enforce 
compliance with our immigration laws 
Policy Strategy 2007 
UK Borders Act Act of Parliament 2007 
Counter-Terrorism Act Act of Parliament 2008 
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act Act of Parliament 2009 
 
                                                 
1012 Adapted from Somerville (2007) Op.cit Table 2, p.24. Updated by author 
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Table Two : Key Government Initiatives towards managed migration and the building 
blocks of a points-based system 1997-20081013 
Policy/Speech/Initiative   Department  Year 
Primary Purpose Rules dropped Home Office  1997 
Government opt-out of Treaty of Amsterdam FCO/No.10 1997 
Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy DTI 1998 
Prime Minister’s Initiative on International Education (PMI) DfEE/No.10 1999 
Innovators Scheme introduced  Home Office 2000 
Roche Speech on managed migration  Home Office  2000 
Work Permit criteria reduced  DfEE 2000 
Work Permits UK moved to Home Office Home Office 2001 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) quota increased 
to 15,200 places 
Home Office 2001 
Home Office/Performance and Innovation Unit research paper on 
migration published  
Home Office/No.10 2001 
Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HMSP) introduced  Home Office 2002 
UK Government decides on no transitional controls for A8 nations 
in 2004 
FCO/No.10 2002 
SAWS quota increased to 25,000 Home Office 2003 
Sector-Based Schemes (SBS) introduced – hospitality and catering  Home Office 2003 
Working Holiday Makers Scheme liberalised Home Office 2003 
Accession of A8 nations into EU FCO/No.10/Home 
Office 
2004 
Blair speech on migration on run-up to election No.10 2005 
PMI2 renewed for further six years/ SBS closed  Home Office/No.10 2006 
Migration Advisory Committee and Migration Impact Forum 
created/ A2 accession  
Home Office 2007 
Points based system operational Home Office 2008 
 
 
 
                                                 
Source: Adapted from Consterdine, Erica (2014), Appendix One, pp.242-243 and updated/modified by author.   
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Appendix Two  
Ministerial History 
 
I held the assorted posts in the 1997-2010 government.  
2008-2009 Department of Work and Pensions  
Minister of State, Employment and Welfare Reform, Minister for London, attendance at 
Cabinet 
2005-2008 Home Office  
2006-08 Minister of State for Policing, Crime, Security and Counter-Terrorism,   
2005-2006 Minister of State for Immigration, Nationality and Citizenship  
2003-2005  Department for Transport  
2004-2005 Minister of State for Transport – Railways  
2003-2004 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
2002-2003 Office of the Deputy Prime Minister  
2002-2003 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State - Planning, Housing, Regeneration and 
Minister for London  
1999-2002  Her Majesty’s Government Whips Office  
2001-2002 Lords Commissioner (Senior Whip) Cabinet Office,  
1999-2001 Assistant Whip. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
1997- 1999 Department for Education and Employment Principal Parliamentary Secretary – 
PPS (Higher Education) to Secretary of State for Education, the Right Honourable David 
Blunkett MP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
